SILENT RISK

Lectures on Fat Tails, (Anti)Fragility, Precaution, and Asymmetric Exposures

BY

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"Empirical evidence that the boat is safe". Risk is both precautionary (fragility based) and evidentiary (statistical based); it is too serious a business to be left to mechanistic users of probability theory. This book attempts a scientific "nonsucker" approach to risk and probability. Courtesy George Nasr.

IN WHICH IS PROVIDED A MATHEMATICAL PARALLEL VERSION OF THE AUTHOR’S INCERTO, WITH DERIVATIONS, EXAMPLES, GRAPHS, THEOREMS, AND HEURISTICS, WITH THE AIM OF OFFERING A NON-BS APPROACH TO RISK AND PROBABILITY, UNDER THE EUPHEMISM "THE REAL WORLD".

PRELIMINARY INCOMPLETE DRAFT FOR ERROR DETECTION
Abstract

The book provides a mathematical framework for decision making and the analysis of (consequential) hidden risks, those tail events undetected or improperly detected by statistical machinery; and substitutes fragility as a more reliable measure of exposure. Model error is mapped as risk, even tail risk.

Risks are seen in tail events rather than in the variations; this necessarily links them mathematically to an asymmetric response to intensity of shocks, convex or concave.

The difference between "models" and "the real world" ecologies lies largely in an additional layer of uncertainty that typically (because of the same asymmetric response by small probabilities to additional uncertainty) thickens the tails and invalidates all probabilistic tail risk measurements — models, by their very nature of reduction, are vulnerable to a chronic underestimation of the tails.

So tail events are not measurable; but the good news is that exposure to tail events is. In "Fat Tail Domains" (Extremistan), tail events are rarely present in past data: their statistical presence appears too late, and time series analysis is similar to sending troops after the battle. Hence the concept of fragility is introduced: is one vulnerable (i.e., asymmetric) to model error or model perturbation (seen as an additional layer of uncertainty)?

Part I looks at the consequences of fat tails, mostly in the form of slowness of convergence of measurements under the law of large number: some claims require 400 times more data than thought. Shows that much of the statistical techniques used in social sciences are either inconsistent or incompatible with probability theory. It also explores some errors in the social science literature about moments (confusion between probability and first moment, etc.)

Part II proposes a more realistic approach to risk measurement: fragility as nonlinear (concave) response, and explores nonlinearities and their statistical consequences. Risk management would consist in building structures that are not negatively asymmetric, that is both "robust" to both model error and tail events. Antifragility is a convex response to perturbations of a certain class of variables.
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Chapter Summaries

1 Risk and decision theory as related to the real world (that is "no BS"). Introduces the idea of fragility as a response to volatility, the associated notion of convex heuristic, the problem of invisibility of the probability distribution and the spirit of the book. Why risk is in the tails not in the variations. 19

2 Introducing mathematical formulations of fat tails. Shows how the problem of induction gets worse. Empirical risk estimator. Introduces different heuristics to "fatten" tails. Where do the tails start? Sampling error and convex payoffs. 39

3 Using the asymptotic Radon-Nikodym derivatives of probability measures, we construct a formal methodology to avoid the "masquerade problem" namely that standard "empirical" tests are not empirical at all and can be fooled by fat tails, though not by thin tails, as a fat tailed distribution (which requires a lot more data) can masquerade as a low-risk one, but not the reverse. Remarkably this point is the statistical version of the logical asymmetry between evidence of absence and absence of evidence. We put some refinement around the notion of "failure to reject", as it may misapply in some situations. We show how such tests as Kolmogorov Smirnoff, Anderson-Darling, Jarque-Bera, Mardia Kurtosis, and others can be gamed and how our ranking rectifies the problem. 79

4 The Spectrum Between Uncertainty and Risk. There has been a bit of discussions about the distinction between "uncertainty" and "risk". We believe in gradation of uncertainty at the level of the probability distribution itself (a "meta" or higher order of uncertainty.) One end of the spectrum, "Knightian risk", is not available for us mortals in the real world. We show how the effect on fat tails and on the calibration of tail exponents and reveal inconsistencies in models such as Markowitz or those used for intertemporal discounting (as many violations of "rationality" aren’t violations. 93

5 The Law of Large Numbers and The Central Limit Theorem are the foundation of statistical knowledge: The behavior of the sum of random variables allows us to get to the asymptote and use handy asymptotic properties, that is, Platonic distributions. But the problem is that in the real world we never get to the asymptote, we just get “close”. Some distributions get close quickly, others very slowly (even if the do converge in the end). We require less fat tails than...
6 We apply the results of the previous chapter on the slowness of the LLN and list misapplication of statistics in social science, almost all of them linked to misinterpretation of the effects of fat-tailedness (and often from lack of awareness of fat tails), and how by attribute substitution researchers can substitute one measure for another. Why for example, because of chronic small-sample effects, the 80/20 is milder in-sample (less fat-tailed) than in reality and why regression rarely works. ........................................ 127

7 There are serious statistical differences between predictions, bets, and exposures that have a yes/no type of payoff, the “binaries”, and those that have varying payoffs, which we call standard, multi-payoff (or "variables"). Real world exposures tend to belong to the multi-payoff category, and are poorly captured by binaries. Yet much of the economics and decision making literature confuses the two. variables exposures are sensitive to Black Swan effects, model errors, and prediction problems, while the binaries are largely immune to them. The binaries are mathematically tractable, while the variables are much less so. Hedging variables exposures with binary bets can be disastrous—and because of the human tendency to engage in attribute substitution when confronted by difficult questions,decision-makers and researchers often confuse the variable for the binary. ................................. 154

8 Error about Errors. Probabilistic representations require the inclusion of model (or representation) error (a probabilistic statement has to have an error rate), and, in the event of such treatment, one also needs to include second, third and higher order errors (about the methods used to compute the errors) and by a regress argument, to take the idea to its logical limit, one should be continuously reapplying the thinking all the way to its limit unless when one has a reason to stop, as a declared a priori that escapes quantitative and statistical method. We show how power laws emerge from nested errors on errors of the standard deviation for a Gaussian distribution. We also show under which regime regressed errors lead to non-power law fat-tailed distributions. ........ 165

9 We present case studies around the point that, simply, some models depend quite a bit on small variations in parameters. The effect on the Gaussian is easy to gauge, and expected. But many believe in power laws as panacea. Even if one believed the r.v. was power law distributed, one still would not be able to make a precise statement on tail risks. Shows weaknesses of calibration of Extreme Value Theory. ........................................ 179

10 Much of the work concerning martingales and Brownian motion has been idealized; we look for holes and pockets of mismatch to reality, with consequences. Infinite moments are not compatible with Ito calculus —outside the asymptote. Path dependence as a measure of fragility. ................................. 191
12 Standard economic theory makes an allowance for the agency problem, but not the compounding of moral hazard in the presence of informational opacity, particularly in what concerns high-impact events in fat tailed domains (under slow convergence for the law of large numbers). Nor did it look at exposure as a filter that removes nefarious risk takers from the system so they stop harming others. But the ancients did; so did many aspects of moral philosophy. We propose a global and morally mandatory heuristic that anyone involved in an action which can possibly generate harm for others, even probabilistically, should be required to be exposed to some damage, regardless of context. While perhaps not sufficient, the heuristic is certainly necessary hence mandatory. It is supposed to counter voluntary and involuntary risk hiding and risk transfer in the tails. We link the rule to various philosophical approaches to ethics and moral luck.

13 Deeper into the conflation between a random variable and exposure to it.

14 We provide a mathematical definition of fragility and antifragility as negative or positive sensitivity to a semi-measure of dispersion and volatility (a variant of negative or positive "vega") and examine the link to nonlinear effects. We integrate model error (and biases) into the fragile or antifragile context. Unlike risk, which is linked to psychological notions such as subjective preferences (hence cannot apply to a coffee cup) we offer a measure that is universal and concerns any object that has a probability distribution (whether such distribution is known or, critically, unknown). We propose a detection of fragility, robustness, and antifragility using a single "fast-and-frugal", model-free, probability free heuristic that also picks up exposure to model error. The heuristic lends itself to immediate implementation, and uncovers hidden risks related to company size, forecasting problems, and bank tail exposures (it explains the forecasting biases). While simple to implement, it improves on stress testing and bypasses the common flaws in Value-at-Risk.

15 The literature of heavy tails starts with a random walk and finds mechanisms that lead to fat tails under aggregation. We follow the inverse route and show how starting with fat tails we get to thin-tails from the probability distribution of the response to a random variable. We introduce a general dose-response curve show how the left and right-boundedness of the response in natural things leads to thin-tails, even when the "underlying" variable of the exposure is fat-tailed.

16 We extract the effect of size on the degradation of the expectation of a random variable, from nonlinear response. The method is general and allows to show the "small is beautiful" or "decentralized is effective" or "a diverse ecology is safer" effect from a response to a stochastic stressor and prove stochastic diseconomies of scale and concentration (with as example the Irish potato famine and GMOs). We apply the methodology to environmental harm using standard sigmoid dose-response to show the need to split sources of pollution across independent.

17 Information is convex to noise. The paradox is that increase in sample size magnifies the role of noise (or luck); it makes tail values even more extreme. There are several problems associated with big data, and their impact on variability...
18 The one percent of the one percent has tail properties such that the tail wealth
(expectation $\int_{K}^{\infty} x p(x) \, dx$) depends far more on inequality than wealth. . . . . 273
19 Explains why the fragile is necessarily in the nonlinear. Examines nonlinearities
in medicine /iatrogenics as a risk management problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
This author travelled two careers in the opposite of the usual directions:

1) **From risk taking to probability:** I came to deepening my studies of probability and did doctoral work during and after trading derivatives and volatility packages and maturing a certain bottom-up organic view of probability and probability distributions. The episode lasted for 21 years, interrupted in its middle for doctoral work. Indeed, volatility and derivatives (under the condition of skin in the game) are a great stepping stone into probability: much like driving a car at a speed of 600 mph (or even 6,000 mph) is a great way to understand its vulnerabilities.

But this book goes beyond derivatives as it addresses probability problems in general, and only those that are generalizable,

and

2) **From practical essays (under the cover of "philosophical") to specialized work:** I only started publishing technical approaches (outside specialized option related matters) after publishing nontechnical "philosophical and practical" ones, though on the very same subject.

But the philosophical (or practical) essays and the technical derivations were written synchronously, not in sequence, largely in an idiosyncratic way, what the mathematician Marco Avellaneda called "private mathematical language", of which this is the translation – in fact the technical derivations for *The Black Swan*[66] and *Antifragile*[67] were started long before the essay form. So it took twenty years to mature the ideas and techniques of fragility and nonlinear response, the notion of probability as less rigorous than "exposure" for decision making, and the idea that "truth space" requires different types of logic than "consequence space", one built on asymmetries.

Risk takers view the world very differently from most academic users of probability and industry risk analysts, largely because the notion of "skin in the game" imposes a certain type of rigor and skepticism about we call further down cosmetic "job-market" science.

Risk is a serious business and it is high time that those who learned about it via risk-taking have something not "anecdotal" to say about the subject.
This author is currently teaching a course with the absurd title "risk management and decision-making in the real world", a title he has selected himself; this is a total absurdity since risk management and decision making should never have to justify being about the real world, and what’s worse, one should never be apologetic about it.

In "real" disciplines, titles like "Safety in the Real World", "Biology and Medicine in the Real World" would be lunacies. But in social science all is possible as there is no exit from the gene pool for blunders, nothing to check the system, no skin in the game for researchers. You cannot blame the pilot of the plane or the brain surgeon for being "too practical", not philosophical enough; those who have done so have exited the gene pool. The same applies to decision making under uncertainty and incomplete information. The other absurdity in is the common separation of risk and decision making, since risk taking requires reliability, hence our motto:

**It is more rigorous to take risks one understands than try to understand risks one is taking.**

And the real world is about incompleteness: incompleteness of understanding, representation, information, etc., what one does when one does not know what’s going on, or when there is a non-zero chance of not knowing what’s going on. It is based on focus on the unknown, not the production of mathematical certainties based on weak assumptions; rather measure the robustness of the exposure to the unknown, which can be done mathematically through metamodel (a model that examines the effectiveness and reliability of the model), what we call metaprobability, even if the meta-approach to the model is not strictly probabilistic.

**Real world and "academic" don’t necessarily clash.** Luckily there is a profound literature on satisficing and various decision-making heuristics, starting with Herb Simon and continuing through various traditions delving into ecological rationality, [61], [29], [71]: in fact Leonard Savage’s difference between small and large worlds will be the basis of Part I, which we can actually map mathematically.

The good news is that the real world is about exposures, and exposures are asymmetric, leading us to a new perspective (1) probability is about bounds and (2) the asymmetry
Acknowledgements

The text is not entirely that of the author. Four chapters contain recycled text written with collaborators in standalone articles: the late Benoit Mandelbrot (section of slowness of LLN under power laws, even with finite variance), Elie Canetti and the stress-testing staff at the International Monetary Fund (for the heuristic to detect tail events), Phil Tetlock (binary vs variable for forecasting), Constantine Sandis (skin in the game) and Raphael Douady (mathematical mapping of fragility). But it is the latter paper that represents the biggest debt: as the central point of this book is convex response (or, more generally, nonlinear effects which subsume tail events), the latter paper is the result of 18 years of mulling that single idea, as an extension of Dynamic Hedging applied outside the options domain, with 18 years of collaborative conversation with Raphael before the actual composition!

This book is in debt to three persons who left us. In addition to Benoit Mandelbrot, this author feels deep gratitude to the late David Freedman, for his encouragements to develop a rigorous model-error based, real-world approach to statistics, grounded in classical skeptical empiricism, and one that could circumvent the problem of induction: and the method was clear, of the "don't use statistics where you can be a sucker" or "figure out where you can be the sucker". There was this "moment" in the air, when a group composed of the then unknown John Ioannidis, Stan Young, Philip Stark, and others got together –I was then an almost unpublished and argumentative "volatility" trader (Dynamic Hedging was unreadable to nontraders) and felt that getting David Freedman’s attention was more of a burden than a blessing, as it meant some obligations. Indeed this exact book project was born from a 2012 Berkeley statistics department commencement lecture, given in the honor of David Freedman, with the message: "statistics is the most powerful weapon today, it comes with responsibility" (since numerical assessments increase risk taking) and the corrolary:

"Understand the model’s errors before you understand the model".

leading to the theme of this book, that all one needs to do is figure out the answer to the following question:

Are you convex or concave to model errors?

It was a very sad story to get a message from the statistical geophysicist Albert Tarantola linking to the electronic version of his book Inverse Problem Theory: Methods for Data Fitting and Model Parameter Estimation [69]. He had been maturing an idea on dealing with probability with his new work taking probability ab ovo. Tarantola had been piqued by the "masquerade" problem in The Black Swan presented in Chapter 3 and the notion that most risk methods "predict the irrelevant". Tragically, he passed away before the conference he was organizing took place, and while I ended up never meeting him, I felt a strong bond in my research, with the obligation to deliver technical results of
Sections of this text were presented in many places—as I said it took years to mature the point. Some of these chapters are adapted from lectures on hedging with Paul Wilmott and from my course "Risk Management in the Real World" at NYU which as I discuss in the introduction is an absurd (but necessary) title. Outside of risk practitioners, in the first stage, I got invitations from statistical and mathematics departments initially to satisfy their curiosity about the exoticism of "outsider" and strange "volatility" trader or "quant" wild animal. But they soon got disappointed that the animal was not much of a wild animal but an orthodox statistician, actually overzealous about a nobullshit approach. I thank Wolfgang Härtle for opening the door of orthodoxy with a full-day seminar at Humboldt University and Pantula Sastry for providing the inaugurating lecture of the International Year of Statistics at the National Science Foundation.

(Additional Acknowledgments: to come. Charles Tapiero convinced me that one can be more aggressive drilling points using a "mild" academic language.)

Carl Tony Fakhry has taken the thankless task of diligently rederiving every equation (at the time of writing he has just reached Chapter 3). I also thank Wenzhao Wu and Mian Wang for list of typos.

To the Reader

The text can be read by (motivated) non-quants: everything mathematical in the text is accompanied with a "literary" commentary, so in many sections the math can be safely skipped. Its mission, to repeat, is to show a risk-taker perspective on risk management, integrated into the mathematical language, not to lecture on statistical concepts.

On the other hand, when it comes to math, it assumes a basic "quant level" advanced or heuristic knowledge of mathematical statistics, and is written as a monograph; it is closer to a longer research paper or old fashioned treatise. As I made sure there is little overlap with other books on the subject, I calibrated this text to the textbook by A. Papoulis Probability, Random Variables, and Stochastic Processes[49]: there is nothing basic discussed in this text that is not defined in Papoulis.

For more advanced, more mathematical, or deeper matters such as convergence theorems, the text provides definitions, but the reader is recommended to use Loeve’s two volumes Probability Theory [40] and [41] for a measure theoretic approach, or Feller’s two volumes, [25] and [24] and, for probability bounds, Petrov[51]. For extreme value theory, Embrecht et al [19] is irreplaceable.

Notes for Reviewers

This is a first draft for general discussion, not for equation-wise verification. There are still typos, errors and problems progressively discovered by readers thanks to the dissemination on the web. The bibliographical references are not uniform, they are in the process of being integrated into bibtex.

Note that there are redundancies that will be removed at the end of the composition.
Incomplete Sections in Part I (mostly concerned with limitations of measurements of tail probabilities)

i  Every chapter will need to have some arguments fleshed out (more English), for about 10% longer text.
ii  A list of symbols.
iii  Chapter 2 proposes a measure of fattailedness based on ratio of Norms for all (superexponential, subexponential, and powerlaws with tail exponent >2); it is more powerful than Kurtosis since we show it to be unstable in many domains. It lead us to a robust heuristic derivation of fat tails. We will add an Appendix comparing it to the Hill estimator.
iv  An Appendix on the misfunctioning of maximum likelihood estimators (extension of the problem of Chapter 3).
v  In the chapter on pathologies of stochastic processes, a longer explanation of why a stochastic integral "in the real world" requires 3 periods not 2 with examples (event information for computation of exposure $X_t \rightarrow$ order $X_{t+\Delta t} \rightarrow$ execution $X_{t+2\Delta t}$).
vi  The "Weron" effect of recovered $\alpha$ from estimates higher than true values.
ix  A discussion of convergence (and nonconvergence) of random matrices to the Wigner semicirle, along with its importance with respect to Big Data
x  A section of pitfalls when deriving slopes for power laws, with situations where we tend to overestimate the exponent.

Incomplete Sections in Part II (mostly concerned with building exposures and convexity of payoffs: What is and What is Not "Long Volatility")

i  A discussion of gambler’s ruin. The interest is the connection to tail events and fragility. "Ruin" is a better name because the idea of survival for an aggregate, such as probability of eocids for the planet.
ii  An exposition of the precautionary principle as a result of the fragility criterion.
iii  A discussion of the "real option" literature showing connecting fragility to the negative of "real option".
iv  A link between concavity and iatrogenic risks (modeled as short volatility).
v  A concluding chapter.
Figure 1: Risk is too serious to be left to BS competitive job-market spectator-sport science. Courtesy George Nasr.
Chapter Summary 1: Risk and decision theory as related to the real world (that is "no BS"). Introduces the idea of fragility as a response to volatility, the associated notion of convex heuristic, the problem of invisibility of the probability distribution and the spirit of the book. Why risk is in the tails not in the variations.

1.1 Fragility, not Just Statistics, For Hidden Risks

Let us start with a sketch of the solution to the problem, just to show that there is a solution (it will take an entire book to get there). The following section will outline both the problem and the methodology.

This reposes on the central idea that an assessment of fragility—and control of such fragility—is more useful, and more reliable, than probabilistic risk management and data-based methods of risk detection.

In a letter to Nature about the book Antifragile: Fragility (the focus of Part II of this volume) can be defined as an accelerating sensitivity to a harmful stressor: this response plots as a concave curve and mathematically culminates in more harm than benefit from the disorder cluster: (i) uncertainty, (ii) variability, (iii) imperfect, incomplete knowledge, (iv) chance, (v) chaos, (vi) volatility, (vii) disorder, (viii) entropy, (ix) time, (x) the unknown, (xi) randomness, (xii) turmoil, (xiii) stressor, (xiv) error, (xv) dispersion of outcomes, (xvi) unknowledge.

Antifragility is the opposite, producing a convex response that leads to more benefit than harm. We do not need to know the history and statistics of an item to measure its fragility or antifragility, or to be able to predict rare and random ('black swan') events. All we need is to be able to assess whether the item is accelerating towards harm or benefit.

Same with model errors—as we subject models to additional layers of uncertainty.

The relation of fragility, convexity and sensitivity to disorder is thus mathematical and not derived from empirical data.

The problem with risk management is that "past" time series can be (and actually are) misleading. Specifying in advance any action or policy is antifragile.
Figure 1.1: The risk of breaking of the coffee cup is not necessarily in the past time series of the variable; in fact surviving objects have to have had a "rosy" past. Further, fragile objects are disproportionally more vulnerable to tail events than ordinary ones –by the concavity argument.

series, with associated overconfidence. "Where is he going to get the risk from since we cannot get it from the past? from the future?", he wrote. Not really, it is staring at us: from the present, the present state of the system. This explains in a way why the detection of fragility is vastly more potent than that of risk –and much easier to do. We can use the past to derive general statistical statements, of course, coupled with rigorous probabilistic inference but it is unwise to think that the data unconditionally yields precise probabilities, as we discuss next.

**Asymmetry and Insufficiency of Past Data.** Our focus on fragility does not mean you can ignore the past history of an object for risk management, it is just accepting that the past is highly insufficient.

The past is also highly asymmetric. There are instances (large deviations) for which the past reveals extremely valuable information about the risk of a process. Something that broke once before is breakable, but we cannot ascertain that what did not break is unbreakable. This asymmetry is extremely valuable with fat tails, as we can reject some theories, and get to the truth by means of negative inference, *via negativa*.

This confusion about the nature of empiricism, or the difference between empiricism (rejection) and naive empiricism (anecdotal acceptance) is not just a problem with journalism. As we will see in Chapter x, it pervades social science and areas of science supported by statistical analyses. Yet naive inference from time series is incompatible with rigorous statistical inference; yet many workers with time series believe that it *is* statistical inference. One has to think of history as a sample path, just as one looks at a sample from a large population, and continuously keep in mind how representative the sample is of the large population. While analytically equivalent, it is psychologically hard to take what Daniel Kahneman calls the "outside view", given that we are all part of history, part of the sample so to speak.
fragility and that of statistical knowledge can be mapped into the difference between $x$ and $f(x)$

This will ease us into the "engineering" notion as opposed to other approaches to decision-making.

1.2 The Conflation of Events and Exposures

Take $x$ a random or nonrandom variable, and $f(x)$ the exposure, payoff, the effect of $x$ on you, the end bottom line. Practitioner and risk takers observe the following disconnect: people (nonpractitioners) talking $x$ (with the implication that we practitioners should care about $x$ in running our affairs) while practitioners think about $f(x)$, nothing but $f(x)$. And the straight confusion since Aristotle between $x$ and $f(x)$ has been chronic. The mistake is at two level: one, simple confusion; second, in the decision-science literature, seeing the difference and not realizing that action on $f(x)$ is easier than action on $x$.

An explanation of the rule "It is preferable to take risks one understands than try to understand risks one is taking." It is easier to modify $f(x)$ to the point where one can be satisfied with the reliability of the risk properties than understand the statistical properties of $x$, particularly under fat tails.\footnote{\text{The reason decision making and risk management are inseparable is that there are some exposure people should never take if the risk assessment is not reliable, something people understand in real life but not when modeling. About every rational person facing an plane ride with an unreliable risk model or a high degree of uncertainty about the safety of the aircraft would take a train instead; but the same person, in the absence of skin in the game, when working as "risk expert" would say : "well, I am using the best model we have" and use something not reliable, rather than be consistent with real-life decision-making.}}

**Examples.** The variable $x$ is unemployment in Senegal, $f_1(x)$ is the effect on the bottom line of the IMF, and $f_2(x)$ is the effect on your grandmother’s well-being (which we assume is minimal).

The variable $x$ can be a stock price, but you own an option on it, so $f(x)$ is your exposure an option value for $x$, or, even more complicated the utility of the exposure to the option value.

The variable $x$ can be changes in wealth, $f(x)$ the convex-concave value function of Kahneman-Tversky, how these “affect” you. One can see that $f(x)$ is vastly more stable or robust than $x$ (it has thinner tails).
In general, in nature, because \( f(x) \) the response of entities and organisms to random events is generally thin-tailed while \( x \) can be fat-tailed, owing to \( f(x) \) having the sigmoid "S" shape convex-concave (some type of floor below, progressive saturation above). This explains why the planet has not blown-up from tail events. And this also explains the difference (Chapter 15) between economic variables and natural ones, as economic variables can have the opposite effect of accelerated response at higher values of \( x \) (right-convex \( f(x) \)) hence a thickening of at least one of the tails.

### 1.2.1 The Solution: Convex Heuristic

Next we give the reader a hint of the methodology and proposed approach with a semi-informal technical definition for now.

**Definition 1. Rule.** A rule is a decision-making heuristic that operates under a broad set of circumstances. Unlike a theorem, which depends on a specific (and closed) set of assumptions, it holds across a broad range of environments – which is precisely the point. In that sense it is more rigorous than a theorem for decision-making, as it is in consequence space, concerning \( f(x) \), not truth space, the properties of \( x \).

In his own discussion of the Borel-Cantelli lemma (the version popularly known as "monkeys on a typewriter")[7], Emile Borel explained that some events can be considered mathematically possible, but practically impossible. There exists a class of statements that are mathematically rigorous but practically nonsense, and vice versa.

If, in addition, one shifts from "truth space" to consequence space", in other words focus on (a function of) the payoff of events in addition to probability, rather than just their probability, then the ranking becomes even more acute and stark, shifting, as we will see, the discussion from probability to the richer one of fragility. In this book we will include costs of events as part of fragility, expressed as fragility under parameter perturbation. Chapter 4 discusses robustness under perturbation or metamodels (or metaprobability). But here is the preview of the idea of convex heuristic, which in plain English, is at least robust to model uncertainty.

**Definition 2. Convex Heuristic.** In short it is required to not produce concave responses under parameter perturbation.

### Summary of a Convex Heuristic (from Chapter 14)

Let \( \{f_i\} \) be the family of possible functions, as "exposures" to \( x \) a random variable with probability measure \( \lambda_{\sigma^-}(x) \), where \( \sigma^- \) is a parameter determining the scale (say, mean absolute deviation) on the left side of the distribution (below the mean). A decision rule is said "nonconcave" for payoff below \( K \) with respect to \( \sigma^- \) up to perturbation \( \Delta \) if, taking the partial expected payoff

\[
\mathbb{E}^{K}_{\sigma^-}(f_i) = \int_{-\infty}^{K} f_i(x) d\lambda_{\sigma^-}(x),
\]

is deemed member of the family of convex heuristics \( \mathcal{H}_{x,K} \), etc.


Note that we call these decision rules "convex" in $H$ not necessarily because they have a convex payoff, but also because, thanks to the introduction of payoff $f$, their payoff ends up comparatively "more convex" than otherwise. In that sense, finding protection is a convex act.

The idea that makes life easy is that we can capture model uncertainty (and model error) with simple tricks, namely the scale of the distribution.

1.3 Fragility and Model Error

Crucially, we can gauge the nonlinear response to a parameter of a model using the same method and map "fragility to model error". For instance a small perturbation in the parameters entering the probability provides a one-sided increase of the likelihood of event (a convex response), then we can declare the model as unsafe (as with the assessments of Fukushima or the conventional Value-at-Risk models where small parameters variance more probabilities by 3 orders of magnitude). This method is fundamentally option-theoretic.

1.3.1 Why Engineering?

[Discussion of the problem- A personal record of the difference between measurement and working on reliability. The various debates.]

1.3.2 Risk is not Variations

On the common confusion between risk and variations. Risk is tail events, necessarily.

1.3.3 What Do Fat Tails Have to Do With This?

The focus is squarely on "fat tails", since risks and harm lie principally in the high-impact events, The Black Swan and some statistical methods fail us there. But they do so predictably. We end Part I with an identification of classes of exposures to these risks, the Fourth Quadrant idea, the class of decisions that do not lend themselves to modelization and need to be avoided – in other words where $x$ is so reliable that one needs an $f(x)$ that clips the left tail, hence allows for a computation of the potential shortfall. Again, to repat, it is more, much more rigorous to modify your decisions.

1.4 Detecting How We Can be Fooled by Statistical Data

Rule 1. In the real world, one sees time series, not the generator of events, unless one is himself fabricating the data.
This section will illustrate the general methodology in detecting potential model error and provides a glimpse at rigorous "real world" decision-making.

The best way to figure out if someone is using an erroneous statistical technique is to apply such a technique on a dataset for which you have the answer. The best way to know the exact properties \textit{ex ante} to generate it by Monte Carlo. So the technique throughout the book is to generate fat-tailed data, the properties of which we know with precision, and check how standard and mechanistic methods used by researchers and practitioners detect the \textit{true} properties, then show the wedge between \textit{observed} and \textit{true} properties.

The focus will be, of course, on the effect of the law of large numbers.

The example below provides an idea of the methodology, and Chapter 3 produces a formal "hierarchy" of statements that can be made by such an observer without violating a certain inferential rigor. For instance he can "reject" that the data is Gaussian, but not accept it as easily. And he can produce inequalities or "lower bound estimates" on, say, variance, never "estimates" in the standard sense since he has no idea about the generator and standard estimates require some associated statement about the generator.

\textbf{Definition 3. Arbitrage of Probability Measure.} A probability measure \( \mu_A \) can be arbitraged if one can produce data fitting another probability measure \( \mu_B \) and systematically fool the observer that it is \( \mu_A \) based on his metrics in assessing the validity of the measure.

Chapter 3 will rank probability measures along this arbitrage criterion.

\textbf{Example of Finite Mean and Infinite Variance.} This example illustrates two biases: underestimation of the mean in the presence of heavy-tailed data, and illusory
Let us say that $x$ follows a version of Pareto Distribution with density $p(x)$,

$$
p(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{\alpha k^{1/\gamma}(-\mu-x)^{\frac{1}{\gamma} - 1}((\frac{k}{-\mu-x})^{-1/\gamma}+1)^{-\alpha-1}}{\gamma} & \mu + x \leq 0 \\
0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1.1)
$$

By generating a Monte Carlo sample of size $N$ with parameters $\alpha = 3/2, \mu = 1, k = 2$, and $\gamma = 3/4$ and sending it to a friendly researcher to ask him to derive the properties,
Figure 1.5: The "true" distribution as expected from the Monte Carlo generator

Figure 1.6: A typical realization, that is, an observed distribution for $N = 10^3$
1.4. DETECTING HOW WE CAN BE FOOLED BY STATISTICAL DATA

The expected "true" mean is:

$$\mathbb{E}(x) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{k \Gamma(\gamma+1)\Gamma(\alpha-\gamma)}{\Gamma(\alpha)} + \mu & \alpha > \gamma \\
\text{Indeterminate} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

and the "true" variance:

$$V(x) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{k^2(\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(2\gamma+1)\Gamma(\alpha-2\gamma)-\Gamma(\gamma+1)^2\Gamma(\alpha-\gamma)^2)}{\Gamma(\alpha)^2} & \alpha > 2\gamma \\
\text{Indeterminate} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

which in our case is "infinite". Now a friendly researcher is likely to mistake the mean, since about 60% of the measurements will produce a higher value than the true mean, and, most certainly likely to mistake the variance (it is infinite and any finite number is a mistake).

Further, about 73% of observations fall above the true mean. The CDF = 1 - \left(\left(\frac{\Gamma(\gamma+1)\Gamma(\alpha-\gamma)}{\Gamma(\alpha)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} + 1\right)^{-\alpha} where \( \Gamma \) is the Euler Gamma function \( \Gamma(z) = \int_0^\infty e^{-t}t^{z-1} \, dt \).

As to the expected shortfall, \( S(K) = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{K} x \, p(x) \, dx}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x \, p(x) \, dx} \), close to 67% of the observations underestimate the "tail risk" below 1% and 99% for more severe risks. This exercise was a standard one but there are many more complicated distributions than the ones we played with.

1.4.1 Imitative, Cosmetic (Job Market) Science Is The Plague of Risk Management

The problem can be seen in the opposition between problems and inverse problems. One can show probabilistically the misfitness of mathematics to many problems where it is used. It is much more rigorous and safer to start with a disease then look at the classes of drugs that can help (if any, or perhaps consider that no drug can be a potent alternative), than to start with a drug, then find some ailment that matches it, with the serious risk of mismatch. Believe it or not, the latter was the norm at the turn of last century, before the FDA got involved. People took drugs for the sake of taking drugs.
What we are saying here is now accepted logic in healthcare but people don’t get it when we change domains. In mathematics it is much better to start with a real problem, understand it well on its own terms, then go find a mathematical tool (if any, or use nothing as is often the best solution) than start with mathematical theorems then find some application to these. The difference (that between problem and inverse problem) is monstrous as the degrees of freedom are much narrower in the forward than the backward equation, sort of). To cite Donald Geman (private communication), there are hundreds of theorems one can elaborate and prove, all of which may seem to find some application in the real world, particularly if one looks hard (a process similar to what George Box calls "torturing" the data). But applying the idea of non-reversibility of the mechanism: there are very, very few theorems that can correspond to an exact selected problem. In the end this leaves us with a restrictive definition of what "rigor" means. But people don’t get that point there. The entire fields of mathematical economics and quantitative finance are based on that fabrication. Having a tool in your mind and looking for an application leads to the narrative fallacy. The point will be discussed in Chapter 6 in the context of statistical data mining.

1.5 Five Principles for Real World Decision Theory

Note that, thanks to inequalities and bounds (some tight, some less tight), the use of the classical theorems of probability theory can lead to classes of qualitative precautionary decisions that, ironically, do not rely on the computation of specific probabilities.
Table 1.1: General Principles of Risk Engineering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{P}_1$</td>
<td>Dutch Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probabilities need to add up to $1^*$ but cannot exceed $1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{P}_1'$</td>
<td>Inequalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is more rigorous to work with probability inequalities and bounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>than probabilistic estimates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{P}_2$</td>
<td>Asymmetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some errors have consequences that are largely, and clearly one sided.***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{P}_3$</td>
<td>Nonlinear Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fragility is more measurable than probability***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{P}_4$</td>
<td>Conditional Precautionary Principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domain specific precautionary, based on fat tailedness of errors and asymmetry of payoff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{P}_5$</td>
<td>Decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exposures ($f(x)$) can be more reliably modified, instead of relying on computing probabilities of $x$.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This and the corrollary that there is a non-zero probability of visible and known states spanned by the probability distribution adding up to $<1$ confers to probability theory, when used properly, a certain analytical robustness.

** Consider a plane ride. Disturbances are more likely to delay (or worsen) the flight than accelerate it or improve it. This is the concave case. The opposite is innovation and tinkering, the convex case.

*** The errors in measuring nonlinearity of responses are more robust and smaller than those in measuring responses. (Transfer theorems).
Part I

Fat Tails: The LLN Under Real World Ecologies
Main point of Part I. Model uncertainty (or, within models, parameter uncertainty), or more generally, adding layers of randomness, cause fat tails. The main effect is slower operation of the law of large numbers.

Part I of this volume presents a mathematical approach for dealing with errors in conventional probability models. For instance, if a "rigorously" derived model (say Markowitz mean variance, or Extreme Value Theory) gives a precise risk measure, but ignores the central fact that the parameters of the model don’t fall from the sky, but have some error rate in their estimation, then the model is not rigorous for risk management, decision making in the real world, or, for that matter, for anything. So we may need to add another layer of uncertainty, which invalidates some models but not others. The mathematical rigor is therefore shifted from focus on asymptotic (but rather irrelevant because inapplicable) properties to making do with a certain set of incompleteness and preasymptotics. Indeed there is a mathematical way to deal with incompleteness. Adding disorder has a one-sided effect and we can deductively estimate its lower bound. For instance we can figure out from second order effects that tail probabilities and risk measures are underestimated in some class of models.

Savage’s Difference Between The Small and Large World

Pseudo-Rigor and Lack of Skin in the Game: The disease of pseudo-rigor in the application of probability to real life by people who are not harmed by their mistakes can be illustrated as follows, with a very sad case study. One of the most "cited" document in risk and quantitative methods is about "coherent measures of risk", which set strong principles on how to compute tail risk measures, such as the "value at risk" and other methods. Initially circulating in 1997, the measures of tail risk—while coherent—have proven to be underestimating risk at least 500 million times (sic). We have had a few blowups since, including Long Term Capital Management fiasco—and we had a few blowups before, but departments of mathematical probability were not informed of them. As we are writing these lines, it was announced that J.-P. Morgan made a loss that should have happened every ten billion years. The firms employing these "risk minds" behind the "seminal" paper blew up and ended up bailed out by the taxpayers. But we now now about the disease of pseudo-rigor that has been spreading. This is why the writing of risk measures continues...
Figure 1.8: A Version of Savage’s Small World/Large World Problem. In statistical domains assume \textbf{Small World} = \textit{coin tosses} and \textbf{Large World} = \textit{Real World}. Note that measure theory is not the small world, but large world, thanks to the degrees of freedom it confers.

The problem of formal probability theory is that it necessarily covers narrower situations (small world $\Omega_S$) than the real world ($\Omega_L$), which produces Procrustean bed effects. $\Omega_S \subset \Omega_L$. The "academic" in the bad sense approach has been to assume that $\Omega_L$ is smaller rather than study the gap. The problems linked to incompleteness of models are largely in the form of preasymptotics and inverse problems.

**Method:** We cannot probe the Real World but we can get an idea (via perturbations) of the main directions of the effects and difficulties arising from incomplete data.

So adding a layer of uncertainty to the representation in the form of model error, or metaprobability has a one-sided effect: expansion of $\Omega_S$ with following results:

i) **Fat tails:**
   i-a)- Randomness at the level of the scale of the distribution generates fat tails. (Multi-level stochastic volatility).
   i-b)- Model error in all its forms generates fat tails.
   i-c) - Convexity of probability measures to uncertainty causes fat tails.

ii) **Law of Large Numbers(weak):** operates much more slowly, if ever at all. "P-values" are biased lower.

iii) **Risk is larger than the conventional measures derived in $\Omega_S$, particularly for payoffs in the tail.**

iv) **Allocations from optimal control and other theories (portfolio theory) have a higher variance than shown, hence increase risk.**

v) **The problem of induction is more acute. (epistemic opacity).**

vi) **The problem is more acute for convex payoffs, and simpler for concave ones.**

Now i) $\Rightarrow$ ii) through vi).

Risk (and decisions) require more rigor than other applications of statistical inference.

**Coin tosses are not quite "real world" probability.** In his wonderful textbook [9], Leo Breiman referred to probability as having two sides, the left side represented by his teacher, Michel Loève, which concerned itself with formalism and measure theory, and the right one which is typically associated with coin tosses and similar applications. Many have the illusion that the "real world" would be closer to the coin tosses. It is not: coin tosses are fake practice for probability theory, artificial setups in which people know the probability (what is called the **ludic fallacy** in *The Black Swan*), and where bets are bounded, hence insensitive to problems of extreme fat tails. Ironically, measure theory, while formal, is less constraining and can set us free from these narrow structures. Its abstraction allows the expansion out of the small box, all the while remaining rigorous, in fact, at the highest possible level of rigor. Plenty of damage has been brought by the illusion that the coin toss model provides a "realistic" approach to the discipline, as we see in Chapter x, it leads to the random walk and the associated pathologies with a certain class of unbounded variables.

**General Classification of Problems Related To Fat Tails**

**The Black Swan Problem.** Incomputability of Small Probabilities: It is not merely that important tails of the distributions matter, but also how long and how long it takes. The
their probabilities are not computable, not reliable for any effective use. And the smaller the probability, the larger the error, affecting events of high impact. The idea is to work with measures that are less sensitive to the issue (a statistical approach), or conceive exposures less affected by it (a decision theoretic approach). Mathematically, the problem arises from the use of degenerate metaprobability.

In fact the central point is the 4th quadrant where prevails both high-impact and non-measurability, where the max of the random variable determines most of the properties (which to repeat, has not computable probabilities).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Chapters</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Presymptotics, Incomplete Convergence</td>
<td>The real world is before the asymptote. This affects the applications (under fat tails) of the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2       | Inverse Problems | a) The direction Model ⇒ Reality produces larger biases than Reality ⇒ Model  
     b) Some models can be "arbitraged" in one direction, not the other. | 1,?,? |
| 3       | Degenerate Metaprobability* | Uncertainty about the probability distributions can be expressed as additional layer of uncertainty, or, simpler, errors, hence nested series of errors on errors. The Black Swan problem can be summarized as degenerate metaprobability.² | ?,? |

*Degenerate metaprobability is a term used to indicate a single layer of stochasticity, such as a model with certain parameters.

We will rank probability measures along this arbitrage criterion.

**Associated Specific "Black Swan Blindness" Errors (Applying Thin-Tailed Metrics to Fat Tailed Domains).** These are shockingly common, arising from mechanistic reliance on software or textbook items (or a culture of bad statistical insight). We skip the elementary "Pinker" error of mistaking journalistic fact - checking for scientific statistical "evidence" and focus on less obvious but equally dangerous ones.

1. Overinference. Making an inference from a fat tailed data set when it is in
2. **Underinference**: Assuming $N=1$ is insufficient under large deviations. Chapters 1 and 3.

(In other words both these errors lead to refusing true inference and accepting anecdote as "evidence")

3. Asymmetry: Fat-tailed probability distributions can masquerade as thin tailed ("great moderation", "long peace"), not the opposite.

4. The econometric (very severe) violation in using standard deviations and variances as a measure of dispersion without ascertaining the stability of the fourth moment ($F.F$). This error alone allows us to discard everything in economics/econometrics using $\sigma$ as irresponsible nonsense (with a narrow set of exceptions).


6. Assuming that the errors in the estimation of $x$ apply to $f(x)$ (very severe).

7. Mistaking the properties of "Bets" and "digital predictions" for those of Vanilla exposures, with such things as "prediction markets". Chapter 9.

8. Fitting tail exponents power laws in interpolative manner. Chapters 2, 6


10. Calibration of small probabilities relying on sample size and not augmenting the total sample by a function of $1/p$, where $p$ is the probability to estimate.

11. Considering ArrowDebreu State Space as exhaustive rather than sum of known probabilities $\leq 1$

**Definition 4.** *Metaprobability: the two statements 1) "the probability of Rand Paul winning the election is 15.2%" and 2) the probability of getting $n$ odds numbers in $N$ throws of a fair die is $x\%" are different in the sense that the first statement has higher uncertainty about its probability, and you know (with some probability) that it may change under an alternative analysis or over time. There is no such thing as "Knightian risk" in the real world, but gradations.*
Figure 1.10: Fragility: Can be seen in the slope of the sensitivity of payoff across metadistributions
Fat Tails and The Problem of Induction


2.1 The Problem of (Enumerative) Induction

Turkey and Inverse Turkey (from the Glossary in Antifragile): The turkey is fed by the butcher for a thousand days, and every day the turkey pronounces with increased statistical confidence that the butcher "will never hurt it"—until Thanksgiving, which brings a Black Swan revision of belief for the turkey. Indeed not a good day to be a turkey. The inverse turkey error is the mirror confusion, not seeing opportunities—pronouncing that one has evidence that someone digging for gold or searching for cures will "never find" anything because he didn’t find anything in the past.

What we have just formulated is the philosophical problem of induction (more precisely of enumerative induction.) To this version of Bertrand Russel’s chicken we add: mathematical difficulties, fat tails, and sucker problems.

2.2 Simple Risk Estimator

Let us define a risk estimator that we will work with throughout the book.

Definition 5. Let $X$ be, as of time $T$, a standard sequence of $n+1$ observations, $X = (x_{t_0+i\Delta t})_{0\leq i\leq n}$ (with $x_t \in \mathbb{R}$, $i \in \mathbb{N}$), as the discretely monitored history of a stochastic process $X_t$ over the closed interval $[t_0, T]$ (with realizations at fixed interval $\Delta t$ thus $T = t_0 + n\Delta t$). $^1$

$^1$It is not necessary that $\Delta t$ follows strictly calendar time for high frequency observations, as calendar time does not necessarily correspond to transaction time or economic time, so by a procedure used in option trading called "transactional time" or "economic time", the observation frequency might need to be rescaled in a certain fashion to increase sampling at some windows over others – a procedure not dissimilar to seasonal adjustment, though more rigorous mathematically. What matters is that, if there
Figure 2.1: A rolling window: to estimate the errors of an estimator, it is not rigorous to compute in-sample properties of estimators, but compare properties obtained at $T$ with prediction in a window outside of it. Maximum likelihood estimators should have their variance (or other more real-world metric of dispersion) estimated outside the window.

The empirical estimator $M_X^T(A, f)$ is defined as

$$M_X^T(A, f) = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_A f(x_{t_0+i\Delta t})}{\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_D} \quad (2.1)$$

where $1_A D \to \{0, 1\}$ is an indicator function taking values 1 if $x_t \in A$ and 0 otherwise, $(D' \text{ subdomain of domain } D: A \subseteq D' \subset D)$, and $f$ is a function of $x$. For instance $f(x) = 1$, $f(x) = x$, and $f(x) = x^N$ correspond to the probability, the first moment, and $N^{th}$ moment, respectively. $A$ is the subset of the support of the distribution that is of concern for the estimation. Typically, $\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_D = n$.

Let us stay in dimension 1 for the next few chapters not to muddle things. Standard Estimators tend to be variations about $M_X^T(A, f)$ where $f(x) = x$ and $A$ is defined as the domain of the distribution of $X$, standard measures from $x$, such as moments of order $z$, etc., are calculated "as of period" $T$. Such measures might be useful for the knowledge of some properties, but remain insufficient for decision making as the decision-maker may be concerned for risk management purposes with the left tail (for distributions that are not entirely skewed, such as purely loss functions such as damage from earthquakes, terrorism, etc.), or any arbitrarily defined part of the distribution.

**Standard Risk Estimators.**

**Definition 6.** The empirical risk estimator $S$ for the unconditional shortfall $S$ below $K$ is defined as, with $A = (-\infty, K)$, $f(x) = x$

$$S = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_A}{\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_{D'}} \quad (2.2)$$

An alternative method is to compute the conditional shortfall:

$$S' = \mathbb{E}[M|X < K] = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_{D'}}{\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_A}$$
2.2. SIMPLE RISK ESTIMATOR

One of the uses of the indicator function $1_A$, for observations falling into a subsection $A$ of the distribution, is that we can actually derive the past actuarial value of an option with $X$ as an underlying struck as $K$ as $M^X_T(A, x)$, with $A = (-\infty, K]$ for a put and $A = [K, \infty)$ for a call, with $f(x) = x$.

**Criterion 1.** The measure $M$ is considered to be an estimator over interval $[t-N\Delta t, T]$ if and only if it holds in expectation over a specific period $X_T+i\Delta t$ for a given $i>0$, that is across counterfactuals of the process, with a threshold $\epsilon$ (a tolerated relative absolute divergence; removing the absolute sign reveals the bias) so

$$\xi(M^X_T(A_z, f)) = \frac{\E |M^X_T(A_z, f) - M^X_{>T}(A_z, f)|}{|M^X_T(A_z, f)|} < \epsilon \quad (2.3)$$

when $M^X_T(A_z, f)$ is computed; but while working with the opposite problem, that is, trying to guess the spread in the realizations of a stochastic process, when the process is known, but not the realizations, we will use $M^X_{>T}(A_z, 1)$ as a divisor.

In other words, the estimator as of some future time, should have some stability around the "true" value of the variable and stay below an upper bound on the tolerated bias.

We use $\xi(.) = |.|$ in mean absolute deviations to accommodate functions and exposures and that do not have finite second moment, even if the process has such moments. Another reason is that in the real world gains and losses are in straight numerical deviations.

So we skip the notion of "variance" for an estimator and rely on absolute mean deviation so $\xi$ can be the absolute value for the tolerated bias. And note that we use mean deviation as the equivalent of a "loss function"; except that with matters related to risk, the loss function is embedded in the subset $A$ of the estimator.

This criterion makes our risk estimator compatible with standard sampling theory. Actually, it is at the core of statistics. Let us rephrase:

Standard statistical theory doesn’t allow claims on estimators made in a given set unless these are made on the basis that they can "generalize", that is, reproduce out of sample, into the part of the series that has not taken place (or not seen), i.e., for time series, for $\tau > t$.

This should also apply in full force to the risk estimator. In fact we need more, much more vigilance with risks.

For convenience, we are taking some liberties with the notations, pending on context: $M^X_T(A, f)$ is held to be the estimator, or a conditional summation on data but for convenience, given that such estimator is sometimes called "empirical expectation", we will be also using the same symbol, namely with $M^X_{>T}(A, f)$ for the textit estimated variable for period $> T$ (to the right of $T$, as we will see, adapted to the filtration $T$). This will be shown as $M^X_T(A, f)$ is the estimator pertaining to $T = \mathbb{P}$ and
probability space \((\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})\), and a continuously increasing filtration \(\mathcal{F}_t, \mathcal{F}_s \subset \mathcal{F}_t\) if \(s < t\). The expectation operator (and other Lebesque measures) are adapted to the filtration \(\mathcal{F}_T\) in the sense that the future is progressive and one takes a decision at a certain period \(T + \Delta t\) from information at period \(T\), with an incompressible lag that we write as \(\Delta t\) — in the "real world", we will see in Chapter x there are more than one lagging periods \(\Delta t\), as one may need a lag to make a decision, and another for execution, so we necessarily need \(\Delta t > \Delta t\). The central idea of a \(\text{cadlag}\) process is that in the presence of discontinuities in an otherwise continuous stochastic process (or treated as continuous), we consider the right side, that is the first observation, and not the last.

### 2.3 Fat Tails, the Finite Moment Case

**Fat tails** are not about the incidence of low probability events, but the contributions of events away from the "center" of the distribution to the total properties.\(^2\) As a useful heuristic, consider the ratio \(h\)

\[
h = \frac{\sqrt{\mathbb{E}(X^2)}}{\mathbb{E}(|X|)}
\]

where \(\mathbb{E}\) is the expectation operator (under the probability measure of concern and \(x\) is a centered variable such \(\mathbb{E}(x) = 0\)); the ratio increases with the fat tailedness of the distribution; (The general case corresponds to \(\left(\frac{M_T^X(A, x^n)}{M_T^X(A, |x|)}\right)^{\frac{1}{n}}, n > 1\), under the condition that the distribution has finite moments up to \(n\), and the special case here \(n=2\)).

Simply, \(x^n\) is a weighting operator that assigns a weight, \(x^{n-1}\) large for large values of \(x\), and small for smaller values.

The effect is due to the convexity differential between both functions, \(|x|\) is piecewise linear and loses the convexity effect except for a zone around the origin.\(^3\)

**Proof:** By Jensen’s inequality under the counting measure.

As a convention here, we write \(L^p\) for space, \(\mathcal{L}^p\) for the norm in that space.

Let \(X \equiv (x_i)_{i=1}^n\), The \(\mathcal{L}^p\) Norm is defined (for our purpose) as, with \(p \in \mathbb{N}, p \geq 1\):

\[
\|X\|_p = \left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |x_i|^p}{n}\right)^{1/p}
\]

The idea of dividing by \(n\) is to transform the norms into expectations, i.e., moments. For the Euclidian norm, \(p = 2\).  

\(^2\)The word "infinite" moment is a big ambiguous, it is better to present the problem as "undefined" moment in the sense that it depends on the sample, and does not replicate outside. Say, for a two-tailed distribution, the designation "infinite" variance might apply for the fourth moment, but not to the third.

\(^3\)TK Adding an appendix "Quick and Robust Estimates of Fatness of Tails When Higher Moments
2.3. FAT TAILS, THE FINITE MOMENT CASE

The norm rises with higher values of $p$, as, with $a > 0$,

$$
\left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |x_i|^{p+a} \right)^{1/(p+a)} \geq \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |x_i|^p \right)^{1/p}
$$

What is critical for our exercise and the study of the effects of fat tails is that, for a given norm, dispersion of results increases values. For example, take a flat distribution, $X = \{1, 1\}$. $\|X\|_1 = \|X\|_2 = \cdots = \|X\|_n = 1$. Perturbating while preserving $\|X\|_1$, $X = \{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{2}\}$ produces rising higher norms:

$$\{\|X\|_n\}_{n=1}^{5} = \left\{1, \frac{\sqrt{5}}{2}, \frac{\sqrt{7}}{2^{2/3}}, \frac{\sqrt{41}}{2}, \frac{\sqrt{61}}{2^{4/5}} \right\}. \quad (2.4)$$

Trying again, with a wider spread, we get even higher values of the norms, $X = \{\frac{1}{4}, \frac{7}{4}\}$,

$$\{\|X\|_n\}_{n=1}^{5} = \left\{1, \frac{5}{4}, \frac{\sqrt{43}}{2}, \frac{\sqrt{1201}}{4}, \frac{\sqrt{2101}}{2 \times 2^{3/5}} \right\}. \quad (2.5)$$

So we can see it becomes rapidly explosive.

---

**Some harmless formalism:**

$L^p$ space. Let’s look at payoff in functional space, to work with the space of functions having a certain integrability. Let $Y$ be a measurable space with Lebesgue measure $\mu$. The space $L^p$ of $f$ measurable functions on $Y$ is defined as:

$$L^p(\mu) = \left\{ f : \left( \int_Y |f|^p \, d\mu \right)^{1/p} < \infty \right\}$$

The application of concern for our analysis is where the measure $\mu$ is a counting measure (on a countable set) and the function $f(y) \equiv y^p$, $p \geq 1$. 

---

*An application of Hölder’s inequality.*
One property quite useful with power laws with infinite moment:

\[ \|X\|_\infty = \sup \left( \frac{1}{n} |x_i| \right)^n \]  \hfill (2.6)

**Gaussian Case.** For a Gaussian, where \( x \sim N(0, \sigma) \), as we assume the mean is 0 without loss of generality,

\[
\frac{M^X_T (A, X^N)^{1/N}}{M^X_T (A, |X|)} = \frac{\pi^{N-1}}{\sqrt{2}} \left( \frac{2^{N-1}}{(-1)^N} \right) \Gamma \left( \frac{N+1}{2} \right)
\]

or, alternatively

\[
\frac{M^X_T (A, X^N)}{M^X_T (A, |X|)} = 2^{\frac{1}{2}(N-3)} (1 + (-1)^N) \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^2} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}-\frac{N}{2}} \Gamma \left( \frac{N+1}{2} \right)
\]  \hfill (2.7)

where \( \Gamma(z) \) is the Euler gamma function; \( \Gamma(z) = \int_0^\infty t^{z-1}e^{-t}dt. \) For odd moments, the ratio is 0. For even moments:

\[
\frac{M^X_T (A, X^2)}{M^X_T (A, |X|)} = \sqrt{\frac{\pi}{2}} \sigma
\]

hence

\[
\frac{\sqrt{M^X_T (A, X^2)}}{M^X_T (A, |X|)} = \frac{\text{Standard Deviation}}{\text{Mean Absolute Deviation}} = \sqrt{\frac{\pi}{2}}
\]

For a Gaussian the ratio \( \sim 1.25 \), and it rises from there with fat tails.

**Example:** Take an extremely fat tailed distribution with \( n=10^6 \), observations are all \(-1\) except for a single one of \( 10^6 \),

\[ X = \{-1, -1, ..., -1, 10^6\} \]

The mean absolute deviation, \( \text{MAD} (X) = 2. \) The standard deviation \( \text{STD} (X)=1000. \) The ratio standard deviation over mean deviation is 500.

As to the fourth moment, it equals \( 3\sqrt{\frac{\pi}{2}} \sigma^3 \).

For a power law distribution with tail exponent \( \alpha=3 \), say a Student T

\[
\frac{\sqrt{M^X_T (A, X^2)}}{M^X_T (A, |X|)} = \frac{\text{Standard Deviation}}{\text{Mean Absolute Deviation}} = \frac{\pi}{2}
\]

We will return to other metrics and definitions of fat tails with power law distributions in other contexts, provided they \( \text{\textit{infinite}} \) that is, do not exist. Our heuristic of using the ratio of moments to mean deviation works only in sample, not outside.
"Infinite" moments. Infinite moments, say infinite variance, always manifest themselves as computable numbers in observed sample, yielding an estimator $M$, simply because the sample is finite. A distribution, say, Cauchy, with infinite means will always deliver a measurable mean in finite samples; but different samples will deliver completely different means. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the "drifting" effect of $M$ a with increasing information.

**What is a "Tail Event"?** There seems to be a confusion about the definition of a "tail event", as it has different meanings in different disciplines.

1) In statistics: an event of low probability.

2) Here: an event of low probability but worth discussing, hence has to have some large consequence.

3) In measure and probability theory: Let $(X_i)_{i=1}^n$ be a $n$ sequence of realizations (that is, random variables). The tail sigma algebra of the sequence is $\mathcal{T} = \bigcap_{n=1}^{\infty} \sigma(X_{n+1}, X_{n+2}, \ldots)$ and an event $\in \mathcal{T}$ is a tail event. So here it means a specific event extending infinitely into the future.

So when we discuss the Borel-Cantelli lemma or the zero-one law that the probability of a tail event happening infinitely often is 1 or 0, it is the latter that is meant.
2.4 A Simple Heuristic to Create Mildly Fat Tails

Since higher moments increase under fat tails, as compared to lower ones, it should be possible so simply increase fat tails without increasing lower moments.

Note that the literature sometimes separates "Fat tails" from "Heavy tails", the first term being reserved for power laws, the second to subexponential distribution (on which, later). Fughtetaboutdit. We simply call "Fat Tails" something with a higher kurtosis than the Gaussian, even when kurtosis is not defined. The definition is functional as used by practitioners of fat tails, that is, option traders and lends itself to the operation of "fattening the tails", as we will see in this section.

A Variance-preserving heuristic. Keep $\mathbb{E}(X^2)$ constant and increase $\mathbb{E}(X^4)$, by "stochasticizing" the variance of the distribution, since $\langle X^4 \rangle$ is itself analog to the variance of $\langle X^2 \rangle$ measured across samples ( $\mathbb{E}(X^4)$ is the noncentral equivalent of $\mathbb{E}\left((X^2 - \mathbb{E}(X^2))^2\right)$ ). Chapter x will do the "stochasticizing" in a more involved way.

An effective heuristic to get some intuition about the effect of the fattening of tails consists in simulating a random variable set to be at mean 0, but with the following variance-preserving tail fattening trick: the random variable follows a distribution $\text{N}(0, \sigma \sqrt{1-a})$ with probability $p = \frac{1}{2}$ and $\text{N}(0, \sigma \sqrt{1+a})$ with the remaining probability $\frac{1}{2}$, with $0 \leq a < 1$.

The characteristic function is

$$
\phi(t, a) = \frac{1}{2} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(1+a)t^2\sigma^2} \left(1 + e^{at^2\sigma^2}\right)
$$

Odd moments are nil. The second moment is preserved since

$$
M(2) = (-i)^2 \partial_{t^2} \phi(t)\big|_0 = \sigma^2
$$
which puts the traditional kurtosis at \(3(a^2 + 1)\). This means we can get an "implied \(a\) from kurtosis. The value of \(a\) is roughly the mean deviation of the stochastic volatility parameter "volatility of volatility" or \(\text{Vvol}\) in a more fully parametrized form.

This heuristic, while useful for intuition building, is of limited powers as it can only raise kurtosis to twice that of a Gaussian, so it should be limited to getting some intuition about its effects. Section 2.6 will present a more involved technique.

As Figure 2.6 shows: fat tails are about higher peaks, a concentration of observations around the center of the distribution.

### 2.5 The Body, The Shoulders, and The Tails

We assume tails start at the level of convexity of the segment of the probability distribution to the scale of the distribution.

#### 2.5.1 The Crossovers and Tunnel Effect.

Notice in Figure 2.6 a series of crossover zones, invariant to \(a\). Distributions called "bell shape" have a convex-concave-convex shape (or quasi-concave shape).

Let \(X\) be a random variable, the distribution of which \(p(x)\) is from a general class of all unimodal one-parameter continuous pdfs \(p_\sigma\) with support \(\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathbb{R}\) and scale parameter \(\sigma\). Let \(p(.)\) be quasi-concave on the domain, but neither convex nor concave. The density function \(p(x)\) satisfies: \(p(x) \geq p(x + \epsilon)\) for all \(\epsilon > 0\), and \(x > x^*\) and \(p(x) \geq p(x - \epsilon)\) for all \(x < x^*\) with \(\{x^*: p(x^*) = \max_{x} p(x)\}\). The class of quasiconcave functions is defined as follows: for all \(x\) and \(y\) in the domain and \(\omega \in [0, 1]\),

\[
p(\omega x + (1 - \omega) y) \geq \min (p(x), p(y))
\]

1- If the variable is "two-tailed", that is, \(\mathcal{D} = (-\infty, \infty)\), where \(p^\delta(x) \equiv \frac{p(x + \delta) + p(x - \delta)}{2}\)

1. There exist a "high peak" inner tunnel, \(A_T = (a_2, a_3)\) for which the \(\delta\)-perturbed \(\sigma\) of the probability distribution \(p^\delta(x) \geq p(x)\) if \(x \in (a_2, a_3)\)

2. There exists outer tunnels, the "tails", for which \(p^\delta(x) \geq p(x)\) if \(x \in (-\infty, a_1)\) or \(x \in (a_4, \infty)\)

3. There exist intermediate tunnels, the "shoulders", where \(p^\delta(x) \leq p(x)\) if \(x \in (a_1, a_2)\) or \(x \in (a_3, a_4)\)

\(A = \{a_i\}\) is the set of solutions \(\left\{ x : \frac{\partial^2 p(x)}{\partial x^2} |_{a_i} = 0 \right\}\).

For the Gaussian \((\mu, \sigma)\), the solutions are obtained by setting the second derivative to 0, so

\[
-\frac{(x - \mu)^2}{(a_i - \mu)^2} = 0
\]
which produces the following crossovers:

\[ \{a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4\} = \]

\[ \left\{ \mu - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \left( 5 + \sqrt{17} \right)} \sigma, \mu + \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \left( 5 + \sqrt{17} \right)} \sigma \right\} \]

In figure 2.6, the crossovers for the intervals are numerically \{-2.13\sigma, -0.66\sigma, 0.66\sigma, 2.13\sigma\}. 

As to a symmetric power law (as we will see further down), the Student T Distribution with scale \(s\) and tail exponent \(\alpha\):

\[ \left( \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - x} \right)^{\alpha + 1} \]
\{a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4\} = 
\left\{ -\sqrt{\frac{5\alpha - \sqrt{(\alpha+1)(17\alpha+1)+1}}{\alpha-1} \cdot \frac{s}{\sqrt{2}}}, \sqrt{\frac{5\alpha - \sqrt{(\alpha+1)(17\alpha+1)+1}}{\alpha-1} \cdot \frac{s}{\sqrt{2}}} \right\},
\sqrt{\frac{5\alpha + \sqrt{(\alpha+1)(17\alpha+1)+1}}{\alpha-1} \cdot \frac{s}{\sqrt{2}}},
\sqrt{\frac{5\alpha + \sqrt{(\alpha+1)(17\alpha+1)+1}}{\alpha-1} \cdot \frac{s}{\sqrt{2}}} \right\}

When the Student is "cubic", that is, \(\alpha = 3\):

\left\{ -\sqrt{4 - \sqrt{13}s}, -\sqrt{4 + \sqrt{13}s}, \sqrt{4 - \sqrt{13}s}, \sqrt{4 + \sqrt{13}s} \right\}

We can verify that when \(\alpha \to \infty\), the crossovers become those of a Gaussian. For instance, for \(a_1\):

\[ \lim_{\alpha \to \infty} -\sqrt{\frac{5\alpha - \sqrt{(\alpha+1)(17\alpha+1)+1}}{\alpha-1} \cdot \frac{s}{\sqrt{2}}} = -\sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \left( 5 - \sqrt{17} \right) s} \]

**In Summary, Where Does the Tail Start?**

For a general class of symmetric distributions with power laws, the tail starts at:

\[ \pm \sqrt{\frac{5\alpha + \sqrt{(\alpha+1)(17\alpha+1)+1}}{\alpha-1} \cdot \frac{s}{\sqrt{2}}} \]

with \(\alpha\) infinite in the stochastic volatility Gaussian case and \(s\) the standard deviation. The "tail" is located between around 2 and 3 standard deviations. This flows from our definition: which part of the distribution is convex to errors in the estimation of the scale.

But in practice, because historical measurements of STD will be biased lower because of small sample effects (as we repeat fat tails accentuate small sample effects), the deviations will be > 2-3 STDs.
2.6 Fattening of Tails With Skewed Variance

We can improve on the fat-tail heuristic in 2.4, (which limited the kurtosis to twice the Gaussian) as follows. We Switch between Gaussians with variance:

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma^2(1 + a), & \quad \text{with probability } p \\
\sigma^2(1 + b), & \quad \text{with probability } 1 - p
\end{align*}
\]

with \( p \in [0, 1) \), both \( a, b \in (-1, 1) \) and \( b = -a \frac{p}{1-p} \), giving a characteristic function:

\[
\phi(t, a) = p \ e^{-\frac{t}{2}(a+1)\sigma^2 t^2} - (p - 1) \ e^{-\frac{a^2 \sigma^2 (ap + p - 1)}{2(p-1)}}
\]

with Kurtosis \( \frac{3((1-a^2)p)}{p-1} \) thus allowing polarized states and high kurtosis, all variance preserving, conditioned on, when \( a > (<) 0 \), \( a < (>) \frac{1-p}{p} \).

Thus with \( p = 1/1000 \), and the maximum possible \( a = 999 \), kurtosis can reach as high a level as 3000.

This heuristic approximates quite effectively the effect on probabilities of a lognormal weighting for the characteristic function

\[
\phi(t, V) = \int_0^\infty e^{-\frac{t^2 u}{2} - \frac{\left( \log(v) - v_0 + \frac{\sqrt{v^2 \cdot v_0^2}}{2Vv} \right)^2}{2Vv^2}} \ dv
\]

where \( v \) is the variance and \( Vv \) is the second order variance, often called volatility of volatility. Thanks to integration by parts we can use the Fourier Transform to obtain all varieties of payoffs (see Gatheral, 2006).

Chapter x will show how tail events have large errors.

### Why do we use Student T to simulate symmetric power laws?

For convenience, only for convenience. It is not that we believe that the generating process is Student T. Simply, the center of the distribution does not matter much for the properties involved in certain classes of decision making. The lower the exponent, the less the center plays a role. The higher the exponent, the more the student T resembles the Gaussian, and the more justified its use will be accordingly. More advanced methods involving the use of Levy laws may help in the event of asymmetry, but the use of two different Pareto distributions with two different exponents, one for the left tail and the other for the right one, would be the job of...
2.7. Why power laws? There are a lot of theories on why things should be power laws, as sort of exceptions to the way things work probabilistically. But it seems that the opposite idea is never presented: power should can be the norm, and the Gaussian a special case as we will see in Chapt x, of concave-convex responses (sort of dampening of fragility and antifragility, bringing robustness, hence thinning tails).

2.7 Fat Tails in Higher Dimension

Figure 2.7: Multidimensional Fat Tails: For a 3 dimensional vector, thin tails (left) and fat tails (right) of the same variance. Instead of a bell curve with higher peak (the "tunnel") we see an increased density of points towards the center.

\[ \hat{X} = (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_m) \] the vectors of random variables. Consider the joint probability distribution \( f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) \). We denote the \( m \)-variate multivariate Normal distribution by \( N(0, \Sigma) \), with without loss of generality, a mean vector \( \vec{\mu} = (0, \ldots, 0) \), variance-covariance matrix \( \Sigma \), and joint pdf

\[
f(\vec{x}) = (2\pi)^{-m/2}|\Sigma|^{-1/2}\exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}(\vec{x} - \vec{\mu})^T \Sigma^{-1} (\vec{x} - \vec{\mu})\right)
\]

(2.8)

where \( \vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_m) \in \mathbb{R}^m \), and \( \Sigma \) is a symmetric, positive definite \( (m \times m) \) matrix.
Figure 2.8: Three Types of Distributions. As we hit the tails, the Student remains scalable while the Standard Lognormal shows an intermediate position before eventually ending up getting an infinite slope on a log-log plot.

\[
f_a(x) = \frac{1}{2} (2\pi)^{-m/2} \left| \Sigma_1 \right|^{-1/2} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2} \left( x - \mu \right)^T \Sigma_1^{-1} \left( x - \mu \right) \right) \\
+ \frac{1}{2} (2\pi)^{-m/2} \left| \Sigma_2 \right|^{-1/2} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2} \left( x - \mu \right)^T \Sigma_2^{-1} \left( x - \mu \right) \right) 
\]

(2.9)

Where \( a \) is a scalar that determines the intensity of stochastic volatility, \( \Sigma_1 = \Sigma(1-a) \) and \( \Sigma_2 = \Sigma(1-a) \).

2.8 Scalable and Nonscalable, A Deeper View of Fat Tails

So far for the discussion on fat tails we stayed in the finite moments case. For a certain class of distributions, those with finite moments, \( \frac{P_{X>nk}}{P_{X>K}} \) depends on \( n \) and \( K \). For a scale-free distribution, with \( K \) "in the tails", that is, large enough, \( \frac{P_{X>nk}}{P_{X>K}} \) depends on \( n \) not \( K \). These latter distributions lack in characteristic scale and will end up having a Pareto tail, i.e., for \( x \) large enough, \( P_{X>x} = Cx^{-\alpha} \) where \( \alpha \) is the tail and \( C \) is a scaling constant.

Note: We can see from the scaling difference between the Student and the Pareto that...
2.8. SCALABLE AND NONSCALABLE, A DEEPER VIEW OF FAT TAILS

\[ P(X > x) = L(x)x^{-\alpha} \]

where \( L(x) \) is a "slow varying function", which satisfies the following:

\[ \lim_{x \to \infty} \frac{L(tx)}{L(x)} = 1 \]

for all constants \( t > 0 \).

For \( x \) large enough, \( \frac{\log P_{\geq x}}{\log x} \) converges to a constant, namely the tail exponent \(-\alpha\). A scalable should produce the slope \( \alpha \) in the tails on a log-log plot, as \( x \to \infty \). Compare to the Gaussian (with STD \( \sigma \) and mean \( \mu \)), by taking the PDF this time instead of the exceedance probability \( \log (f(x)) = \frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2} - \log(\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}) \equiv -\frac{1}{2\sigma^2} x^2 \) which goes to \(-\infty\) for \( \pm x \to \infty \).

So far this gives us the intuition of the difference between classes of distributions. Only scalable have "true" fat tails, as others turn into a Gaussian under summation. And the tail exponent is asymptotic; we may never get there and what we may see is an intermediate version of it. The figure above drew from Platonic off-the-shelf distributions; in reality processes are vastly more messy, with switches between exponents.

**Estimation issues.** Note that there are many methods to estimate the tail exponent \( \alpha \) from data, what is called a "calibration. However, we will see, the tail exponent is rather hard to guess, and its calibration marred with errors, owing to the insufficiency of data in the tails. In general, the data will show thinner tail than it should.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( k )</th>
<th>( P(X &gt; k)^{-1} ) (Gaussian)</th>
<th>( P(X &gt; k) ) (Gaussian)</th>
<th>( P(X &gt; k)^{-1} ) Student (3)</th>
<th>( P(X &gt; k) ) Student (3)</th>
<th>( P(X &gt; k)^{-1} ) Pareto (2)</th>
<th>( P(X &gt; k) ) Pareto (2)</th>
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<td>8000</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Scalability, comparing slowly varying functions to other distributions
2.9 Subexponential as a class of fat tailed distributions

We introduced the category "true fat tails" as scalable power laws to differentiate it from the weaker one of fat tails as having higher kurtosis than a Gaussian.

Some use as a cut point infinite variance, but Chapter 3 will show it to be not useful, even misleading. Many finance researchers (Officer, 1972) and many private communications with finance artists reveal some kind of mental block in seeing the world polarized into finite/infinite variance.

Another useful distinction: Let \( X = (x_i)_{1 \leq i \leq n} \) be i.i.d. random variables in \( \mathbb{R}^+ \), with cumulative distribution function \( F \); then by the Teugels (1975) and Pitman (1980) definition:

\[
\lim_{x \to \infty} \frac{1 - F^2(x)}{1 - F(x)} = 2
\]

where \( F^2 \) is the convolution of \( x \) with itself.

Note that \( X \) does not have to be limited to \( \mathbb{R}^+ \); we can split the variables in positive and negative domain for the analysis.

**Example 1.** Let \( f^2(x) \) be the density of a once-convolved one-tailed Pareto distribution scaled at 1 with tail exponent \( \alpha \), where the density of the non-convolved distribution

\[
f(x) = \alpha x^{-\alpha-1},
\]

\( x \geq 1, x \in [2, \infty) \),

which yields a closed-form density:

\[
f^2(x) = 2\alpha^2 x^{-2\alpha-1} \left( B_{\frac{1}{x}}(-\alpha, 1 - \alpha) - B_{\frac{1}{x}}(-\alpha, 1 - \alpha) \right)
\]

where \( B_z(a, b) \) is the Incomplete Beta function, \( B_z(a, b) \equiv \int_0^z t^{a-1} (1 - t)^{b-1} \, dt \)

\[
\left\{ \frac{\int_{K}^{\infty} f^2(x, \alpha) \, dx}{\int_{K}^{\infty} f(x, \alpha) \, dx} \right\}^{\alpha = 1, 2} =
\]

\[
\left\{ \frac{2(K + \log(K - 1))}{K}, \frac{2 \left( \frac{K(K+3)-6}{K-1} + 6 \log(K - 1) \right)}{K^2} \right\}
\]

and, for \( \alpha = 5 \),

\[
\frac{1}{2(K - 1)^4 K^5} \left(K(K(K(K(K(4K + 9) + 24) + 84) + 504) - 5250) + 10920 \right) - 8820) + 2520
\]

We know that the limit is 2 for all three cases, but it is important to observe the preasymptotics.
Example 2. Case of the Gaussian. Since the Gaussian belongs to the family of the stable distribution (Chapter x), the convolution will produce a Gaussian of twice the variance. So taking a Gaussian, $\mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ for short (0 mean and unitary standard deviation), the densities of the convolution will be Gaussian $(0, \sqrt{2})$, the ratio of the exceedances

$$\frac{\int_{K}^{\infty} f^2(x) \, dx}{\int_{K}^{\infty} f(x) \, dx} = \frac{\text{erfc} \left( \frac{K}{2} \right)}{\text{erfc} \left( \frac{K}{\sqrt{2}} \right)}$$

will rapidly explode.

Application: Two Real World Situations. We are randomly selecting two people, and the sum of their heights is 4.1 meters. What is the most likely combination? We are randomly selecting two people, and the sum of their assets, the total wealth is $30$ million. What is the most likely breakdown?

Assume two variables $X_1$ and $X_2$ following an identical distribution, where $f$ is the density function,

$$P[X_1 + X_2 = s] = f^2(s)$$
The probability densities of joint events, with $0 \leq \beta < \frac{s}{2}$:

$$P \left( X_1 = \frac{s}{n} + \beta \right) \times P \left( X_2 = \frac{s}{n} - \beta \right)$$

Let us work with the joint distribution for a given sum:

**For a Gaussian**, the product becomes

$$f \left( \frac{s}{n} + \beta \right) f \left( \frac{s}{n} - \beta \right) = \frac{e^{-\beta^2 - \frac{s^2}{2n^2}}}{2\pi}$$

**For a Power law**, say a Pareto distribution with $\alpha$ tail exponent, $f(x) = \alpha x^{-\alpha - 1} x_{\min}^\alpha$ where $x_{\min}$ is minimum value, $\frac{s}{2} \geq x_{\min}$, and $\beta \geq \frac{s}{2} - x_{\min}$

$$f \left( \beta + \frac{s}{n} \right) f \left( \beta - \frac{s}{n} \right) = \alpha^2 x_{\min}^{2\alpha} \left( \left( \beta - \frac{s}{2} \right) \left( \beta + \frac{s}{2} \right) \right)^{-\alpha - 1}$$

The product of two densities decreases with $\beta$ for the Gaussian\footnote{Technical comment: we illustrate some of the problems with continuous probability as follows. The sets 4.1 and 30 $10^6$ have Lebesgue measures 0, so we work with densities and comparing densities implies Borel subsets of the space, that is, intervals (open or closed) ± a point. When we say "net worth is}, and increases with the power law. For the Gaussian the maximal probability is obtained $\beta = 0$. For the power law, the larger the value of $\beta$, the better.

So the most likely combination is exactly 2.05 meters in the first example, and $x_{\min}$ and $30$ million $-x_{\min}$ in the second.
2.10. **DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR STATISTICALLY DERIVED ESTIMATORS**

There are broadly two separate ways to go about estimators: nonparametric and parametric.

---

**2.9.1 More General Approach to Subexponentiality**

More generally, distributions are called subexponential when the exceedance probability declines more slowly in the tails than the exponential.

For a one-tailed random variable,

\[
\lim_{x \to \infty} \frac{P_{X > \Sigma_x}}{P_{X > x}} = n, \quad \text{(Christyakov, 1964), which is equivalent to}
\]

\[
\lim_{x \to \infty} \frac{P_{X > \Sigma_x}}{P(X > \max(x))} = 1, \quad \text{(Embrecht and Goldie, 1980)}.
\]

The sum is of the same order as the maximum (positive) value, another way of saying that the tails play a large role.

Clearly \( F \) has to have no exponential moment:

\[
\int_0^\infty e^{\epsilon x} dF(x) = \infty
\]

for all \( \epsilon > 0 \).

We can visualize the convergence of the integral at higher values of \( m \): Figures 2.12 and 2.13 illustrate the effect of \( e^{mx} f(x) \), that is, the product of the exponential moment \( m \) and the density of a continuous distributions \( f(x) \) for large values of \( x \).

The standard Lognormal belongs to the subexponential category, but just barely so (we used in the graph above Log Normal-2 as a designator for a distribution with the tail exceedance \( \sim Ke^{-\beta(\log(x)-\mu)^7} \) where \( \gamma=2 \))

---

**2.10 Different Approaches For Statistically Derived Estimators**

There are broadly two separate ways to go about estimators: nonparametric and parametric.
CHAPTER 2. FAT TAILS AND THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Figure 2.13: Multiplying the Lognormal (0,1) density by $e^{mx}$, for $m = \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$.

Figure 2.14: A time series of an extremely fat-tailed distribution (one-tailed). Given a long enough series, the contribution from the largest observation should represent the entire sum, dwarfing the rest.
The nonparametric approach. It is based on observed raw frequencies derived from sample-size n. Roughly, it sets a subset of events A and $M_T^X(A,1)$ (i.e., $f(x) = 1$), so we are dealing with the frequencies $\varphi(A) = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_A$. Thus these estimates don't allow discussions on frequencies $\varphi < \frac{1}{n}$, at least not directly. Further the volatility of the estimator increases with lower frequencies. The error is a function of the frequency itself (or rather, the smaller of the frequency $\varphi$ and $1-\varphi$). So if $\sum_{i=0}^{n} 1_A = 30$ and $n = 1000$, only 3 out of 100 observations are expected to fall into the subset A, restricting the claims to too narrow a set of observations for us to be able to make a claim, even if the total sample $n = 1000$ is deemed satisfactory for other purposes. Some people introduce smoothing kernels between the various buckets corresponding to the various frequencies, but in essence the technique remains frequency-based. So if we nest subsets, $A_1 \subseteq A_2 \subseteq A$, the expected "volatility" (as we will see later in the chapter, we mean MAD, mean absolute deviation, not STD) of $M_T^X(A_z,f)$ will produce the following inequality:

$$\frac{E(|M_T^X(A_z,f) - M_T^X(A_{\geq}z,f)|)}{|M_T^X(A_z,f)|} \leq \frac{E(|M_T^X(A_{<}z,f) - M_T^X(A_{>}z,f)|)}{|M_T^X(A_{<}z,f)|}$$

for all functions f (Proof via twinking of law of large numbers for sum of random variables).

The parametric approach. It allows extrapolation but emprisons the representation into a specific off-the-shelf probability distribution (which can itself be composed of more sub-probability distributions); so $M_T^X$ is an estimated parameter for use input into a distribution or model and the freedom left resides in different values of the parameters.

Both methods make is difficult to deal with small frequencies. The nonparametric for obvious reasons of sample insufficiency in the tails, the parametric because small probabilities are very sensitive to parameter errors.

The Sampling Error for Convex Payoffs

This is the central problem of model error seen in consequences not in probability. The literature is used to discussing errors on probability which should not matter much for small probabilities. But it matters for payoffs, as f can depend on x. Let us see how the problem becomes very bad when we consider f and in the presence of fat tails. Simply, you are multiplying the error in probability by a large number, since fat tails imply that the probabilities $p(x)$ do not decline fast enough for large values of x. Now the literature seem to have examined errors in probability, not errors in payoff.

Let $M_T^X(A_z,f)$ be the estimator of a function of x in the subset $A_z = (\delta_1, \delta_2)$ of the support of the variable. Let $\xi(M_T^X(A_z,f))$ be the mean absolute error in the estimation of the probability in the small subset $A_z = (\delta_1, \delta_2)$, i.e.,

$$\xi(M_T^X(A_z,f)) = \frac{E|M_T^X(A_z,1) - M_T^X(A_{\geq}z,1)|}{M_T^X(A_z,1)}$$

Assume f(x) is either linear or convex (but not concave) in the form $C + \Lambda \cdot x^\beta$, with both $\Lambda > 0$, $\beta > 0$, or $\Lambda > 0$, $\beta < 0$.
Then the estimation error of $M_X^T (A_z, f)$ compounds the error in probability, thus giving us the lower bound in relation to $\xi$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \left| M_X^T (A_z, f) - M_{\geq T}^X (A_z, f) \right| \right] \geq \left( |\delta_1 - \delta_2| \min (|\delta_2|, |\delta_1|) \right)^{\beta - 1}$$

$$+ \min (|\delta_2|, |\delta_1|) \mathbb{E} \left[ \left| M_X^T (A_z, 1) - M_{\geq T}^X (A_z, 1) \right| \right]$$

Since $\frac{\mathbb{E}[M_{\geq T}^X (A_z, f)]}{\mathbb{E}[M_{\geq T}^X (A_z, 1)]} = \frac{\int_{\delta_1^2}^{\delta_2^2} f(x)p(x) \, dx}{\int_{\delta_1^2}^{\delta_2^2} p(x) \, dx}$, and expanding $f(x)$, for a given $n$ on both sides.

We can now generalize to the central inequality from convexity of payoff, which we shorten as Convex Payoff Sampling Error Inequalities, CPSEI:

**Rule 2.** Under our conditions above, if for all $\lambda \in (0,1)$ and $f^{\{i,j\}} (x \pm \Delta) \in A_z$,

$$(1-\lambda) f^i(x-\Delta) + \lambda f^i(x+\Delta) \geq (1-\lambda) f^j(x-\Delta) + \lambda f^j(x+\Delta), \ (f^i is never less convex than f^j in interval A_z),$$

then

$$\xi \left( M_X^T (A_z, f^i) \right) \geq \xi \left( M_X^T (A_z, f^j) \right)$$

**Rule 3.** Let $n_i$ be the number of observations required for $M_{\geq T}^X (A_{zi}, f^i)$ the estimator under $f^i$ to get an equivalent expected mean absolute deviation as $M_{\geq T}^X (A_{zj}, f^j)$ under $f^j$ with observation size $n_j$, that is, for $\xi(M_X^T, n_i (A_{zi}, f^i)) = \xi(M_X^T, n_j (A_{zj}, f^j))$, then

$$n_i \geq n_j$$

This inequality becomes strict in the case of nonfinite first moment for the underlying distribution.

The proofs are obvious for distributions with finite second moment, using the speed of convergence of the sum of random variables expressed in mean deviations. We will not get to them until Chapter x on convergence and limit theorems but an example will follow in a few lines.

We will discuss the point further in Chapter x, in the presentation of the conflation problem.

For a sketch of the proof, just consider that the convex transformation of a probability distribution $p(x)$ produces a new distribution $f(x) \equiv \Lambda x^\beta$ with density $p_f(x) = \Lambda^{-1/\beta} x^{1-\beta} p \left( \frac{x}{\Lambda} \right)^{1/\beta}$ over its own adjusted domain, for which we find an increase in volatility, which means that any mean absolute deviation is of greater volatility for
2.10. DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR STATISTICALLY DERIVED ESTIMATORS

Example. For a Gaussian distribution, the variance of the transformation becomes:

\[ V(\Lambda x^\beta) = \frac{2^\beta - 2 \Lambda^2 \sigma^2 \beta}{\pi} \left( 2\sqrt{\pi} (-1)^{2\beta + 1} \Gamma\left( \beta + \frac{1}{2} \right) - (-1)^{\beta + 1} \Gamma\left( \frac{\beta + 1}{2} \right)^2 \right) \]

and to adjust the scale to be homogeneous degree 1, the variance of

\[ V(x^\beta) = \frac{2^\beta - 2 \sigma^2 \beta}{\pi} \left( 2\sqrt{\pi} (-1)^{2\beta + 1} \Gamma\left( \beta + \frac{1}{2} \right) - (-1)^{\beta + 1} \Gamma\left( \frac{\beta + 1}{2} \right)^2 \right) \]

For \( \Lambda = 1 \), we get an idea of the increase in variance from convex transformations:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>Variance ( V(\beta) )</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>( \sigma^2 )</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 ( \sigma^4 )</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15 ( \sigma^6 )</td>
<td>( \frac{231}{5} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>96 ( \sigma^8 )</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>945 ( \sigma^{10} )</td>
<td>( \frac{46189}{63} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10170 ( \sigma^{12} )</td>
<td>( \frac{38787711}{12769} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the standard deviation drops at the rate \( \sqrt{n} \) for non power laws, the number of \( n(\beta) \), that is, the number of observations needed to incur the same error on the sample in standard deviation space will be \( \sqrt{V(\beta)} / \sqrt{\sigma^2} = \sqrt{V(1)} / \sqrt{n} \), hence \( n_1 = 2 n \sigma^2 \). But to equalize the errors in mean deviation space, since Kurtosis is higher than that of a Gaussian, we need to translate back into \( L^1 \) space, which is elementary in most cases.

For a Pareto Distribution with domain \( v[x^\beta_{\text{min}}, \infty) \),

\[ V(\Lambda x^\beta) = \frac{\alpha \Lambda^2 x^\beta_{\text{min}}}{(\alpha - 2)(\alpha - 1)^2}. \]

Using Log characteristic functions allows us to deal with the difference in sums and get the speed of convergence.

**Example illustrating the Convex Payoff Inequality.** Let us compare the "true" theoretical value to random samples drawn from the Student T with 3 degrees of freedom, for \( M_T^X(A, x^\beta) \), \( A = (-\infty, -3] \), \( n=200 \), across \( m \) simulations \( (> 10^5) \) by estimating \( E |M_T^X(A, x^\beta) - M_{T > 0}^X(A, x^\beta) / M_T^X(A, x^\beta)| \) using

\[ 1 \leftarrow m \leftarrow n \frac{1}{n} \left( x_i^j \right)^\beta \]

\[ \Rightarrow \frac{1}{n} \left( x_i^j \right)^\beta \]
It produces the following table showing an explosive relative error $\xi$. We compare the effect to a Gaussian with matching standard deviation, namely $\sqrt{3}$. The relative error becomes infinite as $\beta$ approaches the tail exponent. We can see the difference between the Gaussian and the power law of finite second moment: both "sort of" resemble each others in many applications — but... not really.

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<th>$\xi_{G(0, \sqrt{3})}$</th>
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<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>&quot;fuhgetaboudit&quot;</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Warning.** Severe mistake (common in the economics literature). One should never make a decision involving $M^X_T (A_{>z}, f)$ and basing it on calculations for $M^X_T (A_z, 1)$, especially when $f$ is convex, as it violates CPSEI. Yet many papers make such a mistake. And as we saw under fat tails the problem is vastly more severe.

**Utility Theory.** Note that under a concave utility of negative states, decisions require a larger sample. By CPSEI the magnification of errors require larger number of observation. This is typically missed in the decision-science literature. But there is worse, as we see next.

**Tail payoffs.** The author is disputing, in Taleb (2013), the results of a paper, Ilmanen (2013), on why tail probabilities are overvalued by the market: naively Ilmanen (2013) took the observed probabilities of large deviations, $f(x) = 1$ then made an inference for $f(x)$ an option payoff based on $x$, which can be extremely explosive (a error that can cause losses of several orders of magnitude the initial gain). Chapter x revisits the problem in the context of nonlinear transformations of random variables. The error on the estimator can be in the form of parameter mistake that inputs into the assumed probability distribution, say $\sigma$ the standard deviation (Chapter x and discussion of metaprobability), or in the frequency estimation. Note now that if $\delta_1 \rightarrow -\infty$, we may have an infinite error on $M^X_T (A_z, f)$, the left-tail shortfall while, by definition, the error on probability is necessarily bounded.

If you assume in addition that the distribution $p(x)$ is expected to have fat tails (of
Now the mistake of estimating the properties of $x$, then making a decisions for a nonlinear function of it, $f(x)$, not realizing that the errors for $f(x)$ are different from those of $x$ is extremely common. Naively, one needs a lot larger sample for $f(x)$ when $f(x)$ is convex than when $f(x) = x$. We will re-examine it along with the "conflation problem" in Chapter x.

2.11 Econometrics imagines functions in $L^2$ Space

Note

There is something Wrong With Econometrics, as Almost All Papers Don’t Replicate. Two reliability tests in Chapter x, one about parametric methods the other about robust statistics, show that there is something rotten in econometric methods, fundamentally wrong, and that the methods are not dependable enough to be of use in anything remotely related to risky decisions. Practitioners keep spinning inconsistent ad hoc statements to explain failures.

We will show how, with economic variables one single observation in 10,000, that is, one single day in 40 years, can explain the bulk of the "kurtosis", a measure of "fat tails", that is, both a measure how much the distribution under consideration departs from the standard Gaussian, or the role of remote events in determining the total properties. For the U.S. stock market, a single day, the crash of 1987, determined 80% of the kurtosis for the period between 1952 and 2008. The same problem is found with interest and exchange rates, commodities, and other variables. Redoing the study at different periods with different variables shows a total instability to the kurtosis. The problem is not just that the data had "fat tails", something people knew but sort of wanted to forget; it was that we would never be able to determine "how fat" the tails were within standard methods. Never.

---

Lo and Mueller: "... "black swans" (Taleb, 2007). These cultural icons refer to disasters that occur so infrequently that they are virtually impossible to analyze using standard statistical inference. However, we find this perspective less than helpful because it suggests a state of hopeless ignorance in which we..."
2.12 Typical Manifestations of The Turkey Surprise

Two critical (and lethal) mistakes, entailing mistaking inclusion in a class $D_i$ for $D_{<i}$ because of induced slowness in the convergence under the law of large numbers. We will see that in the hierarchy, scale (or variance) is swamped by tail deviations.

Great Moderation (Bernanke, 2006) consists in mistaking a two-tailed process with fat tails for a process with thin tails and low volatility.

Long Peace (Pinker, 2011) consists in mistaking a one-tailed process with fat tails for a process with thin tails and low volatility and low mean.

Some background on Bernanke’s severe mistake. When I finished writing The Black Swan, in 2006, I was confronted with ideas of "great moderation" stemming from the drop in volatility in financial markets. People involved in promulgating such theories did not realize that the process was getting fatter and fatter tails (from operational and financial, leverage, complexity, interdependence, etc.), meaning fewer but deeper departures from the mean. The fact that nuclear bombs explode less often than regular shells does not make them safer. Needless to say that with the arrival of the events of 2008, I did not have to explain myself too much. Nevertheless people in economics are still using the methods that led to the "great moderation" narrative, and Bernanke, the protagonist of the theory, had his mandate renewed.

When I contacted social scientists I discovered that the familiarity with fat tails was pitifully small, highly inconsistent, and confused.

Later, to my horror, I saw an identical theory of great moderation...
2.13. METRICS FOR FUNCTIONS OUTSIDE $L^2$ SPACE

We can see from the data in Chapter 3 that the predictability of the Gaussian-style cumulants is low, the mean deviation of mean deviation is $\sigma \approx 70\%$ of the mean deviation $\sigma$.

### Table 2.2: Robust cumulants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distr</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaussian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} \sigma$</td>
<td>$2e^{-1/\pi} \sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} \left(1 - e^{\frac{1}{\pi}} \text{erfc} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}}\right)\right) \sigma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pareto $\alpha$</td>
<td>$\frac{\alpha s}{\alpha - 1}$</td>
<td>$2(\alpha - 1)\alpha^{-2} \alpha^{1-\alpha} s$</td>
<td>$\frac{8\sqrt{3}\Gamma\left(\frac{5}{4}\right)}{\pi^{3/2}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST $\alpha=3/2$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$2\sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} s \Gamma\left(\frac{5}{4}\right) / \Gamma\left(\frac{3}{4}\right)$</td>
<td>$s - \frac{s}{\sqrt{2}} \tan^{-1}\left(\frac{3}{s}\right)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST Square $\alpha=2$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\sqrt{2}s$</td>
<td>$s - \frac{s}{\sqrt{2}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST Cubic $\alpha=3$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\frac{2\sqrt{3}s}{\pi}$</td>
<td>$\frac{8\sqrt{3}s \tan^{-1}\left(\frac{3}{s}\right)}{\pi^2}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where erfc is the complimentary error function $\text{erfc}(z) = 1 - \frac{2}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_0^z e^{-t^2} dt$.

Figure 2.16: History moves by jumps: A fat tailed historical process, in which events are distributed according to a power law that corresponds to the "80/20", with $\alpha \approx 1.2$, the equivalent of a 3-D Brownian motion.

Chapter x will get into the details and what we can learn from it.

2.13 Metrics for Functions Outside $L^2$ Space

We can see from the data in Chapter 3 that the predictability of the Gaussian-style cumulants is low, the mean deviation of mean deviation is $\sigma \approx 70\%$ of the mean deviation $\sigma$. Except that it applied to security. The problem is that, unlike Bernanke, Pinker realized the process had fat tails, but did not realize the resulting errors in inference.

Chapter x will get into the details and what we can learn from it.
Figure 2.17: What the proponents of "great moderation" or "long peace" have in mind: history as a thin-tailed process.
of the standard deviation (in sample, but the effect is much worse in practice); working with squares is not a good estimator. Many have the illusion that we need variance: we don’t, even in finance and economics (especially in finance and economics).

We propose different cumulants, that should exist whenever the mean exists. So we are not in the dark when we refuse standard deviation. It is just that these cumulants require more computer involvement and do not lend themselves easily to existing Platonic distributions. And, unlike in the conventional Brownian Motion universe, they don’t scale neatly.

Note finally that these measures are central since, to assess the quality of the estimation $M^X_T$, we are concerned with the expected mean error of the empirical expectation, here $E (|M^X_T (A_z, f) - M^X_{>T} (A_z, f)|)$, where $z$ corresponds to the support of the distribution.

$C_0 \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{T} x_i}{T}$

(This is the simple case of $1_A = 1_D$; an alternative would be:

$C_0 \equiv \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{T} 1_A} \sum_{i=1}^{T} x_i 1_A$ or $C_0 \equiv \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{T} 1_D} \sum_{i=1}^{T} x_i 1_A$,

depending on whether the function of concern for the fragility metric requires conditioning or not).

$C_1 \equiv \frac{1}{T-1} \sum_{i=1}^{T} |x_i - C_0|$

produces the Mean Deviation (but centered by the mean, the first moment).

$C_2 \equiv \frac{1}{T-2} \sum_{i=1}^{T} ||x_i - C_0|| - C_1|$

produces the mean deviation of the mean deviation. . . .

$C_N \equiv \frac{1}{T-N} \sum_{i=1}^{T} ||||x_i - C_0|| - C_1|| - C_2|| - ... - C_{N-1}|$

Note the practical importance of $C_1$: under some conditions usually met, it measures the quality of the estimation $E [||M^X_T (A_z, f) - M^X_{>T} (A_z, f)||]$, since $M^X_{>T} (A_z, f) = C_0$. When discussing fragility, we will use a "tail cumulant", that is absolute deviations for $1_A$ covering a specific tail.

Table 2.2 shows the theoretical first two cumulants for two symmetric distributions: a Gaussian, $N (0, \sigma)$ and a symmetric Student T St$(0, s, \alpha)$ with mean 0, a scale parameter $s$, the PDF for $x$ is

$$
\left( \frac{\alpha}{\tau - \alpha^2} \right)^{\frac{\alpha+1}{2}}
$$
As to the PDF of the Pareto distribution, \( p(x) = \alpha s^\alpha x^{-\alpha - 1} \) for \( x \geq s \) (and the mean will be necessarily positive).

These cumulants will be useful in areas for which we do not have a good grasp of convergence of the sum of observations.

### 2.14 A Comment on Bayesian Methods in Risk Management

[This section will be developed further; how the statement "but this is my prior" can be nonsense with risk management if such a prior is not solid.]

Brad Efron (2013)[17]

Sorry. My own practice is to use Bayesian analysis in the presence of genuine prior information; to use empirical Bayes methods in the parallel cases situation; and otherwise to be cautious when invoking uninformative priors. In the last case, Bayesian calculations cannot be uncritically accepted and should be checked by other methods, which usually means frequentistically.

### Further Reading

Pitman [53], Embrechts and Goldie (1982)[20]//Embrechts (1979 Doctoral thesis?)[21], Chistyakov (1964) [12], Goldie (1978)[31], Pitman[53], Teugels [70], and, more general, [22].
For monomodal distributions, fat tails are the norm: one can look at tens of thousands of time series of the socio-economic variables without encountering a single episode of "platykurtic" distributions. But for multimodal distributions, some surprises can occur.

A.1 Multimodality and Fat Tails, or the War and Peace Model

We noted in 1.x that stochasticizing, ever so mildly, variances, the distribution gains in fat tailedness (as expressed by kurtosis). But we maintained the same mean.

But should we stochasticize the mean as well, and separate the potential outcomes wide enough, so that we get many modes, the "kurtosis" (as measured by the fourth moment) would drop. And if we associate different variances with different means, we get a variety of "regimes", each with its set of probabilities.

Either the very meaning of "fat tails" loses its significance under multimodality, or takes on a new one where the "middle", around the expectation ceases to matter.[1, 42].
with expected mean \( m_1 \) and standard deviation \( \sigma_1 \), \( s_2 \) a violent regime, with expected mean \( m_2 \) and standard deviation \( \sigma_2 \), and more. Each state has its probability \( p_i \).

Assume, to simplify a one-period model, as if one was standing in front of a discrete slice of history, looking forward at outcomes. (Adding complications (transition matrices between different regimes) doesn’t change the main result.)

The Characteristic Function \( \phi(t) \) for the mixed distribution becomes:

\[
\phi(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i e^{-\frac{1}{2}t^2\sigma_i^2 + itm_i}
\]

For \( N = 2 \), the moments simplify to the following:

\[
M_1 = p_1 m_1 + (1 - p_1) m_2
\]

\[
M_2 = p_1 (m_1^2 + \sigma_1^2) + (1 - p_1) (m_2^2 + \sigma_2^2)
\]

\[
M_3 = p_1 m_1^3 + (1 - p_1) m_2 (m_2^2 + 3\sigma_2^2) + 3m_1 m_1 \sigma_1^2
\]

\[
M_4 = p_1 (6m_1^2 \sigma_1^2 + m_1^4 + 3\sigma_1^4) + (1 - p_1) (6m_2^2 \sigma_2^2 + m_2^4 + 3\sigma_2^4)
\]

Let us consider the different varieties, all characterized by the condition \( p_1 < (1 - p_1) \), \( m_1 < m_2 \), preferably \( m_1 < 0 \) and \( m_2 > 0 \), and, at the core, the central property: \( \sigma_1 > \sigma_2 \).

### Variety 1: War and Peace

Calm period with positive mean and very low volatility, turmoil with negative mean and extremely low volatility.
A.2. TRANSITION PROBABILITES, OR WHAT CAN BREAK WILL EVENTUALLY BREAK

Variety 2: Conditional deterministic state. Take a bond $B$, paying interest $r$ at the end of a single period. At termination, there is a high probability of getting $B(1 + r)$, a possibility of default. Getting exactly $B$ is very unlikely. Think that there are no intermediary steps between war and peace: these are separable and discrete states. Bonds don’t just default "a little bit". Note the divergence, the probability of the realization being at or close to the mean is about nil. Typically, $p(\mathbb{E}(x))$ the probability densities of the expectation are smaller than at the different means of regimes, so $\mathbb{P}(x = \mathbb{E}(x)) < \mathbb{P}(x = m_1)$ and $< \mathbb{P}(x = m_2)$, but in the extreme case (bonds), $\mathbb{P}(x = \mathbb{E}(x))$ becomes increasingly small. The tail event is the realization around the mean.

In option payoffs, this bimodality has the effect of raising the value of at-the-money options and lowering that of the out-of-the-money ones, causing the exact opposite of the so-called "volatility smile".

Note the coffee cup has no state between broken and healthy. And the state of being broken can be considered to be an absorbing state (using Markov chains for transition probabilities), since broken cups do not end up fixing themselves.

Nor are coffee cups likely to be "slightly broken", as we see in figure A.1.

A.1.1 A brief list of other situations where bimodality is encountered:

1. Mergers
2. Professional choices and outcomes
3. Conflicts: interpersonal, general, martial, any situation in which there is no intermediary between harmonious relations and hostility.
4. Conditional cascades

A.2 Transition probabilites, or what can break will eventually break
more. But let us go through an exercise that will give us an idea about fragility. Assuming
the structure of the model stays the same, we can look at the longer term behavior under
transition of states. Let \( P \) be the matrix of transition probabilities, where \( p_{i,j} \) is the
transition from state \( i \) to state \( j \) over \( \Delta t \), (that is, where \( S(t) \) is the regime prevailing
over period \( t \), \( P(S(t + \Delta t) = s_j | S(t) = s_i) \))

\[
P = \begin{pmatrix}
p_{1,1} & p_{2,1} \\
p_{1,2} & p_{2,2}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

After \( n \) periods, that is, \( n \) steps,

\[
P^n = \begin{pmatrix}
a_n & b_n \\
c_n & d_n
\end{pmatrix}
\]

Where

\[
a_n = \frac{(p_{1,1} - 1)(p_{1,1} + p_{2,2} - 1)^n + p_{2,2} - 1}{p_{1,1} + p_{2,2} - 2}
\]

\[
b_n = \frac{(1 - p_{1,1})((p_{1,1} + p_{2,2} - 1)^n - 1)}{p_{1,1} + p_{2,2} - 2}
\]

\[
c_n = \frac{(1 - p_{2,2})((p_{1,1} + p_{2,2} - 1)^n - 1)}{p_{1,1} + p_{2,2} - 2}
\]

\[
d_n = \frac{(p_{2,2} - 1)(p_{1,1} + p_{2,2} - 1)^n + p_{1,1} - 1}{p_{1,1} + p_{2,2} - 2}
\]

The extreme case to consider is the one with the absorbing state, where \( p_{1,1} = 1 \), hence
(replacing \( p_{i,j} \neq i | i=1,2 = 1 - p_{i,i} \)).

\[
P^n = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 \\
1 - p_{2,2}^N & p_{2,2}^N
\end{pmatrix}
\]

and the "ergodic" probabilities:

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P^n = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 \\
1 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

The implication is that the absorbing state regime 1 \( S(1) \) will end up dominating with
probability 1: what can break and is irreversible will eventually break.

With the "ergodic" matrix,

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P^n = \pi.1^T
\]

where \( 1^T \) is the transpose of unitary vector \( \{1,1\} \), \( \pi \) the matrix of eigenvectors.

The implied matrix \( \pi = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 1
\end{pmatrix} \) where \( 1 \) is the transpose of unitary vector \( \{1,1\} \).
Appendix: Quick and Robust Measure of Fat Tails

B.1 Introduction

We propose a new measure of fatness of tails. We also propose a quick heuristic to extract the tail exponent $\alpha$ and get distributions for a symmetric power law distributed variable. It is based on using whatever moments are believed to be reasonably finite, and replaces kurtosis which in financial data has proved to be unbearingly unstable ([65], [68]). The technique also remedies some of the instability of the Hill estimator, along with its natural tradeoff between how much data one must discard in order to retain in the tails that is relevant to draw the slope. Our estimators use the entire data available. This paper covers two situations:

1. Mild fat tails: a symmetric distribution with finite second moment, $\alpha > 2$, preferably in the neighborhood of 3. (Above 4 the measure of kurtosis becomes applicable again).

2. Extremely fat tails: a symmetric distribution with finite first moment, $1 < \alpha < 3$.

Let $x$ be a r.v. on the real line. Let $x$ be distributed according to a Student T distribution.

$$p(x) = \frac{\left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \frac{(x - \mu)^2}{\sigma^2}}\right)^{\alpha + 1}}{\sqrt{\alpha \sigma B \left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)}}$$ (B.1)

We assume that $\mu = 0$ for data in high enough frequency as the mean will not have an effect on the estimation tail exponent.

B.2 First Metric, the Simple Estimator

Assume finite variance and the tail exponent $\alpha > 2$. 
Figure B.1: Full Distribution of the estimators for $\alpha = 3$

Figure B.2: Full Distribution of the estimators for $\alpha = 7/4$
B.3. SECOND METRIC, THE Ξ₂ ESTIMATOR

\[ \Xi(\alpha) = \sqrt{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{x^2 \left( \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \frac{x^2}{\alpha+\frac{x^2}{2}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha+1}{2}}}{\sqrt{\alpha B\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)}} \, dx} = \frac{\sqrt{\pi} \sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-2}} \Gamma \left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right)}{\sqrt{\alpha} \Gamma \left(\frac{\alpha-1}{2}\right)} \] (B.2)

The tail from the observations: Consider a random sample of size \( n \), \( (X_i)_{1 \leq i \leq n} \). Get a sample metric

Where STD and MAD are the sample standard and mean absolute deviations.

\[ m = \frac{STD}{MAD} \]

for the sample (these measures do not necessarily need to be central). The estimation of \( m \) using maximum likelihood methods [FILL]

The recovered tail \( \alpha_\Xi \).

\[ \alpha_\Xi = \Xi^{-1}(m) = \{ \alpha : \Xi(\alpha) = m \} \]

which is computed numerically.

The \( H_m \) corresponds to the measure of the \( m \) largest deviation in the right tails= (a negative value for \( m \) means it is the left tail). We rank \( X_{(1)} \geq X_{(2)} \geq \ldots \geq X_{(m)} \geq \ldots \geq X_{(n)} \). The Hill estimator

\[ H_m = \left( \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m} \log \left( \frac{X_i}{X_{m+1}} \right)}{m} \right)^{-1} \]

Table B.1: Simulation for true \( \alpha = 3, \, N = 1000 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>STD Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( H_{10} )</td>
<td>3.09681</td>
<td>1.06873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( H_{20} )</td>
<td>2.82439</td>
<td>0.639901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( H_{50} )</td>
<td>2.4879</td>
<td>0.334652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( H_{100} )</td>
<td>2.14297</td>
<td>0.196846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha_\Xi^* )</td>
<td>3.26668</td>
<td>0.422277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.3 Second Metric, the \( \Xi_2 \) estimator
\[ \Xi_2(\alpha) = \left( (\alpha - 1)B\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right) \right)^{\alpha - 1} \left( \left( (\alpha - 1)^2 B\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + 4 \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{2}} \right) - \\
\quad \quad 2^{-\alpha} (\alpha - 1) _2F_1\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{\alpha+1}{2}, \frac{\alpha+2}{2}; -\frac{1}{4} (\alpha - 1)^2 B\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 \right) \frac{\alpha}{(\alpha - 1)} _2F_1\left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\alpha+1}{2}, 3; -\frac{4}{(\alpha - 1)^2 B\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)^2} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \] (B.3)

\[ m' = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{|X_i - \text{MAD}|}{MAD} \]

Table B.2: Simulation for true \( \alpha = 7/4, N = 1000 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>STD Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( H_{10} )</td>
<td>1.92504</td>
<td>0.677026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( H_{20} )</td>
<td>1.80589</td>
<td>0.423783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( H_{50} )</td>
<td>1.68919</td>
<td>0.237579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( H_{100} )</td>
<td>1.56134</td>
<td>0.149595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha^*_2 )</td>
<td>1.8231</td>
<td>0.243436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The "Déjà Vu" Illusion

A matter of some gravity. Black Swan neglect was prevalent before... and after the exposition of the ideas. They just feel as if they were present in the discourse. For there is a common response to the Black Swan problem, one of the sort: "fat tails... we know it. There is nothing new there". In general, the "nothing new" response is more likely to come from nonspecialists or people who do not know a subject well. For a philistine, Verdi’s Trovatore is not new, since it sounds like another opera he heard by Mozart with women torturing their throat. One needs to know a subject to place it in context.

We take a stop and show what is different in this text, and why it is a hindrance for risk understanding. Our point point is that under fat tails we have near-total opacity for some segments of the distribution, incomputability of tail probability and convergence of different laws, hence need to move to measurements of fragility.

The response: "Mandelbrot and Pareto did fat tails" is effectively backwards. In fact they arrived to the opposite of opacity. Now, risk and uncertainty? Keynes and Knight dealt with uncertainty as opposed to risk? Well, they got exactly opposite results.

They do not notice that it is the equivalent of saying that anyone using an equation is doing nothing new since equations were discovered by ancients, or that calculus was invented by Newton, and that, accordingly, they themselves did nothing worthy of attention.

Now, what they do not say "nothing new" about is exactly what has nothing new, some wrinkle on some existing conversation, by the narcissism of small differences.

Some economists’ reaction to skin-in-the-game, SITG (on which, later, but the bias is relevant here): "nothing new; we know everything about the agency problem" (remarkably they always know everything about everything but never see problems before they occur, and rarely after). Our point is beyond their standard agency problem: 1) it is evolutionary, aiming at throwing bad risk takers out of the gene pool so they stop harming others, 2) under fat tails, and slow law of large numbers, only SITG works to protect systems, 3) It is moral philosophy, 4) It requires building a system that can accommodate SITG. Economists do not notice that it is asking them to leave the pool when they make mistakes, etc. Effectively Joseph Stiglitz, the author of the Palgrave encyclopedia entry on the agency problem missed that had he had skin in the game with Fanny Mae he would have exited them. God, for their own good, he should have
sub-disciplines and stop giving macro advice. Giving opinions without downside is the opposite of SITG.


3 | HIERARCHY OF DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ASYMMETRIES

Chapter Summary 3: Using the asymptotic Radon-Nikodym derivatives of probability measures, we construct a formal methodology to avoid the "masquerade problem" namely that standard "empirical" tests are not empirical at all and can be fooled by fat tails, though not by thin tails, as a fat tailed distribution (which requires a lot more data) can masquerade as a low-risk one, but not the reverse. Remarkably this point is the statistical version of the logical asymmetry between evidence of absence and absence of evidence. We put some refinement around the notion of "failure to reject", as it may misapply in some situations. We show how such tests as Kolmogorov Smirnoff, Anderson-Darling, Jarque-Bera, Mardia Kurtosis, and others can be gamed and how our ranking rectifies the problem.

3.1 Permissible Empirical Statements

One can make statements of the type "This is not Gaussian", or "this is not Poisson"(many people don’t realize that Poisson distributions are generally thin tailed owing to finite moments); but one cannot rule out a Cauchy tail or other similar power laws. So this chapter puts some mathematical structure around the idea of which "empirical" statements are permissible in acceptance and rejection and which ones are not. (One can violate these statements but not from data analysis, only basing oneself on a priori statement of what belongs to some probability distributions.)

Let us get deeper into the masquerade problem, as it concerns the problem of induction and fat-tailed environments, and get to the next step. Simply, if a mechanism is fat tailed it can deliver large values; therefore the incidence of large deviations is possible, but how possible, how often these occur should occur, will be hard to know with any precision beforehand. This is similar to the standard water puddle problem: plenty of ice cubes could have generated it. As someone who goes from reality to possible explanatory models, I face a completely different spate of problems from those who do the opposite.

1Classical statistical theory is based on rejection and failure to reject, which is inadequate as one can
We said that fat tailed series can, in short episodes, masquerade as thin-tailed. At the worst, we don’t know how long it would take to know for sure what is going on. But we can have a pretty clear idea whether organically, because of the nature of the payoff, the "Black Swan" can hit on the left (losses) or on the right (profits). This point can be used in climatic analysis. Things that have worked for a long time are preferable—they are more likely to have reached their ergodic states.

This chapter aims here at building a rigorous methodology for attaining statistical (and more general) knowledge by rejection, and cataloguing rejections, not addition. We can reject some class of statements concerning the fat-tailedness of the payoff, not others.

### 3.2 Masquerade Example

![Figure 3.1: N=1000. Sample simulation. Both series have the exact same means and variances at the level of the generating process. Naive use of common metrics leads to the acceptance that the process A has thin tails.](image)

![Figure 3.2: N=1000. Rejection: Another realization. there is 1/2 chance of seeing the real properties of A. We can now reject the hypothesis that the smoother process has thin tails.](image)

We construct the cases as switching between Gaussians with variances

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma^2(a + 1) & \text{ with probability } p \\
\sigma^2(b + 1) & \text{ with probability } (1 - p)
\end{align*}
\]
a Kurtosis $\kappa = \frac{3((1-a^2)p-1)}{p-1}$ thus allowing polarized states and high kurtosis, with a condition that for $a > (0)$, $a < (0) \frac{1-p}{p}$. Let us compare the two cases:

A) A switching process producing Kurtosis $= 10^7$ (using $p = 1/2000$, a slightly below the upper bound $a=\frac{1-p}{p}$) to

B) The regular situation $p = 0$, $a = 1$, the case of kurtosis $\kappa = 3$.

The two graphs in figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the realizations of the processes A (to repeat, produced with the switching process) and B, entirely Gaussian, both of the same variance.

### 3.3 The Probabilistic Version of Absence of Evidence

Our concern is exposing some errors in probabilistic statements and statistical inference, in making inferences symmetric, when they are more likely to be false on one side than the other, or more harmful one side than another. Believe it or not, this pervades the entire literature.

Many have the illusion that "because Kolmogorov-Smirnov is nonparametric", it is therefore immune to the nature specific distribution under the test (perhaps from an accurate sentence in Feller (1971), vol 2 as we will see further down). The belief in Kolmogorov-Smirnov is also built in the illusion that our concern is probability rather than expected payoff, or the associated problem of "confusing a binary for a vanilla", where by attribute substitution, one tests a certain variable in place of another, simpler one.

In other words, it is a severe mistake to treat epistemological inequalities as equalities. No matter what we do, we end up going back to the problem of induction, except that the world still exists and people unburdened with too many theories are still around. By making one-sided statements, or decisions, we have been immune to the muddle in statistical inference.

**Remark on via negativa and the problem of induction.** Test statistics are effective (and robust) at rejecting, but not at accepting, as a single large deviation allowed the rejection with extremely satisfactory margins (a near-infinitesimal P-Value). This illustrates the central epistemological difference between absence of evidence and evidence of absence.

### 3.4 Via Negativa and One-Sided Arbitrage of Statistical Methods

**Via negativa.** In theology and philosophy, corresponds to the focus on what something is not, an indirect definition. In action, it is a recipe for what to avoid, what not to do—subtraction, not addition, say, in medicine. In epistemology: what to *not* accept, or reject of the first principle of knowable attacks, pure rejection (Scientiae...
The proof and the derivations are based on climbing to a higher level of abstraction by focusing the discussion on a hierarchy of distributions based on fat-tailedness.

**Remark** Test statistics can be arbitraged, or "fooled" in one direction, not the other.

Let us build a hierarchy of distributions based on tail events. But, first, a discussion of the link to the problem of induction.

From *The Black Swan* (Chapter 16): This author has learned a few tricks from experience dealing with power laws: whichever exponent one try to measure will be likely to be overestimated (recall that a lower exponent implies a smaller role for large deviations)—what you see is likely to be less Black Swannish than what you do not see. Let’s say I generate a process that has an exponent of 1.7. You do not see what is inside the engine, only the data coming out. If I ask you what the exponent is, odds are that you will compute something like 2.4. You would do so even if you had a million data points. The reason is that it takes a long time for some fat tailed processes to reveal their properties, and you underestimate the severity of the shock. Sometimes a fat tailed distribution can make you believe that it is Gaussian, particularly when the process has mixtures. (Page 267, slightly edited).

### 3.5 Hierarchy of Distributions in Term of Tails

Let \( D_i \) be a class of probability measures, \( D_i \subset D_{>i} \) means in our terminology that a random event "in" \( D_i \) would necessarily "be in" \( D_j \), with \( j > i \), and we can express it as follows. Let \( A_K \) be a one-tailed interval in \( \mathbb{R} \), unbounded on one side \( K \), s.a. \( A^-_K = (-\infty, K] \) or \( A^+_K = [K, \infty) \), and \( \mu(A) \) the probability measure on the interval, which corresponds to \( \mu_i(A^-_K) \) the cumulative distribution function for \( K \) on the left, and \( \mu_i(A^+_K) = 1 - \mu_i(A^-_K) \) the CDF (that is, the exceedance probability) on the right.

For continuous distributions, we can treat of the Radon-Nikodym derivatives for two measures \( \frac{\partial \mu_i}{\partial \mu_j} \) over as the ratio of two probability with respect to a variable in \( A_K \).

**Definition 7.** We can define i) "right tail acceptance" as being subject to a strictly positive probability of mistaking \( D^+_i \) for \( D^-_i \) and ii) rejection as a claim that \( D^+_i \subset D^-_j \). Likewise for what is called "confirmation" and "disconfirmation". Hence \( D^+_i \subset D^+_j \) if there exists a \( K_0 \) ("in the positive tail") such that \( \mu_j(A^-_{K_0}) > \mu_i(A^-_{K_0}) \) and \( \mu_j(A^+_{K_0}) > \mu_i(A^+_{K_0}) \) for all \( K > K_0 \),

and left tail acceptance if there exists a \( K_0 \) ("in the negative tail") such that \( \mu_j(A^-_{K_0}) > \mu_i(A^-_{K_0}) \) and \( \mu_j(A^+_{K_0}) > \mu_i(A^+_{K_0}) \) for all \( K < K_0 \).

The derivations are as follows. Simply, the effect of the scale of the distribution (say, the variance in the finite second moment case) wanes in the tails. For the classes of distributions up to the Gaussian, the point is a no brainer because of compact support with 0 measure beyond a certain \( K \). As as far as the Gaussian, there are two brands, one reached as a limit of, say, a sum of \( n \) Bernouilli variables, so the distribution will have some support out to a multiple of \( n \) infinity that is infinity away. But...
from an approximation; it does not have compact support but because of the exponential decline in the tails, it will be dominated by power laws. To quote Adrien Douady, it has compact support for all practical purposes. Let us focus on the right tail.

**Case of Two Powerlaws**

For powerlaws, let us consider the competing effects of scale, say \( \sigma \) (even in case of nonfinite variance), and \( \alpha \) tail exponent, with \( \alpha > 1 \). Let the density be

\[
P_{\alpha, \sigma}(x) = L(x) x^{-\alpha - 1}
\]

where \( L(x) \) is a slowly varying function,

\[
r_{\lambda, k}(x) \equiv \frac{P_{\lambda, k}(x)}{P_{\alpha, \sigma}(x)}
\]

By only perturbing the scale, we increase the tail by a certain factor, since \( \lim_{x \to \infty} r_{1, k}(x) = k^\alpha \), which can be significant. But by perturbing both and looking at the limit we get \( \lim_{x \to \infty} r_{\lambda, k}(x) = \lambda k^\alpha \left( \frac{L}{x} \right)^{\alpha(-1+\lambda)} \), where \( L \) is now a constant, thus making the changes to \( \alpha \) the tail exponent leading for large values of \( x \).

Obviously, by symmetry, the same effect obtains in the left tail.

**Rule 4.** When comparing two power laws, regardless of parametrization of the scale parameters for either distributions, the one with the lowest tail exponent will have higher density in the tails.

**Comparing Gaussian to Lognormal**

Let us compare the Gaussian\((\mu, \sigma)\) to a Lognormal\((m, s)\), in the right tail, and look at how one dominates in the remote tails. There is no values of parameters \( \sigma \) and \( s \) such that the PDF of the Normal exceeds that of the Lognormal in the tails. Assume means of 0 for the Gaussian and the equivalent \( e^{-\frac{k^2 s^2}{2}} \) for the Lognormal with no loss of generality.

Simply, let us consider the the sign of \( d \), the difference between the two densities,

\[
d = \frac{\frac{e^{-\frac{\log^2(x)}{2k^2s^2}}}{ksx} - e^{-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma^2}}}{\sqrt{2\pi}}
\]

by comparing the unscaled tail values of \( \frac{e^{-\frac{\log^2(x)}{2k^2s^2}}}{ksx} \) and \( e^{-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma^2}} \). Taking logarithms of the ratio, \( \delta(x) = \frac{x^2}{2\sigma^2} - \frac{\log^2(x)}{2k^2s^2} - \log(ksx) + \log(\sigma) \), which is dominated by the first term \( x^2 \) as it is convex when the other terms are concave, so it will be \( > 0 \) for large values of \( x \) independently of parameters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_1$</td>
<td>True Thin Tails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_2$</td>
<td>Thin tails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_{3a}$</td>
<td>Conventional Thin tails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_{3b}$</td>
<td>Starter Fat Tails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_5$</td>
<td>Subexponential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_6$</td>
<td>Supercubic $\alpha$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_7$</td>
<td>Infinite Variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{D}_8$</td>
<td>Infinite First Moment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rule 5.** Regardless of parametrization of the scale parameter (standard deviation) for either distribution, a lognormal will produce asymptotically higher tail densities in the positive domain than the Gaussian.

**Case of Mixture of Gaussians**

Let us return to the example of the mixture distribution $N(0, \sigma)$ with probability $1 - p$ and $N(0, k \sigma)$ with the remaining probability $p$. The density of the second regime weighted by $p$ becomes $p e^{-\frac{2k^2x^2}{2\pi\sigma^2}}$. For large deviations of $x$, $\frac{p}{k} e^{-\frac{x^2}{2k^2}}$ is entirely dominated by $k$, so regardless of the probability $p > 0$, $k > 1$ sets the terms of the density.

In other words:

**Rule 6.** Regardless of the mixture probabilities, when combining two Gaussians, the one with the higher standard deviations determines the density in the tails.
Figure 3.3: The tableau of Fat tails, along the various classifications for convergence purposes (i.e., convergence to the law of large numbers, etc.) A variation around Embrechts et al [19], but applied to the Radon-Nikodym derivatives.

A comment on 3.3

Gaussian From Convergence is Not Gaussian. : We establish a demarcation between two levels of Gaussians. Adding Bernouilli variables or Binomials, according to the random walk idea (or similar mechanism that generate Gaussians) always leads to thinner tails to the true Gaussian.

Subgaussian domain. for a review,[11], Kahane’s "gaussian shift"²:

Mixtures distributions entailing $\mathcal{D}_i$ and $\mathcal{D}_j$ are classified with the highest level of fat tails $\mathcal{D}_{\max(i,j)}$ regardless of the mixing. A mixture of Gaussians remains Gaussian for large deviations, even if the local properties can be confusing in small samples, except for the situation of infinite nesting of stochastic volatilities discussed in Chapter 6. Now a few rapidly stated rules.
Rule 7. *(General Decision Making Heuristic).* For any information entailing nonbinary decision (see definition in Chapter x), rejection or acceptance of fitness to pre-specified probability distributions, based on suprema of distance between supposed probability distributions (say Kolmogorov-Smirnov and similar style) should only be able to "accept" the fatter tail one and "reject" the lower tail, i.e., based on the criterion $i > j$ based on the classification above.

**Warning 1:** Always remember that one does not observe probability distributions, only realizations. Every probabilistic statement needs to be discounted by the probability of the parameter being away from the true one.

**Warning 2:** Always remember that we do not live in probability space, but pay-off space. [TO ADD COMMENTS ON Keynes’ Treatise on Probability focusing on "propositions" not payoffs]

Rule 8. *(Decision Mistakes).* Fatter tailed distributions are more likely to produce a lower in-sample variance (using empirical estimators) than a distribution of thinner tail of the same variance (in the finite variance case).

For the derivation, recall that (from 2.5), there in increase in observations in the "tunnel" $(a_2, a_3)$ in response to increase in fat-tailedness.

### 3.6 How To Arbitrage Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Counterintuitively, when one raises the kurtosis, as in Figure 3.1.3.1 the time series looks "quieter". Simply, the storms are rare but deep. This leads to mistaken illusion of low volatility when in fact it is just high kurtosis, something that fooled people big-time with the story of the "great moderation" as risks were accumulating and nobody was realizing that fragility was increasing, like dynamite accumulating under the structure.

**Kolmogorov - Smirnov, Shkmolgorov-Smirnoff.** Remarkably, the fat tailed series passes general test of normality with better marks than the thin-tailed one, since it displays a lower variance. The problem discussed with with Avital Pilpel (Taleb and Pilpel, 2001, 2004, 2007) is that Kolmogorov-Smirnov and similar tests of normality are inherently self-referential.

*These probability distributions are not directly observable, which makes any risk calculation suspicious since it hinges on knowledge about these distributions. Do we have enough data? If the distribution is, say, the traditional bell-shaped Gaussian, then yes, we may say that we have sufficient data. But if the distribution is not from such well-bred family, then we do not have enough data. But how do we know which distribution we have on our hands? Well, from the data itself.*

If one needs probability distributions to gauge knowledge about the future behavior of the distribution from its past results, and if, at the same time, one needs the past to...
Table 3.1: Comparing the Fake and genuine Gaussians (Figure 3.1.3.1) and subjecting them to a battery of tests. Note that some tests, such as the Jarque-Bera test, are more relevant to fat tails as they include the payoffs.

**Table of the "fake" Gaussian when not busted**
Let us run a more involved battery of statistical tests (but consider that it is a single run, one historical simulation).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anderson-Darling</td>
<td>0.406988</td>
<td>0.354835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramér-von Mises</td>
<td>0.0624829</td>
<td>0.357839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarque-Bera ALM</td>
<td>1.46412</td>
<td>0.472029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td>0.0242912</td>
<td>0.167368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuiper</td>
<td>0.0424013</td>
<td>0.110324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Combined</td>
<td>1.46412</td>
<td>0.472029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Kurtosis</td>
<td>–0.876786</td>
<td>0.380603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Skewness</td>
<td>0.7466</td>
<td>0.387555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson $\chi^2$</td>
<td>43.4276</td>
<td>0.041549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td>0.998193</td>
<td>0.372054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson $U^2$</td>
<td>0.0607437</td>
<td>0.326458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anderson-Darling</td>
<td>0.656362</td>
<td>0.0854403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramér-von Mises</td>
<td>0.0931212</td>
<td>0.138087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarque-Bera ALM</td>
<td>3.90387</td>
<td>0.136656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td>0.023499</td>
<td>0.204809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuiper</td>
<td>0.0410144</td>
<td>0.144466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Combined</td>
<td>3.90387</td>
<td>0.136656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Kurtosis</td>
<td>–1.83609</td>
<td>0.066344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Skewness</td>
<td>0.620678</td>
<td>0.430795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson $\chi^2$</td>
<td>33.7093</td>
<td>0.250061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td>0.997386</td>
<td>0.107481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson $U^2$</td>
<td>0.0914161</td>
<td>0.116241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table of the "fake" Gaussian when busted**
And of course the fake Gaussian when caught. But recall that we have a small chance of observing the true distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anderson-Darling</td>
<td>376.05</td>
<td>0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramér-von Mises</td>
<td>80.734</td>
<td>0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarque-Bera ALM</td>
<td>$4.21 \times 10^7$</td>
<td>0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td>0.4945497</td>
<td>0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuiper</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Combined</td>
<td>$4.21 \times 10^7$</td>
<td>0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Kurtosis</td>
<td>6430.</td>
<td>$1.5 \times 10^{-8979680}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardia Skewness</td>
<td>166432.</td>
<td>$1.07 \times 10^{-36143}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson $\chi^2$</td>
<td>30585.7</td>
<td>$3.28 \times 10^{-6596}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>$1.91 \times 10^{-57}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson $U^2$</td>
<td>80.58</td>
<td>0.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
derivative a probability distribution in the first place, then we are facing a severe regress loop—a problem of self reference akin to that of Epimenides the Cretan saying whether the Cretans are liars or not liars. And this self-reference problem is only the beginning.

(Taleb and Pilpel, 2001, 2004)

Also,

From the Glossary in The Black Swan. Statistical regress argument (or the problem of the circularity of statistics): We need data to discover a probability distribution. How do we know if we have enough? From the probability distribution. If it is a Gaussian, then a few points of data will suffice. How do we know it is a Gaussian? From the data. So we need the data to tell us what probability distribution to assume, and we need a probability distribution to tell us how much data we need. This causes a severe regress argument, which is somewhat shamelessly circumvented by resorting to the Gaussian and its kin.

A comment on the Kolmogorov Statistic. It is key that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test doesn’t affect payoffs and higher moments, as it only focuses on probabilities. It is a severe problem because the approximation will not take large deviations into account, and doesn’t make it useable for our purpose. But that’s not the only problem. It is, as we mentioned, conditioned on sample size while claiming to be nonparametric.

Let us see how it works. Take the historical series and find the maximum point of divergence with \( F(.) \) the cumulative of the proposed distribution to test against:

\[
D = \sup \left( \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{J} X_{t_0+i\Delta t} - F (X_{t_0+j\Delta t}) \right| \right)
\]

where \( n = \frac{T-t_0}{\Delta t} \)

We will get more technical in the discussion of convergence, take for now that the Kolmogorov statistic has the distribution of a Brownian bridge.
process pinned on both sides, with intermediate steps subjected to double conditioning),
\[ D_j = \left| \left( \sum_{i=1}^{j} \frac{X_{\Delta t_{i+1}} + t_0}{t} - F(X_{\Delta t_{j+t_0}}) \right) \right| \]
which is Uniformly distributed.

The probability of exceeding \( D \), \( P_{>D} = H(\sqrt{n}D) \), where \( H \) is the cumulative distribution function of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution,
\[ H(t) = 1 - 2 \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} (-1)^{i-1} e^{-2i^2 t^2} \]

We can see that the main idea reposes on a decay of \( \sqrt{n}D \) with large values of \( n \). So we can easily fool the testing by proposing distributions with a small probability of very large jump, where the probability of switch \( \lesssim \frac{1}{n} \).

The mistake in misinterpreting Feller: the distribution of \( D \) will be uniform independently of the distribution under scrutiny, or the two distributions to be compared. But it does not mean that the test is immune to sample size, that is, the possibility of jump with a probability an inverse function of \( n \).

**Use of the supremum of divergence**

Note another manifestation of the error of ignoring the effect of the largest deviation. As we saw with Kolmogorov-Smirnoff and other rigorous methods in judging a probability distribution, one focuses on the maximum divergence, the supremum, as information.

Another unused today but very potent technique, initially by Paul Levy (1924), called the concentration function, also reposes on the use of a maximal distance:

From Petrov (1995):
\[ Q_\lambda(X) \equiv \sup_X P(x \leq X \leq x + \lambda) \]
for every \( \lambda \geq 0 \).

We will make use of it in discussion of the behavior of the sum of random variables and the law of large numbers.

### 3.7 Mistaking Evidence for Anecdotes & The Reverse

#### 3.7.1 Now some sad, very sad comments.

I emitted the following argument in a comment looking for maximal divergence: "Had a book proclaiming *The Long Peace* (on how violence has dropped) been published in 1913\(3\over4 \) it would carry similar arguments to those in Pinker’s book", meaning that inability of an estimator period \( T \) to explain period \( > t \), using the idea of maximum divergence. The author of the book complained that I was using "hindsight" to find the largest deviation, implying lack of rigor. This is not a disagreement in principle, but a misinterpretation which was understandable given the context.
We will revisit the problem upon discussing the "$N = 1$" fallacy (that is, the fallacy of thinking that $N = 1$ is systematically insufficient sample). Some social "scientists" wrote about my approach to this problem, stating among other equally ignorant comments, something to the effect that "the plural of anecdotes is not data". This elementary violation of the logic of inference from data is very common with social scientists as we will see in Chapter 3, as their life is based on mechanistic and primitive approaches to probability that miss the asymmetry. Yet, and here is the very, very sad part: social science is the main consumer of statistical methods.

3.7.2 The Good News

There are domains where "confirmatory evidence" works, or can be used for decisions. But for that one needs the LLN to operate rather quickly. The idea of "scientific evidence" is fast ruled out in such domains. In such domains, "scientific evidence" and
Further Reading

[16]
Chapter Summary 4: The Spectrum Between Uncertainty and Risk. There has been a bit of discussions about the distinction between "uncertainty" and "risk". We believe in gradation of uncertainty at the level of the probability distribution itself (a "meta" or higher order of uncertainty.) One end of the spectrum, "Knightian risk", is not available for us mortals in the real world. We show how the effect on fat tails and on the calibration of tail exponents and reveal inconsistencies in models such as Markowitz or those used for intertemporal discounting (as many violations of "rationality" aren’t violations).

4.1 Metaprobability

When one assumes knowledge of a probability distribution, but has uncertainty attending the parameters, or when one has no knowledge of which probability distribution to consider, the situation is called "uncertainty in the Knightian sense" by decision theorists (Knight, 1923). "Risk" is when the probabilities are computable without an error rate. Such an animal does not exist in the real world. The entire distinction is a lunacy, since no parameter should be rationally computed without an error rate. We find it preferable to talk about degrees of uncertainty about risk/uncertainty, using metaprobability.

The Effect of Estimation Error, General Case

The idea of model error from missed uncertainty attending the parameters (another layer of randomness) is as follows.

Most estimations in social science, economics (and elsewhere) take, as input, an average or expected parameter,

$$\bar{\alpha} = \int \alpha \phi(\alpha) \, d\alpha,$$

where $\alpha$ is distributed (denoted to be uncertain for some reason) and normally of...
parameter, \( p(X = x) = p(x \mid \alpha) \), rather than the more appropriate metaprobability adjusted probability for the density:

\[
p(x) = \int \phi(\alpha) \, d\alpha
\]

(4.2)

In other words, if one is not certain about a parameter \( \alpha \), there is an inescapable layer of stochasticity; such stochasticity raises the expected (metaprobability-adjusted) probability if it is \(< \frac{1}{2} \) and lowers it otherwise. The uncertainty is fundamentally epistemic, includes incertitude, in the sense of lack of certainty about the parameter.

The model bias becomes an equivalent of the Jensen gap (the difference between the two sides of Jensen’s inequality), typically positive since probability is convex away from the center of the distribution. We get the bias \( \omega_A \) from the differences in the steps in integration

\[
\omega_A = \int \phi(\alpha) \, p(x \mid \alpha) \, d\alpha - p \left( x \right) \int \alpha \phi(\alpha) \, d\alpha
\]

With \( f(x) \) a function, \( f(x) = x \) for the mean, etc., we get the higher order bias \( \omega_{A'} \)

\[
\omega_{A'} = \int \left( \int \phi(\alpha) \, f(x) \, p(x \mid \alpha) \, d\alpha \right) \, dx - \int f(x) \, p \left( x \right) \int \alpha \phi(\alpha) \, d\alpha \, dx
\]

(4.3)

Now assume the distribution of \( \alpha \) as discrete \( n \) states, with \( \alpha = \{\alpha_i\}_{i=1}^n \) each with associated probability \( \phi = \{\phi_i\}_{i=1}^n \sum_{i=1}^n \phi_i = 1 \). Then 4.2 becomes

\[
p(x) = \phi_i \left( \sum_{i=1}^n p(x \mid \alpha_i) \right)
\]

(4.4)

So far this holds for \( \alpha \) any parameter of any distribution.

### 4.2 Metaprobability and the Calibration of Power Laws

In the presence of a layer of metaprobabilities (from uncertainty about the parameters), the asymptotic tail exponent for a powerlaw corresponds to the lowest possible tail exponent regardless of its probability. The problem explains "Black Swan" effects, i.e., why measurements tend to chronically underestimate tail contributions, rather than merely deliver imprecise but unbiased estimates.

When the perturbation affects the standard deviation of a Gaussian or similar non-powerlaw tailed distribution, the end product is the weighted average of the probabilities. However, a powerlaw distribution with errors about the possible tail exponent will bear the asymptotic properties of the lowest exponent, not the average exponent.

Now assume \( p(X=x) \) a standard Pareto Distribution with \( \alpha \) the tail exponent being estimated, \( p(x \mid \alpha) = \alpha x^{-\alpha - 1} x_{\min}^\alpha \), where \( x_{\min} \) is the lower bound for \( x \),
4.2. METAPROBABILITY AND THE CALIBRATION OF POWER LAWS

\[ \frac{p}{LParen2}X^{\alpha} /Minus /RParen2 \]

\[ \frac{p}{LParen1}X^{\alpha} /Star /RParen1 \]

\[ \Summation_{i=1}^{n} p(X|\alpha_i) \phi_i \]

\[ p(X|\alpha) \]

\[ Prob \]

Figure 4.1: Log-log plot illustration of the asymptotic tail exponent with two states.

Taking it to the limit

\[ \text{limit}_{x \to \infty} x^{\alpha^*+1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i x^{-\alpha_i - 1} x_{\min_i}^{\alpha_i} \phi_i = K \]

where K is a strictly positive constant and \( \alpha^* = \min \alpha_i \). In other words \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i x^{-\alpha_i - 1} x_{\min_i}^{\alpha_i} \phi_i \) is asymptotically equivalent to a constant times \( x^{\alpha^*+1} \). The lowest parameter in the space of all possibilities becomes the dominant parameter for the tail exponent.

Figure 4.2: Illustration of the convexity bias for a Gaussian from raising small probabilities: The plot shows the STD effect on \( P_{\geq x} \) and compares \( P_{\geq 6} \) with a STD of 1.5 compared to \( P_{\geq 6} \).
Figure 4.1 shows the different situations: a) \( p(x|\bar{\alpha}) \), b) \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} p(x|\alpha_i) \phi_i \) and c) \( p(x|\alpha^*) \). We can see how the last two converge. The asymptotic Jensen Gap \( \omega_A \) becomes \( p(x|\alpha^*) - p(x|\bar{\alpha}) \).

**Implications**

Whenever we estimate the tail exponent from samples, we are likely to underestimate the thickness of the tails, an observation made about Monte Carlo generated \( \alpha \)-stable variates and the estimated results (the “Weron effect”)\[74\].

The higher the estimation variance, the lower the true exponent.

The asymptotic exponent is the lowest possible one. It does not even require estimation.

Metaprobabilistically, if one isn’t sure about the probability distribution, and there is a probability that the variable is unbounded and “could be” powerlaw distributed, then it is powerlaw distributed, and of the lowest exponent.

The obvious conclusion is to in the presence of powerlaw tails, focus on changing payoffs to clip tail exposures to limit \( \omega_A' \) and “robustify” tail exposures, making the computation problem go away.

**4.3 The Effect of Metaprobability on Fat Tails**

Recall that the tail fattening methods in 2.4 and 2.6. These are based on randomizing the variance. Small probabilities rise precisely because they are convex to perturbations of the parameters (the scale) of the probability distribution.

**4.4 Fukushima, Or How Errors Compound**

“Risk management failed on several levels at Fukushima Daiichi. Both TEPCO and its captured regulator bear responsibility. First, highly tailored geophysical models predicted an infinitesimal chance of the region suffering an earthquake as powerful as the Tohoku quake. This model uses historical seismic data to estimate the local frequency of earthquakes of various magnitudes; none of the quakes in the data was bigger than magnitude 8.0. Second, the plant’s risk analysis did not consider the type of cascading, systemic failures that precipitated the meltdown. TEPCO never conceived of a situation in which the reactors shut down in response to an earthquake, and a tsunami topped the seawall, and the cooling pools inside the reactor buildings were overstuffed with spent fuel rods, and the main control room became too radioactive for workers to survive, and damage to local infrastructure delayed reinforcement, and hydrogen explosions breached the reactors’ outer containment structures. Instead, TEPCO and its regulators addressed each of the risks independently, and judged the plant safe to operate as is.” Nick Werle, published by the n+1 Foundation, Brooklyn NY
4.5 The Markowitz inconsistency

Assume that someone tells you that the probability of an event is exactly zero. You ask him where he got this from. "Baal told me" is the answer. In such case, the person is coherent, but would be deemed unrealistic by non-Baalists. But if on the other hand, the person tells you "I estimated it to be zero," we have a problem. The person is both unrealistic and inconsistent. Something estimated needs to have an estimation error. So probability cannot be zero if it is estimated, its lower bound is linked to the estimation error; the higher the estimation error, the higher the probability, up to a point. As with Laplace's argument of total ignorance, an infinite estimation error pushes the probability toward $\frac{1}{2}$. We will return to the implication of the mistake; take for now that anything estimating a parameter and then putting it into an equation is different from estimating the equation across parameters. And Markowitz was inconsistent by starting his "seminal" paper with "Assume you know $E$ and $V$" (that is, the expectation and the variance). At the end of the paper he accepts that they need to be estimated, and what is worse, with a combination of statistical techniques and the "judgment of practical men." Well, if these parameters need to be estimated, with an error, then the derivations need to be written differently and, of course, we would have no such model. Economic models are extremely fragile to assumptions, in the sense that a slight alteration in these assumptions can lead to extremely consequential differences in the results.

4.6 Psychological pseudo-biases under second layer of uncertainty.

Often psychologists and behavioral economists find "irrational behavior" (or call it under something more polite like "biased") as agents do not appear to follow a normative model and violate their models of rationality. But almost all these correspond to missing a second layer of uncertainty by a tinky-toy first-order model that doesn’t get nonlinearities — it is the researcher who is making a mistake, not the real-world agent. Recall that the expansion from "small world" to "larger world" can be simulated by perturbation of parameters, or "stochasticization", that is making something that appears deterministic a random variable itself. Benartzi and Thaler [3], for instance, find an explanation that agents are victims of a disease labelled "myopic loss aversion" in not investing enough in equities, not realizing that these agents may have a more complex, fat-tailed model. Under fat tails, no such puzzle exists, and if it does, it is certainly not from such myopia.

This approach invites "paternalism" in "nudging" the preferences of agents in a manner to fit professors-without-skin-in-the-game-using-wrong-models.

The problem also applies to GMOs and how "risk experts" find them acceptable; researchers pathologize those who do not partake of the baby models (thin tailed). The point, an extension of the Pinker problem, is discussed in Chapter x.

Let us now proceed in detecting a path to the specific problem of 1) the specific
CHAPTER 4. EFFECTS OF HIGHER ORDERS OF UNCERTAINTY

Figure 4.3: The effect of $H_{a,p}(t)$ "utility" or prospect theory of under second order effect on variance. Here $\sigma = 1, \mu = 1$ and $t$ variable.

Figure 4.4: The ratio $\frac{H_{a,\frac{1}{2}}}{H_1}$ or the degradation of "utility" under second order effects.
4.6. PSYCHOLOGICAL PSEUDO-BIASES UNDER SECOND LAYER OF UNCERTAINTY.

4.6.1 Myopic loss aversion

Take the prospect theory valuation function for $x$ changes in wealth.

$$w_{\lambda, \alpha}(x) = x^\alpha 1_{x \geq 0} - \lambda (-x^\alpha) 1_{x < 0}$$

Where $\phi_{\mu t, \sigma \sqrt{t}}(x)$ is the Normal Distribution density with corresponding mean and standard deviation (scaled by $t$)

The expected "utility" (in the prospect sense):

$$H_0(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} w_{\lambda, \alpha}(x) \phi_{\mu t, \sigma \sqrt{t}}(x) \, dx$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.5)

We can see from 4.6 that the more frequent sampling of the performance translates into worse utility. So what Benartzi and Thaler did was try to find the sampling period "myopia" that translates into the sampling frequency that causes the "premium" —the error being that they missed second order effects.

Now under variations of $\sigma$ with stochastic effects, heuristically captured, the story changes: what if there is a very small probability that the variance gets multiplied by a large number, with the total variance remaining the same? The key here is that we are not even changing the variance at all: we are only shifting the distribution to the tails. We are here generously assuming that by the law of large numbers it was established that the "equity premium puzzle" was true and that stocks really outperformed bonds.

So we switch between two states, $(1 + a) \sigma^2$ w.p. $p$ and $(1 - a) \sigma^2$ w.p. $(1 - p)$.

Rewriting 4.5

$$H_{a, p}(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} w_{\lambda, \alpha}(x) \left( p \phi_{\mu t, \sqrt{1 + a} \sigma \sqrt{t}}(x) + (1 - p) \phi_{\mu t, \sqrt{1 - a} \sigma \sqrt{t}}(x) \right) \, dx$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.7)

Result. Conclusively, as can be seen in figures 4.3 and 4.4, second order effects cancel the statements made from "myopic" loss aversion. This doesn’t mean that myopia doesn’t have effects, rather that it cannot explain the "equity premium", not from the outside (i.e. the distribution might have different properties from the inside)
Comment. We used the \((1+a)\) heuristic largely for illustrative reasons; we could use a full distribution for \(\sigma^2\) with similar results. For instance the gamma distribution with density \(f(v) = v^{\gamma-1} e^{-v/\lambda} / \Gamma(\gamma)\) with expectation \(V\) matching the variance used in the "equity premium" theory.

Rewriting 4.7 under that form,

\[
\int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty w_{\lambda,\alpha}(x) \phi_{\mu t,\sqrt{\nu t}}(x) f(v) \, dv \, dx
\]

Which has a closed form solution (though a bit lengthy for here).

### 4.6.2 Time preference under model error

This author once watched with a great deal of horror one Laibson \([37]\) at a conference in Columbia University present the idea that having one massage today to two tomorrow, but reversing in a year from now is irrational and we need to remedy it with some policy. (For a review of time discounting and intertemporal preferences, see \([27]\), as economists temps to impart what seems to be a varying "discount rate" in a simplified model).

Intuitively, what if I introduce the probability that the person offering the massage is full of balloney? It would clearly make me both prefer immediacy at almost any cost and conditionally on his being around at a future date, reverse the preference. This is what we will model next.

First, time discounting has to have a geometric form, so preference doesn’t become negative: linear discounting of the form \(Ct\), where \(C\) is a constant ant \(t\) is time into the future is ruled out: we need something like \(C^t\) or, to extract the rate, \((1 + k)^t\) which can be mathematically further simplified into an exponential, by taking it to the continuous time limit. Exponential discounting has the form \(e^{-kt}\). Effectively, such a discounting method using a shallow model prevents "time inconsistency", so with \(\delta < t\):

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{e^{-kt}}{e^{-k(t-\delta)}} = e^{-k\delta}
\]

Now add another layer of stochasticity: the discount parameter, for which we use the symbol \(\lambda\), is now stochastic.

So we now can only treat \(H(t)\) as

\[
H(t) = \int e^{-\lambda t} \phi(\lambda) \, d\lambda
\]

It is easy to prove the general case that under symmetric stochasticization of intensity \(\Delta \lambda\) (that is, with probabilities \(\frac{1}{2}\) around the center of the distribution) using the same technique we did in 2.4:
4.6. PSYCHOLOGICAL PSEUDO-BIASES UNDER SECOND LAYER OF UNCERTAINTY

\[
\frac{H'(t, \Delta \lambda)}{H'(t, 0)} = \frac{1}{2} e^{\lambda t} \left( e^{(-\Delta \lambda - \lambda)t} + e^{(\Delta \lambda - \lambda)t} \right) = \cosh(\Delta \lambda t)
\]

Where \( \cosh \) is the cosine hyperbolic function – which will converge to a certain value where intertemporal preferences are flat in the future.

**Example: Gamma Distribution.** Under the gamma distribution with support in \( \mathbb{R}^+ \), with parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), \( \phi(\lambda) = \frac{\beta^{-\alpha} \lambda^{\alpha-1} e^{-\frac{\lambda}{\beta}}}{\Gamma(\alpha)} \)

we get:

\[
H(t, \alpha, \beta) = \int_0^\infty e^{-\lambda t} \left( \frac{\beta^{-\alpha} \lambda^{\alpha-1} e^{-\frac{\lambda}{\beta}}}{\Gamma(\alpha)} \right) d\lambda = \beta^{-\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{\beta} + t \right)^{-\alpha}
\]

so

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{H(t, \alpha, \beta)}{H(t - \delta, \alpha, \beta)} = 1
\]

Meaning that preferences become flat in the future no matter how steep they are in the present, which explains the drop in discount rate in the economics literature.

Further, fudging the distribution and normalizing it, when

\[
\phi(\lambda) = \frac{e^{-\frac{\lambda}{k}}}{k},
\]

we get the *normatively obtained* (not empirical pathology) so-called hyperbolic discounting:

\[
H(t) = \frac{1}{1 + kt}
\]
Chapter Summary 5: The Law of Large Numbers and The Central Limit Theorem are the foundation of statistical knowledge: The behavior of the sum of random variables allows us to get to the asymptote and use handy asymptotic properties, that is, Platonic distributions. But the problem is that in the real world we never get to the asymptote, we just get “close”. Some distributions get close quickly, others very slowly (even if they have finite variance). We examine how fat tailedness slows down the process. Further, in some cases the LLN doesn’t work at all.

5.1 The Law of Large Numbers Under Fat Tails

Recall from Chapter 2 that the quality of an estimator is tied to its replicability outside the set in which it was derived: this is the basis of the law of large numbers.

How do you reach the limit?

The common interpretation of the weak law of large numbers is as follows.
By the weak law of large numbers, consider a sum of random variables $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_N$ independent and identically distributed with finite mean $m$, that is $E[X_i] < \infty$, then $\frac{1}{N}\sum_{1 \leq i \leq N} X_i$ converges to $m$ in probability, as $N \to \infty$. But the problem of convergence in probability, as we will see later, is that it does not take place in the tails of the distribution (different parts of the distribution have different speeds). This point is quite central and will be examined later with a deeper mathematical discussion on limits in Chapter x. We limit it here to intuitive presentations of turkey surprises.

(Hint: we will need to look at the limit without the common route of Chebychev’s inequality which requires $E[X_i^2] < \infty$. Chebychev’s inequality and similar ones eliminate the probabilities of some tail events).

So long as there is a mean, observations should at some point reveal it.

The law of iterated logarithms. For the “thin-tailed” conditions, we can see in Figure x how by the law of iterated logarithm, for $x_i$ i.i.d. distributed with mean 0 and unitary variance, $\limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i}{\sqrt{2n \log \log(n)}} = 1$ a.s. (and by symmetry $\liminf_{n \to \infty} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i}{\sqrt{2n \log \log(n)}} = -1$), thus giving us an acceptably narrow cone limiting the fluctuation of the sum.

Speed of convergence. Let us examine the speed of convergence of the average $\frac{1}{N} \sum_{1 \leq i \leq N} X_i$. For a Gaussian distribution $(m, \sigma)$, the characteristic function for the convolution is:

$$\varphi(t/N)^N = \left(e^{\frac{imt}{N} - \frac{\sigma^2 t^2}{2N^2}}\right)^N,$$

which, derived twice at 0 yields $(-i)^2 \frac{\partial^2 \varphi}{\partial t^2} - i \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial t} / t \to 0$ which produces the standard deviation $\sigma(n) = \frac{\sigma(1)}{\sqrt{N}}$ so one can say that sum “converges” at a speed $\sqrt{N}$.

Another approach consists in expanding $\varphi$ and letting $N$ go to infinity

$$\lim_{N \to \infty} \left(e^{\frac{imt}{N} - \frac{\sigma^2 t^2}{2N^2}}\right)^N = e^{imt}.$$

Now $e^{imt}$ is the characteristic function of the degenerate distribution at $m$, with density $p(x) = \delta(m - x)$ where $\delta$ is the Dirac delta with values zero except at the point $m - x$. (Note that the strong law of large numbers implies that convergence takes place almost everywhere except for a set of probability 0; for that the same result should be obtained for all values of $t$).

But things are far more complicated with power laws. Let us repeat the exercise for a Pareto distribution with density $L^\alpha x^{-1-\alpha}$, $x > L$,

$$\varphi(t/N)^N = \alpha^N E_{\alpha+1} \left(-\frac{iLt}{N}\right)^N,$$

where $E_{\alpha}(z) = \int_0^\infty e^{-zt} \gamma^{\alpha-1} dt$.
5.1. THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS UNDER FAT TAILS

Figure 5.2: The distribution (histogram) of the standard deviation of the sum of $N=100 \, \alpha=13/6$. The second graph shows the entire span of realizations. If it appears to show very little information in the middle, it is because the plot is stretched to accommodate the extreme observation on the far right.

\[
\lim_{N \to \infty} \varphi \left( \frac{t}{N} \right)^N = e^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} i L t},
\]

which is degenerate Dirac at $\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} L$, and as we can see the limit only exists for $\alpha > 1$.

Setting $L = 1$ to scale, the standard deviation $\sigma_\alpha(N)$ for the $N$-average becomes, for $\alpha > 2$

\[
\sigma_\alpha(N) = \frac{1}{N} \left( \alpha^N E_{\alpha+1}(0)^{N-2} \left( E_{\alpha-1}(0) E_{\alpha+1}(0) + E_{\alpha}(0)^2 \left( -N \alpha^N E_{\alpha+1}(0)^N + N - 1 \right) \right) \right).
\]

The trap. After some tinkering, we get $\sigma_\alpha(N) = \frac{\sigma_\alpha(1)}{\sqrt{N}}$, the same as with the Gaussian, which is a trap. For we should be careful in interpreting $\sigma_\alpha(N)$, which will be very volatile since $\sigma_\alpha(1)$ is already very volatile and does not reveal itself easily in realizations of the process. In fact, let $p(.)$ be the PDF of a Pareto distribution with mean $m$, variance $v$, minimum value $L$ and exponent $\alpha$.

Infinite variance of variance The distribution of the variance, $v$ can be obtained analytically: intuitively its asymptotic tail is $v^{\frac{1}{\alpha} - 1}$. Where $g(.)$ is the probability density of the variance:

\[
g(v) = \frac{\alpha L^\alpha \left( \frac{\sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} L}}{\alpha-1} + \sqrt{v} \right)^{-\alpha-1}}{2\sqrt{v}}
\]

with domain: $[(L - \frac{\sqrt{\alpha-2} L}{\alpha-1})^2, \infty)$.

Cleaner: $\Delta_\alpha$ the expected mean deviation of the variance for a given $\alpha$ will be $\Delta_\alpha = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha-1}} \int_0^\infty (r^2 - m^2) \frac{1}{n(r)} dr$.
Absence of Useful Theory:. As to situations, central situations, where $1 < \alpha < 2$, we are left hanging analytically (but we can do something about it in the next section). We will return to the problem in our treatment of the preasymptotics of the central limit theorem.

But we saw in ?? that the volatility of the mean is $\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} s$ and the mean deviation of the mean deviation, that is, the volatility of the volatility of mean is $2(\alpha - 1)^{\alpha - 2}\alpha^{1 - \alpha} s$, where $s$ is the scale of the distribution. As we get close to $\alpha = 1$ the mean becomes more and more volatile in realizations for a given scale. This is not trivial since we are not interested in the speed of convergence per se given a variance, rather the ability of a sample to deliver a meaningful estimate of some total properties.

Intuitively, the law of large numbers needs an infinite observations to converge at $\alpha = 1$. So, if it ever works, it would operate at a $>20$ times slower rate for an “observed” $\alpha$ of 1.15 than for an exponent of 3. To make up for measurement errors on the $\alpha$, as a rough heuristic, just assume that one needs $> 400$ times the observations. Indeed, 400 times! (The point of what we mean by “rate” will be revisited with the discussion of the Large Deviation Principle and the Cramer rate function in $X.x$; we need a bit more refinement of the idea of tail exposure for the sum of random variables).

Comparing $N = 1$ to $N = 2$ for a symmetric power law with $1 < \alpha \leq 2$.

Let $\phi(t)$ be the characteristic function of the symmetric Student T with $\alpha$ degrees of freedom. After two-fold convolution of the average we get:

$$\phi(t/2)^2 = \frac{4^{1-\alpha}\alpha^{\alpha/2}|t|^{\alpha} K_{\frac{\alpha}{2}} \left( \frac{\sqrt{\pi}|t|}{2} \right)^2}{\Gamma \left( \frac{\alpha}{2} \right)^2},$$

We can get an explicit density by inverse Fourier transform of $\phi$,

$$p_{2,\alpha}(x) = \frac{1}{2\pi} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi(t/2)^2 e^{-itx} dt,$$

which yields the following

$$p_{2,\alpha}(x) = \frac{\pi 2^{-4\alpha} \alpha^{5/2} \Gamma(2\alpha) \ _2F_1 \left( \alpha + \frac{1}{2}, \frac{\alpha+1}{2}; \frac{\alpha+2}{2}; -\frac{x^2}{\alpha} \right)}{\Gamma \left( \frac{\alpha}{2} + 1 \right)^4}$$

where $\ _2F_1$ is the hypergeometric function:

$$\ _2F_1(a, b; c; z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{(a)_k (b)_k}{(c)_k} \frac{z^k}{k!}$$
5.1. THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS UNDER FAT TAILS

Figure 5.3: Preasymptotics of the ratio of mean deviations. But one should note that mean deviations themselves are extremely high in the neighborhood of $\sqrt{1}$. So we have a “sort of” double convergence to $\sqrt{n}$: convergence at higher $n$ and convergence at higher $\alpha$.

\[ p_{1,\alpha}(x) = \frac{\left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + x^2}\right)^{\frac{\alpha+1}{2}}}{\sqrt{\alpha} B \left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)} \]

From there, we see that in the Cauchy case ($\alpha=1$) the sum conserves the density, so

\[ p_{1,1}(x) = p_{2,1}(x) = \frac{1}{\pi (1 + x^2)} \]

Let us use the ratio of mean deviations; since the mean is 0,

\[ \mu(\alpha) = \frac{\int |x|p_{2,\alpha}(x)dx}{\int |x|p_{1,\alpha}(x)dx} \]

\[ \mu(\alpha) = \frac{\sqrt{\pi}}{\Gamma \left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right)} \frac{2^{1-\alpha} \Gamma \left(\alpha - \frac{1}{2}\right)}{\Gamma \left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right)^2} \]

and

\[ \lim_{\alpha \to \infty} \mu(\alpha) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \]

The double effect of summing fat tailed random variables: The summation of random variables performs two simultaneous actions, one, the “thinning” of the tails by the CLT for a finite variance distribution (or convergence to some basin of attraction for infinite variance classes); and the other, the lowering of the dispersion by the LLN. Both effects are fast under thinner tails, and slow under fat tails. But there is a third effect: the dispersion of observations for $n=1$ is itself much higher under fat tails. Fatter tails for power laws come with higher expected mean.
5.2 Preasymptotics and Central Limit in the Real World

An intuition: how we converge mostly in the center of the distribution

We start with the Uniform Distribution, patently the easiest of all.

\[ f(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{H-L} & L \leq x \leq H \\ 0 & \text{elsewhere} \end{cases} \]

where \( L = 0 \) and \( H = 1 \)

A random run from a Uniform Distribution
The central functioning of CLT is as follows: the convolution is a multiplication; it is the equivalent of weighting the probability distribution by a function that iteratively gives more weight to the body, and less weight to the tails, until it becomes round enough to dull the iterative effect. See how "multiplying" a flat distribution by something triangular as in Figure 5.2 produces more roundedness.

Now some math. By convoluting 2, 3, 4 times we can see the progress and the decrease of mass in the tails:

\[ f_2(z_2) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (f(z-x))(f_x) \, dx = \begin{cases} 2 - z_2 & 1 < z_2 < 2 \\ z_2 & 0 < z_2 \leq 1 \end{cases} \]  

(5.1)

We have a triangle (piecewise linear).

\[ f_3(z_3) = \int_{0}^{3} (f_2(z_3 - 2))(f_{x2}) \, dx_2 = \begin{cases} \frac{z_3^2}{2} & 0 < z_3 \leq 1 \\ -(z_3 - 3)z_3 - \frac{3}{2} & 1 < z_3 < 2 \\ -\frac{1}{2}(z_3 - 3)(z_3 - 1) & z_3 = 2 \\ \frac{1}{2}(z_3 - 3)^2 & 2 < z_3 < 3 \end{cases} \]  

(5.2)

With \( N = 3 \) we square terms, and the familiar "bell" shape.

\[ f_4x = \int_{0}^{4} (f_3(z_4 - x))(f_{x3}) \, dx_3 = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{4} & z_4 = 3 \\ \frac{1}{2}z_4^2 & z_4 = 2 \\ \frac{1}{4}(z_4^2 + 4z_4 - 2) & 1 < z_4 < 2 \lor 2 < z_4 < 3 \\ \frac{1}{4}(z_4 - 4)^2 & 3 < z_4 < 4 \end{cases} \]  

(5.3)

A simple Uniform Distribution
5.2.1 Finite Variance: Necessary but Not Sufficient

The common mistake is to think that if we satisfy the criteria of convergence, that is, independence and finite variance, that central limit is a given. Take the conventional formulation of the Central Limit Theorem ¹:

Let \( X_1, X_2, \ldots \) be a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables with mean \( m \) & variance \( \sigma^2 \) satisfying \( m < \infty \) and \( 0 < \sigma^2 < \infty \), then
\[
\sum_{i=1}^N X_i - Nm \xrightarrow{D} \frac{N(0, 1)}{\sigma \sqrt{n}} \text{ as } n \to \infty
\]

Where \( \xrightarrow{D} \) is converges “in distribution” and \( N(0,1) \) is the Gaussian with mean 0 and unit standard deviation.

Granted convergence “in distribution” is about the weakest form of convergence. Effectively we are dealing with a double problem.
The first, as uncovered by Jaynes, corresponds to the abuses of measure theory: Some properties that hold at infinity might not hold in all limiting processes .

There is a large difference between convergence a.s. (almost surely) and the weaker forms.

Jaynes 2003 (p.44):“The danger is that the present measure theory notation presupposes the infinite limit already accomplished, but contains no symbol indicating which limiting process was used (...) Any attempt to go directly to the limit can result in nonsense”.

We accord with him on this point –along with his definition of probability as information incompleteness, about which later.

The second problem is that we do not have a “clean” limiting process –the process is itself idealized.

Now how should we look at the Central Limit Theorem? Let us see how we arrive to it assuming “independence”.

The Kolmogorov-Lyapunov Approach and Convergence in the Body. 2 The CLT works does not fill-in uniformly, but in a Gaussian way –indeed, disturbingly so. Simply, whatever your distribution (assuming one mode), your sample is going to be skewed to deliver more central observations, and fewer tail events. The consequence is that, under aggregation, the sum of these variables will converge “much” faster in the body of the distribution than in the tails. As \( N \), the number of observations increases, the Gaussian zone should cover more grounds... but not in the “tails”.

This quick note shows the intuition of the convergence and presents the difference between distributions.

Take the sum of of random independent variables \( X_i \) with finite variance under distribution \( \varphi(X) \). Assume 0 mean for simplicity (and symmetry, absence of skewness to simplify).

A more useful formulation is the Kolmogorov or what we can call "Russian" approach of working with bounds:

\[
P \left( -u \leq Z = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^n X_i}{\sqrt{n \sigma}} \leq u \right) = \frac{\int_{-u}^u e^{-\frac{z^2}{2}} dZ}{\sqrt{2\pi}}
\]
Figure 5.4: Q-Q Plot of N Sums of variables distributed according to the Student T with 3 degrees of freedom, N=50, compared to the Gaussian, rescaled into standard deviations. We see on both sides a higher incidence of tail events.

So the distribution is going to be:

\[ 1 - \int_{-u}^{u} e^{-\frac{z^2}{2}} dZ \], for \(-u \leq z \leq u\)

inside the “tunnel” \([-u,u]\) –the odds of falling inside the tunnel itself, and

\[ \int_{-\infty}^{-u} Z\varphi'(N)dz + \int_{u}^{\infty} Z\varphi'(N)dz \]

outside the tunnel, in \([-u,u]\), where \(\varphi'(N)\) is the n-summed distribution of \(\varphi\).

How \(\varphi'(N)\) behaves is a bit interesting here –it is distribution dependent.

Before continuing, let us check the speed of convergence \textit{per} distribution. It is quite interesting that we the ratio of observations in a given sub-segment of the distribution is in proportion to the expected frequency \(\frac{N_u}{N}\), where \(N_u\), is the numbers of observations falling between \(-u\) and \(u\). So the speed of convergence to the Gaussian will depend on \(\frac{N_u}{N}\) as can be seen in the next two simulations.

To have an idea of the speed of the widening of the tunnel \((-u,u)\) under summation, consider the symmetric (0-centered) Student T with tail exponent \(\alpha=3\), with density \(\frac{2a^3}{\pi(a^2+x^2)^{\frac{5}{2}}}\), and variance \(a^2\). For large “tail values” of \(x\), \(P(x) \to \frac{2a^3}{\pi x^2}\). Under summation of \(N\) variables, the tail \(P(\Sigma x)\) will be \(\frac{2Na^3}{\pi x}\). Now the center, by the Kolmogorov version of the central limit theorem, will have a variance of \(Na^2\) in the center as well, hence

\[ P(\Sigma x) = \frac{e^{-\frac{a^2}{2\pi^2 N}}}{\sqrt{2\pi a \sqrt{N}}} \]
5.2. PREASYMPTOTICS AND CENTRAL LIMIT IN THE REAL WORLD

Figure 5.5: The Widening Center. Q-Q Plot of variables distributed according to the Student T with 3 degrees of freedom compared to the Gaussian, rescaled into standard deviation, $N=500$. We see on both sides a higher incidence of tail events. $10^7$ simulations.

Figure 5.6: The behavior of the "tunnel" under summation

\[
e^{-\frac{u^2}{2aN}} \leq \frac{2Na^3}{\pi x^4},
\]

hence $u^4 e^{-\frac{u^2}{2aN}} \leq \frac{\sqrt{22a^3} \sqrt{aN}}{\sqrt{\pi}}$, which produces the solution

\[
\pm u = \pm 2a \sqrt{N} \sqrt{-W\left(-\frac{1}{2N^{1/4}(2\pi)^{1/4}}\right)},
\]

where $W$ is the Lambert W function or product log which climbs very slowly\(^3\), particularly if instead of considering the sum $u$ we rescaled by $1/a\sqrt{N}$.

Note about the crossover. See the competing Nagaev brothers, s.a. S.V. Nagaev(1965,1970,1 and A.V. Nagaev(1969) etc. There are two sets of inequalities, one lower one below which the sum is in regime 1 (thin-tailed behavior), an upper one for the fat tailed behavior, where the cumulative function for the sum behaves likes the maximum. By Nagaev (1965) For a regularly varying tail, where $\mathbb{E}(|X|^m) < \infty$ the minimum of the crossover

\(^3\)Interestingly, among the authors on the paper on the Lambert W function figures Donald Knuth:
should be to the left of $\sqrt{\left(\frac{m}{2} - 1\right) N \log(N)}$ (normalizing for unit variance) for the right tail (and with the proper sign adjustment for the left tail).

So

$$\frac{\mathbb{P} > \frac{\sum X_i}{\sqrt{N}}}{\mathbb{P} > \frac{x}{\sqrt{N}}} \rightarrow 1$$

for $0 \leq x \leq \sqrt{\left(\frac{m}{2} - 1\right) N \log(N)}$

**Generalizing for all exponents $> 2$.** More generally, using the reasoning for a broader set and getting the crossover for powerlaws of all exponents:

$$\frac{4^{\alpha/2} \alpha e^{-\frac{\alpha^2 x^2}{2\alpha N}}}{\sqrt{2\pi} \sqrt{a\alpha N}} \approx \frac{a^\alpha \left(\frac{1}{\pi}\right)^{\frac{1+\alpha}{2}} \alpha^{\alpha/2}}{\text{Beta} \left[\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right]}$$

since the standard deviation is $a\sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{2+\alpha}}$

$$x \rightarrow \pm \sqrt{\frac{a \alpha (\alpha + 1) N W(\lambda)}{\sqrt{(\alpha - 2) \alpha}}}$$

Where

$$\lambda = -\frac{(2\pi)^{\frac{1}{\alpha+1}} \sqrt{\frac{\alpha-2}{\alpha}} \left(\frac{4^{\alpha/2} - 2^-\frac{\alpha}{2} - \frac{1}{2} a^{-\alpha} - \frac{1}{2} B\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)}{\sqrt{N}}\right)^{\frac{2}{\alpha+1}}}{a (\alpha + 1) N}$$

### 5.3 Using Log Cumulants to Observe Preasymptotics

The normalized cumulant of order $n$, $n$ is the derivative of the log of the characteristic function $\Phi$ which we convolute $N$ times divided by the second cumulant (i.e., second moment).

This exercise show us how fast an aggregate of N-summed variables become Gaussian, looking at how quickly the 4th cumulant approaches 0. For instance the Poisson get there at a speed that depends inversely on $\lambda$, that is, $1/(N^2 \Lambda^3)$, while by contrast an exponential distribution reaches it at a slower rate at higher values of $\Lambda$ since the cumulant is $(3! \Lambda^2)/N^2$.

**Speed of Convergence of the Summed distribution using Edgeworth Expansions.** A twinking of Feller (1971), Vol II by replacing the derivatives with our cumulants. Let $f_N(z)$ be the normalized sum of the i.i.d. distributed random variables $\Xi = \left\{\xi_i\right\}_{1 < i \leq N}$ with variance $\sigma^2$, $z \equiv \frac{\sum \xi_i - E(\Xi)}{\sigma}$ and $\phi_{0,\sigma}(z)$ the standard Gaussian with mean 0, then the convoluted sum approaches the Gaussian as follows assuming $E(\Xi^p) < \infty$ i.e., the moments of $\Xi$ of $< \ n$ exist.
Table 5.1: Table of Normalized Cumulants For Thin Tailed Distributions-Speed of Convergence (Dividing by $\Sigma^n$ where $n$ is the order of the cumulant).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distr.</th>
<th>Normal($\mu, \sigma$)</th>
<th>Poisson($\lambda$)</th>
<th>Exponent’l($\lambda$)$\Gamma(a, b)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>$e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \sqrt{2\pi\sigma}$</td>
<td>$e^{-\lambda x} \frac{x!}{\lambda x}$</td>
<td>$e^{-x} \lambda \lambda$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-convoluted</td>
<td>$N \log \left( e^{iz\mu - \frac{z^2\lambda}{2}} \right)$</td>
<td>$N \log \left( e^{(1+e^{iz})\lambda} \right)$</td>
<td>$N \log \left( \frac{\lambda}{\lambda - iz} \right)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Characteristic</td>
<td>$N \log ((1 - ibz)^{-1})$</td>
<td>$N \log ((1 - ibz)^{-1})$</td>
<td>$N \log ((1 - ibz)^{-1})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2nd Cumulant | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 3rd          | 0 | $\frac{1}{N\lambda}$ | $\frac{2\lambda}{N}$ | $\frac{2}{a\ b\ N}$ |
| 4th          | 0 | $\frac{1}{N^2\lambda^2}$ | $\frac{3!\lambda^2}{N^2}$ | $\frac{3!}{a^2\ b^2\ N^2}$ |
| 6th          | 0 | $\frac{1}{N^4\lambda^4}$ | $\frac{5!\lambda^4}{N^4}$ | $\frac{5!}{a^4\ b^4\ N^4}$ |
| 8th          | 0 | $\frac{1}{N^6\lambda^6}$ | $\frac{7!\lambda^6}{N^6}$ | $\frac{7!}{a^6\ b^6\ N^6}$ |
| 10th         | 0 | $\frac{1}{N^8\lambda^8}$ | $\frac{9!\lambda^8}{N^8}$ | $\frac{9!}{a^8\ b^8\ N^8}$ |

\[
(z\phi_0,\sigma) \left( \sum_{s=0}^{p-2} \sum_{r=0}^{s} \frac{\sigma^s (zH_{2r+s})}{(\sqrt{2\sigma}) (s! 2^{r+s})} \left\{ \frac{\kappa_k}{(k-1)\kappa \sigma^{2k-2}} \right\}_{k=3}^{p} \right) + 1
\]

where $\kappa_k$ is the cumulant of order $k$. $Y_{n,k}(x_1, \ldots, x_{-k+n+1})$ is the partial Bell polynomial given by

\[
Y_{n,k}(x_1, \ldots, x_{-k+n+1}) = \sum_{m_1=0}^{n} \cdots \sum_{m_n=0}^{n} \frac{n!}{m_1! \cdots m_n!} \times 1_{[nm_{n}+m_{1}+2m_{2}+\cdots=n\wedge m_{n}+m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots=k]} \prod_{s=1}^{n} \left( \frac{x_s}{s!} \right)^{m_s}
\]

Notes on Levy Stability and the Generalized Central Limit Theorem

Take for now that the distribution that survives under addition (that is in the

**5.3. USING LOG CUMULANTS TO OBSERVE PREASYMPTOTICS**

*Table of Normalized Cumulants For Thin Tailed Distributions-Speed of Convergence (Dividing by $\Sigma^n$ where $n$ is the order of the cumulant).*

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</tbody>
</table>

| 2nd Cumulant | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
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| 6th          | 0 | $\frac{1}{N^4\lambda^4}$ | $\frac{5!\lambda^4}{N^4}$ | $\frac{5!}{a^4\ b^4\ N^4}$ |
| 8th          | 0 | $\frac{1}{N^6\lambda^6}$ | $\frac{7!\lambda^6}{N^6}$ | $\frac{7!}{a^6\ b^6\ N^6}$ |
| 10th         | 0 | $\frac{1}{N^8\lambda^8}$ | $\frac{9!\lambda^8}{N^8}$ | $\frac{9!}{a^8\ b^8\ N^8}$ |

\[
(z\phi_0,\sigma) \left( \sum_{s=0}^{p-2} \sum_{r=0}^{s} \frac{\sigma^s (zH_{2r+s})}{(\sqrt{2\sigma}) (s! 2^{r+s})} \left\{ \frac{\kappa_k}{(k-1)\kappa \sigma^{2k-2}} \right\}_{k=3}^{p} \right) + 1
\]

where $\kappa_k$ is the cumulant of order $k$. $Y_{n,k}(x_1, \ldots, x_{-k+n+1})$ is the partial Bell polynomial given by

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Y_{n,k}(x_1, \ldots, x_{-k+n+1}) = \sum_{m_1=0}^{n} \cdots \sum_{m_n=0}^{n} \frac{n!}{m_1! \cdots m_n!} \times 1_{[nm_{n}+m_{1}+2m_{2}+\cdots=n\wedge m_{n}+m_{1}+m_{2}+\cdots=k]} \prod_{s=1}^{n} \left( \frac{x_s}{s!} \right)^{m_s}
\]

**Notes on Levy Stability and the Generalized Central Limit Theorem**

Take for now that the distribution that survives under addition (that is in the
### Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Mixed Gaussians (Stoch Vol)</th>
<th>StudentT(3)</th>
<th>StudentT(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PDF</strong></td>
<td>( p e^{-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma_1^2}} + (1-p) e^{-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma_2^2}} )</td>
<td>( \frac{6\sqrt{3}}{\pi(x^2+3)^2} )</td>
<td>( 12 \left( \frac{1}{x^2+4} \right)^{5/2} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N-convoluted log</strong></td>
<td>( N \log \left( p e^{-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma_1^2}} + (1-p) e^{-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma_2^2}} \right) )</td>
<td>( N \log \left( \log \sqrt{3}</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristic</strong></td>
<td>( N \log \left( p e^{-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma_1^2}} + (1-p) e^{-\frac{x^2}{2\sigma_2^2}} \right) )</td>
<td>( -\sqrt{3}</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2nd Cum

|                      | 1 | 1 | 1 |

#### 3rd

|                      | 0 | "fuhgetaboudit" | TK |

#### 4th

|                      | \( \frac{(3(1-p)p(\sigma_1^2-\sigma_2^2)^2)}{N^2(p\sigma_1^2-(-1+p)\sigma_2^2)^3} \) | "fuhgetaboudit" | "fuhgetaboudit" |

#### 6th

|                      | \( \frac{(15(-1+p)p(-1+2p)(\sigma_1^2-\sigma_2^2)^3)}{N^4(p\sigma_1^2-(-1+p)\sigma_2^2)^6} \) | "fuhgetaboudit" | "fuhgetaboudit" |

...binomials, you end up with a Gaussian, or, more accurately, "converge to the Gaussian basin of attraction". These distributions are not called "unstable" but they are.

There is a more general class of convergence. Just consider that the Cauchy variables converges to Cauchy, so the "stability" has to apply to an entire class of distributions.

Although these lectures are not about mathematical techniques, but about the real world, it is worth developing some results concerning stable distribution in order to prove some results relative to the effect of skewness and tails on the stability.

Let \( n \) be a positive integer, \( n \geq 2 \) and \( X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n \) satisfy some measure of independence and are drawn from the same distribution,

i) there exist \( c n \in \mathbb{R}^+ \) and \( d n \in \mathbb{R}^+ \) such that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \overset{D}{=} c_n X + d_n
\]

where \( \overset{D}{=} \) means "equality" in distribution.

ii) or, equivalently, there exist sequence of i.i.d random variables \( \{Y_i\} \), a real positive sequence \( \{d_i\} \) and a real sequence \( \{a_i\} \) such that
5.3. USING LOG CUMULANTS TO OBSERVE PREASYMPTOTICS

Figure 5.7: Disturbing the scale of the alpha stable and that of a more natural distribution, the gamma distribution. The alpha stable does not increase in risks! (risks for us in Chapter x is defined in thickening of the tails of the distribution). We will see later with “convexification” how it is rare to have an isolated perturbation of distribution without an increase in risks.

where \( D \) means convergence in distribution.

iii) or, equivalently,

The distribution of \( X \) has for characteristic function

\[
\phi(t) = \begin{cases} 
\exp(i\mu t - |t| (1 + 2i\beta/\pi \text{sgn}(t) \log(|t|))) & \alpha = 1 \\
\exp(i\mu t - |t\sigma|^{\alpha} (1 - i\beta \tan(\frac{\pi \alpha}{2}) \text{sgn}(t))) & \alpha \neq 1
\end{cases}
\]

\( \alpha \in (0,2] \), \( \sigma \in \mathbb{R}^+ \), \( \beta \in [-1,1] \), \( \mu \in \mathbb{R} \)

Then if either of i), ii), iii) holds, \( X \) has the “alpha stable” distribution \( S(\alpha, \beta, \mu, \sigma) \), with \( \beta \) designating the symmetry, \( \mu \) the centrality, and \( \sigma \) the scale.

**Warning:** perturbing the skewness of the Levy stable distribution by changing \( \beta \) without affecting the tail exponent is mean preserving, which we will see is unnatural: the transformation of random variables leads to effects on more than one characteristic of the distribution. \( S(\alpha, \beta, \mu, \sigma) \) represents the stable distribution \( S_{\text{type}} \) with index of stability \( \alpha \), skewness parameter \( \beta \), location parameter \( \mu \), and scale parameter \( \sigma \).

The Generalized Central Limit Theorem gives sequences \( a_n \) and \( b_n \) such that the distribution of the shifted and rescaled sum \( Z_n = (\sum_i^n X_i - a_n) / b_n \) of \( n \) i.i.d. random variates \( X_i \) whose distribution function \( F_X(x) \) has asymptotes \( 1 - cx^{-\mu} \) as \( x \to +\infty \) and \( d(-x)^{-\mu} \) as \( x \to -\infty \) weakly converges to the stable distribution \( S_1(\alpha, (c-d)/(c+d), 0, 1) \):

**Note:** Chebyshev’s Inequality and upper bound on deviations under finite variance.. [To ADD MARKOV BOUNDS → CHEBYCHEV → CHERNOV BOUNDS.]

Even when the variance is finite, the bound is rather far. Consider Chebyshev’s inequality.
\[ P(X > n\sigma) \leq \frac{1}{n^2}, \]

which effectively accommodate power laws but puts a bound on the probability distribution of large deviations—still significant.

**The Effect of Finiteness of Variance**

This table shows the inverse of the probability of exceeding a certain \( \sigma \) for the Gaussian and the lower on probability limit for any distribution with finite variance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deviation</th>
<th>Gaussian</th>
<th>ChebyshevUpperBound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gaussian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 \times 10^2</td>
<td>ChebyshevUpperBound</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3. \times 10^4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3. \times 10^6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1. \times 10^9</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8. \times 10^{11}</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2. \times 10^{15}</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>9. \times 10^{18}</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1. \times 10^{23}</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.4 Convergence of the Maximum of a Finite Variance Power Law

An illustration of the following point. The behavior of the maximum value as a percentage of a sum is much slower than we think, and doesn’t make much difference on whether it is a finite variance, that is \( \alpha > 2 \) or not. (See comments in Mandelbrot & Taleb, 2011)

\[ \tau(N) \equiv E() \]

![Graph showing convergence of the maximum](image)

### 5.5 Sources and Further Readings

**Limits of Sums**

Paul Lévy [38], Gnedenko and Kolmogorov [30], Prokhorov [55], Doe [33], Petrov [51], Blum [6].
For Large Deviations

Nagaev[47], [46], Mikosch and Nagaev[43], Nagaev and Pinelis [48]. In the absence of Cramér conditions, Nagaev [45], Brennan[10], Ramsay[56], Bennet[4].

Also, for dependent summands, Bernstein [5].

Discussions of Concentration functions

Esseen [23], [? ], Doeblin [15], [14], Darling [13], Kolmogorov [36], Rogozin [57], Kesten [34], Rogogin [58].
Where Standard Diversification Fails

![Diagram showing the "diversification effect".](image)

**Figure D.1**: The "diversification effect": difference between promised and delivered. Markowitz Mean Variance based portfolio construction will stand probably as one of the most empirically invalid theory ever used in modern times.

This is an analog of the problem with slowness of the law of large number: how a portfolio can track a general index (speed of convergence) and how high can true volatility be compared to the observed one (the base line).
[The equivalent of fat tails for matrices. This will be completed, but consider for now that the 4th moment reaching Gaussian levels (i.e. 3) in the chapter is equivalent to eigenvalues reaching Wigner’s semicircle.]
APPENDIX E. FAT TAILS AND RANDOM MATRICES

Figure E.1: Gaussian

Figure E.2: Standard Tail Fattening

Figure E.3: Student $T_{\frac{3}{2}}$
Figure E.4: Cauchy
Chapter Summary 6: We apply the results of the previous chapter on the slowness of the LLN and list misapplication of statistics in social science, almost all of them linked to misinterpretation of the effects of fat-tailedness (and often from lack of awareness of fat tails), and how by attribute substitution researchers can substitute one measure for another. Why for example, because of chronic small-sample effects, the 80/20 is milder in-sample (less fat-tailed) than in reality and why regression rarely works.

6.1 Mechanistic Statistical Statements

Recall from the Introduction that the best way to figure out if someone is using an erroneous statistical technique is to use such technique on a dataset for which you have the answer. The best way to know the exact properties is to generate it by Monte Carlo. So the technique throughout the chapter is to generate fat-tailed data, the properties of which we know with precision, and check how such standard and mechanistic methods detect the true properties, then show the wedge between observed and true properties.

Also recall from Chapter 5 (5.1) that fat tails make it harder for someone to detect the true properties; for this we need a much, much larger dataset, more rigorous ranking techniques allowing inference in one direction not another (Chapter 3), etc. Hence this chapter is a direct application of the results and rules of Chapter 3.

One often hears the statement "the plural of anecdote is not data", a very, very representative (but elementary) violation of probability theory. It is very severe in effect for risk taking. For large deviations, $n = 1$ is plenty of data. The Chebychev distance, or norm $\mathcal{L}^\infty$ focuses on the largest measure (also see concentration functions, maximum of divergence (Lévy, Petrov), or even the standard and ubiquitous Kolmogorov-Smirnoff): looking at the extremum of a time series is not cherry picking since it is disconfirmatory evidence, the only true evidence one can get in statistics. Remarkably such people tend to also fall for the opposite mistake, the "n-large", in thinking that confirmatory observations provide "p-values". All these
Attribute substitution occurs when an individual has to make a judgment (of a target attribute) that is complicated complex, and instead substitutes a more easily calculated one. There have been many papers (Kahneman and Tversky [73], Hoggarth and Soyer, [62] and comment [64]) showing how statistical researchers overinterpret their own findings, as simplification leads to the fooled by randomness effect.

Dan Goldstein and this author (Goldstein and Taleb [32]) showed how professional researchers and practitioners substitute norms in the evaluation of higher order properties of time series, mistaking $\|x\|_1$ for $\|x\|_2$ (or $\sum |x|$ for $\sqrt{\sum x^2}$). The common result is underestimating the randomness of the estimator $M$, in other words read too much into it (and, what is worse, underestimation of the tails, since, as we saw in 2.4, the ratio $\frac{\sqrt{\sum x^2}}{\sum |x|}$ increases with "fat-tailedness" to become infinite under tail exponents $\alpha \geq 2$). Standard deviation is usually explained and interpreted as mean deviation. Simply, people find it easier to imagine that a variation of, say, (-5,+10,-4,-3, 5, 8) in temperature over successive day needs to be mentally estimated by squaring the numbers, averaging them, then taking square roots. Instead they just average the absolutes. But, what is key, they tend to do so while convincing themselves that they are using standard deviations.

There is worse. Mindless application of statistical techniques, without knowledge of the conditional nature of the claims are widespread. But mistakes are often elementary, like lectures by parrots repeating "N of 1" or "p", or "do you have evidence of?", etc. Many social scientists need to have a clear idea of the difference between science and journalism, or the one between rigorous empiricism and anecdotal statements. Science is not about making claims about a sample, but using a sample to make general claims and discuss properties that apply outside the sample.

Take $M'$ (short for $M^X_T(A,f)$) the estimator we saw above from the realizations (a sample path) for some process, and $M^*$ the "true" mean that would emanate from knowledge of the generating process for such variable. When someone announces: "The crime rate in NYC dropped between 2000 and 2010", the claim is limited $M'$ the observed mean, not $M^*$ the true mean, hence the claim can be deemed merely journalistic, not scientific, and journalists are there to report "facts" not theories. No scientific and causal statement should be made from $M'$ on "why violence has dropped" unless one establishes a link to $M^*$ that supports. Many social scientists do not realize this.
6.3. THE TAILS SAMPLING PROPERTY

What we just saw is at the foundation of statistics (and, it looks like, science). Bayesians disagree on how \( M' \) converges to \( M^* \), etc., never on this point. From his statements in a dispute with this author concerning his claims about the stability of modern times based on the mean casualty in the past (Pinker [52]), Pinker seems to be aware that \( M' \) may have dropped over time (which is a straight equality) and sort of perhaps we might not be able to make claims on \( M^* \) which might not have really been dropping.

In some areas not involving time series, the difference between \( M' \) and \( M^* \) is negligible. So I rapidly jot down a few rules before showing proofs and derivations (limiting \( M' \) to the arithmetic mean, that is, \( M' = M_T^X((-\infty, \infty), x) \)).

Note again that \( \mathbb{E} \) is the expectation operator under "real-world" probability measure \( \mathbb{P} \).

6.3 The Tails Sampling Property

From the derivations in 5.1, \( \mathbb{E}[|M' - M^*|] \) increases in with fat-tailedness (the mean deviation of \( M^* \) seen from the realizations in different samples of the same process). In other words, fat tails tend to mask the distributional properties. This is the immediate result of the problem of convergence by the law of large numbers.

6.3.1 On the difference between the initial (generator) and the "recovered" distribution

(Explanation of the method of generating data from a known distribution and comparing realized outcomes to expected ones)

6.3.2 Case Study: Pinker [52] Claims On The Stability of the Future Based on Past Data

When the generating process is power law with low exponent, plenty of confusion can take place.

Figure 6.1: Q-Q plot* Fitting extreme value theory to data generated by its own process, the rest of course owing to sample insufficiency for extremely large values, a bias that typically causes the underestimation of tails, as the reader can see the points tending to fall to the right.
For instance, Pinker [52] claims that the generating process has a tail exponent \( \sim 1.16 \) but made the mistake of drawing quantitative conclusions from it about the mean from \( M' \) and built theories about drop in the risk of violence that is contradicted by the data he was showing, since fat tails plus negative skewness/asymmetry = hidden and underestimated risks of blowup. His study is also missing the Casanova problem (next point) but let us focus on the error of being fooled by the mean of fat-tailed data.

Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the realizations of two subsamples, one before, and the other after the turkey problem, illustrating the inability of a set to naively deliver true probabilities through calm periods.

The next simulations shows \( M_1 \), the mean of casualties over the first 100 years across \( 10^4 \) sample paths, and \( M_2 \) the mean of casualties over the next 100 years.

So clearly it is a lunacy to try to read much into the mean of a power law with 1.15 exponent (and this is the mild case, where we know the exponent is 1.15. Typically we have an error rate, and the metaprobability discussion in Chapter x will show the exponent to be likely to be lower because of the possibility of error).

### 6.3.3 Claims Made From Power Laws

The Cederman graph, Figure 6.7 shows exactly how not to make claims upon observing power laws.
6.3. THE TAILS SAMPLING PROPERTY

Figure 6.4: Does the past mean predict the future mean? Not so. M1 for 100 years, M2 for the next century. Seen at a narrow scale.

Figure 6.5: Does the past mean predict the future mean? Not so. M1 for 100 years, M2 for the next century. Seen at a wider scale.

Figure 6.6: The same seen with a thin-tailed distribution.
Figure 6.7: Cederman 2003, used by Pinker [52]. I wonder if I am dreaming or if the exponent \( \alpha \) is really = .41. Chapters x and x show why such inference is centrally flawed, since low exponents do not allow claims on mean of the variable except to say that it is very, very high and not observable in finite samples. Also, in addition to wrong conclusions from the data, take for now that the regression fits the small deviations, not the large ones, and that the author overestimates our ability to figure out the asymptotic slope.

6.4 A discussion of the Paretan 80/20 Rule

Next we will see how when one hears about the Paretan 80/20 "rule" (or, worse, "principle"), it is likely to underestimate the fat tails effect outside some narrow domains. It can be more like 95/20 or even 99.9999/.0001, or eventually 100/\( \epsilon \). Almost all economic reports applying power laws for "GINI" (Chapter x) or inequality miss the point. Even Pareto himself miscalibrated the rule.

As a heuristic, it is always best to assume underestimation of tail measurement. Recall that we are in a one-tailed situation, hence a likely underestimation of the mean.

Where does this 80/20 business come from? Assume \( \alpha \) the power law tail exponent and an exceedant probability \( P(X > x) = x^{-\alpha} \). Simply the top \( \alpha \).
\[ \alpha = \frac{\log(p)}{\log(p) - \log(S)} \]

which means that the exponent will be 1.161 for the 80/20 distribution.

Note that as \( \alpha \) gets close to 1 the contribution explodes as it becomes close to infinite mean.

**Derivation**: Start with the standard density \( f(x) = x^\alpha \min x^{-\alpha-1}, x \geq x_{\min} \).

1) The share attributed above \( K, K \geq x_{\min}, \) becomes

\[
\frac{\int_K^\infty x f(x) \, dx}{\int_{x_{\min}}^\infty x f(x) \, dx} = K^{1-\alpha}
\]

2) The probability of exceeding \( K, \)

\[
\int_K^\infty f(x) \, dx = K^{-\alpha}
\]

3) Hence \( K^{-\alpha} \) of the population contributes \( K^{1-\alpha} = p^{\alpha-1} \) of the result

**6.4.1 Why the 80/20 Will Be Generally an Error: The Problem of In-Sample Calibration**

Vilfredo Pareto figured out that 20% of the land in Italy was owned by 80% of the people, and the reverse. He later observed that 20 percent of the peapods in his garden yielded 80 percent of the peas that were harvested. He might have been right about the peas; but most certainly wrong about the land.

For fitting in-sample frequencies for a power law does not yield the proper "true" ratio since the sample is likely to be insufficient. One should fit a powerlaw using extrapolative, not interpolative techniques, such as methods based on Log-Log plotting or regressions. These latter methods are more informational, though with a few caveats as they can also suffer from sample insufficiency.

Data with infinite mean, \( \alpha \leq 1 \), will masquerade as finite variance in sample and show about 80% contribution to the top 20% quantile. In fact you are expected to witness in finite samples a lower contribution of the top 20%.

Let us see: Figure 6.8. Generate \( m \) samples of \( \alpha = 1 \) data \( X_j = (x_{i,j})_{i=1}^n \), ordered \( x_{i,j} \geq x_{i-1,j} \) and examine the distribution of the top \( \nu \) contribution \( \nu \min \sum_{i=1}^{\nu x_{j} \min} \) with \( \nu \in \).
6.5 Survivorship Bias (Casanova) Property

\[ \mathbf{E}(M' - M^\star) \] increases under the presence of an absorbing barrier for the process. This is the Casanova effect, or fallacy of silent evidence see *The Black Swan*, Chapter 8. (*Fallacy of silent evidence*: Looking at history, we do not see the full story, only the rosier parts of the process, in the Glossary)

History is a single sample path we can model as a Brownian motion, or something similar with fat tails (say Levy flights). What we observe is one path among many "counterfactuals", or alternative histories. Let us call each one a "sample path", a succession of discretely observed states of the system between the initial state \( S_0 \) and \( S_T \) the present state.

**Arithmetic process:** We can model it as \( S(t) = S(t - \Delta t) + Z_{\Delta t} \) where \( Z_{\Delta t} \) is noise drawn from any distribution.

**Geometric process:** We can model it as \( S(t) = S(t - \Delta t)e^{W_{t}} \) typically \( S(t - \Delta t)e^{Z_{\Delta t} + s\sqrt{\Delta t}} \) but \( W_t \) can be noise drawn from any distribution. Typically, \( \log \left( \frac{S(t)}{S(t - \Delta t)} \right) \) is treated as Gaussian, but we can use fatter tails. The convenience of the Gaussian is stochastic calculus and the ability to skip steps in the process, as \( S(t) = S(t - \Delta t)e^{\mu t + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 t} \), with \( W_t \sim N(0,1) \), works for all \( \Delta t \), even allowing for a single period to summarize the total.

*The Black Swan* made the statement that history is more rosy than the "true" history, that is, the mean of the ensemble of all sample path.

Take an absorbing barrier \( H \) as a level that, when reached, leads to extinction, defined as becoming unobservable or unobserved at period \( T \).

When you observe history of a family of processes subjected to an absorbing barrier, i.e., you see the winners not the losers, there are biases. If the survival of the entity has been conditioned on the barrier, there are biases in the probability density...
Bias in the measurement of the mean. In the presence of an absorbing barrier H "below", that is, lower than $S_0$, the "observed mean" $\geq$ "true mean"

Bias in the measurement of the volatility. The "observed" variance (or mean deviation) $\leq$ "true" variance

First, let us pull out the "true" distribution using the reflection principle.

Thus if the barrier is $H$ and we start at $S_0$ then we have two distributions, one $f(S)$, the other $f(S-2(S_0-H))$

By the reflection principle, the "observed" distribution $p(S)$ becomes:

$$p(S) = \begin{cases} f(S) & \text{if } S > H \\ f(S) - f(S - 2(S_0 - H)) & \text{if } S < H \end{cases}$$
Figure 6.11: If you don’t take into account the sample paths that hit the barrier, the observed distribution seems more positive, and more stable, than the "true" one.

Figure 6.12: The left tail has fewer samples. The probability of an event falling below $K$ in $n$ samples is $F(K)$, where $F$ is the cumulative distribution.

Simply, the nonobserved paths (the casualties "swallowed into the bowels of history") represent a mass of $1 - \int_H^\infty f(S) - f(S - 2(S_0 - H))\,dS$ and, clearly, it is in this mass that all the hidden effects reside. We can prove that the missing mean is $\int_H^\infty S(f(S) - f(S - 2(S_0 - 1))$ and perturbate $f(S)$ using the previously seen method to "fatten" the tail.

The interest aspect of the absorbing barrier (from below) is that it has the same effect as insufficient sampling of a left-skewed distribution under fat tails. The mean will look better than it really is.

6.6 Left (Right) Tail Sample Insufficiency Under Negative (Positive) Skewness

$\mathbb{E}[M' - M^*]$ increases (decreases) with negative (positive) skeweness of the true underlying variable.

Some classes of payoff (those affected by Turkey problems) show better performance than "true" mean. Others (entrepreneurship) are plagued with in-sample underestimation of the mean. A naive measure of a sample mean, even without absorbing barrier, yields a higher measure than the "true" mean when the distribution is skewed to the left.
6.7. WHY N=1 CAN BE VERY, VERY SIGNIFICANT STATISTICALLY

This can be shown analytically, but a simulation works well.

To see how a distribution masks its mean because of sample insufficiency, take a skewed distribution with fat tails, say the standard Pareto Distribution we saw earlier.

The "true" mean is known to be \( m = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} \). Generate a sequence \( (X_{1,j}, X_{2,j}, ..., X_{N,j}) \) of random samples indexed by \( j \) as a designator of a certain history \( j \). Measure \( \mu_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_{i,j}}{N} \). We end up with the sequence of various sample means \( (\mu_j)_{j=1}^{T} \), which naturally should converge to \( M \) with both \( N \) and \( T \). Next we calculate \( \tilde{\mu} \) the median value of \( \sum_{j=1}^{T} \frac{\mu_j}{M^* T} \), such that \( P > \tilde{\mu} = \frac{1}{2} \) where, to repeat, \( M^* \) is the theoretical mean we expect from the generating distribution.

Entrepreneurship is penalized by right tail insufficiency making performance look worse than it is. Figures 0.1 and 0.2 can be seen in a symmetrical way, producing the exact opposite effect of negative skewness.

6.7 Why N=1 Can Be Very, Very Significant Statistically

The Power of Extreme Deviations: Under fat tails, large deviations from the mean are vastly more informational than small ones. They are not "anecdotal". (The last two properties corresponds to the black swan problem, inherently asymmetric).

We saw the point earlier (with the masquerade problem) in ??..?? . The gist is as follows, worth repeating and applying to this context.

A thin-tailed distribution is less likely to deliver a single large deviation than a fat tailed distribution a series of long calm periods. Now add negative skewness to the issue, which makes large deviations negative and small deviations positive, and a large negative deviation, under skewness, becomes extremely informational.

Mixing the arguments of ??..?? and ??..?? we get:

Asymmetry in Inference: Under both negative [positive] skewness and fat tails, negative [positive] deviations from the mean are more informational than positive
CHAPTER 6. SOME MISUSES OF STATISTICS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

Figure 6.14: A sample regression path dominated by a large deviation. Most samples don’t exhibit such deviation this, which is a problem. We know that with certainty (an application of the zero-one laws) that these deviations are certain as $n \to \infty$, so if one pick an arbitrarily large deviation, such number will be exceeded, with a result that can be illustrated as the sum of all variations will come from a single large deviation.

6.8 The Instability of Squared Variations in Regressions

Probing the limits of a standardized method by arbitrage. We can easily arbitrage a mechanistic method of analysis by generating data, the properties of which are known by us, which we call "true" properties, and comparing these "true" properties to the properties revealed by analyses, as well as the confidence of the analysis about its own results in the form of "p-values" or other masquerades. This is no different from generating random noise and asking the "specialist" for an analysis of the charts, in order to test his knowledge, and, even more importantly, asking him to give us a probability of his analysis being wrong. Likewise, this is equivalent to providing a literary commentator with randomly generated gibberish and asking him to provide comments. In this section we apply the technique to regression analyses, a great subject of abuse by the social scientists, particularly when ignoring the effects of fat tails.

In short, we saw the effect of fat tails on higher moments. We will start with 1) an extreme case of infinite mean (in which we know that the conventional regression analyses break down), then generalize to 2) situations with finite mean (but finite variance), then 3) finite variance but infinite higher moments. Note that except for case 3, these results are "sort of" standard in the econometrics literature, except that they are ignored away through tweaking of the assumptions.

Fooled by $\alpha=1$. Assume the simplest possible regression model, as follows. Let $y_i=\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i + s z_i$, with $Y=\{y_i\}_{1<i\leq n}$ the set of $n$ dependent variables and $X=\{x_i\}_{1<i\leq n}$, the independent one; $Y, X \in \mathbb{R}$, $i \in \mathbb{N}$. The errors $z_i$ are independent but drawn from a standard Cauchy (symmetric, with tail exponent $\alpha=1$), multiplied by the amplitude or scale $s$; we will vary $s$ across the thought experiment (recall that in the absence and variance and mean deviation we rely on $s$ as a measure of dispersion). Since all moments are infinite, $\mathbb{E}[z_i^n] = \infty$ for all $n \geq 1$, we know ex ante that the noise is such that the "errors" or 'residuals" have infinite means and variances -but the problem is that in finite samples the property doesn’t show. The sum of squares will be finite.
6.8. THE INSTABILITY OF SQUARED VARIATIONS IN REGRESSIONS

\[ \alpha = 1; s = 5 \]

\[ \alpha = 1; s = .5 \]

Next we generate \( T \) simulations (indexed by \( j \)) of \( n \) pairs \((y_i, x_i)_{1<i\leq n}\) for increasing values of \( x \), thanks to Cauchy distributed variables variable \( z_{i,j}^\alpha \) and multiplied \( z_{i,j}^\alpha \) by the scaling constant \( s \), leaving us with a set \( \left( (\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i + s z_{i,j}^\alpha)_{i=1}^n \right)^j_{j=1} \). Using standard regression techniques of estimation we "regress" and obtain the standard equation \( Y_{\text{est}} = \beta_0^{\text{est}} + X \beta_1^{\text{est}} \), where \( Y_{\text{est}} \) is the estimated \( Y \), and \( E \) a vector of unexplained residuals \( \equiv (\epsilon_{i,j}) \equiv \left( (y_{i,j}^{\text{est}} - \beta_0^{\text{est}} - \beta_1^{\text{est}} x_{i,j})_{i=1}^n \right)^T_{j=1} \). We thus obtain \( T \) simulated values of \( \rho \equiv (\rho_j)_j^T \), where \( \rho_j \equiv 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \epsilon_{i,j}^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_{i,j} - \bar{y}_j)^2} \), the R-square for a sample run \( j \), where \( \bar{y}_j = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y_{i,j} \), in other words 1- \( / \) (squared residuals) \( / \) (squared variations). We examine the distribution of the different realizations of \( \rho \).

**Arbitraging metrics.** For a sample run which, typically, will not have a large deviation,

R-squared: 0.994813 (When the "true" R-squared would be 0)
CHAPTER 6. SOME MISUSES OF STATISTICS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

Figure 6.17: We can fit different regressions to the same story (which is no story). A regression that tries to accommodate the large deviation.

Figure 6.18: Missing the largest deviation (not necessarily voluntarily): the sample doesn’t include the critical observation.
6.8.1 Application to Economic Variables

We saw in *F.F* that kurtosis can be attributable to 1 in 10,000 observations (>50 years of data), meaning it is unrigorous to assume anything other than that the data has "infinite" kurtosis. The implication is that even if the squares exist, i.e., \( \mathbb{E}[z_i^2] < \infty \), the distribution of \( z_i^2 \) has infinite variance, and is massively unstable. The "P-values" remain grossly miscomputed. The next graph shows the distribution of \( \rho \) across samples.

6.9 Statistical Testing of Differences Between Variables

A pervasive attribute substitution: Where \( X \) and \( Y \) are two random variables, the properties of \( X-Y \), say the variance, probabilities, and higher order attributes are markedly different from the difference in properties. So \( \mathbb{E}(X - Y) = \mathbb{E}(X) - \mathbb{E}(Y) \) but of course, \( Var(X - Y) \neq Var(X) - Var(Y) \), etc. for higher norms. It means that P-values are different, and of course the coefficient of variation ("Sharpe"). Where \( \sigma \) is the Standard deviation of the variable (or sample):

\[
\frac{\mathbb{E}(X - Y)}{\sigma(X - Y)} \neq \frac{\mathbb{E}(X)}{\sigma(X)} - \frac{\mathbb{E}(Y)}{\sigma(Y)}
\]

In *Fooled by Randomness* (2001):

A far more acute problem relates to the outperformance, or the comparison, between two or more persons or entities. While we are certainly fooled by randomness when it comes to a single times series, the foolishness is compounded when it comes to the comparison between, say, two people, or a person and a benchmark. Why? Because of the comparison. In effect, the
and his brother-in-law, launched through life. Assume equal odds for each of good and bad luck. Outcomes: lucky-lucky (no difference between them), unlucky-unlucky (again, no difference), lucky-unlucky (a large difference between them), unlucky-lucky (again, a large difference).

Ten years later (2011) it was found that 50% of neuroscience papers (peer-reviewed in "prestigious journals") that compared variables got it wrong.

In theory, a comparison of two experimental effects requires a statistical test on their difference. In practice, this comparison is often based on an incorrect procedure involving two separate tests in which researchers conclude that effects differ when one effect is significant (P < 0.05) but the other is not (P > 0.05). We reviewed 513 behavioral, systems and cognitive neuroscience articles in five top-ranking journals (Science, Nature, Nature Neuroscience, Neuron and The Journal of Neuroscience) and found that 78 used the correct procedure and 79 used the incorrect procedure. An additional analysis suggests that incorrect analyses of interactions are even more common in cellular and molecular neuroscience.


Fooled by Randomness was read by many professionals (to put it mildly); the mistake is still being made. Ten years from now, they will still be making the mistake.

6.10 Studying the Statistical Properties of Binaries and Extending to Vanillas

See discussion in Chapter 7. A lot of nonsense in discussions of rationality facing "dread risk" (such as terrorism or nuclear events) based on wrong probabilistic structures, such as comparisons of fatalities from falls from ladders to death from terrorism. The probability of falls from ladder doubling is $1 \times 10^{20}$. Terrorism is fat-tailed: similar claims cannot be made.

A lot of unrigorous claims like "long shot bias" is also discussed there.

6.11 The Mother of All Turkey Problems: How Economics Time Series Econometrics and Statistics Don’t Replicate

(Debunking a Nasty Type of Misinference)

Something Wrong With Econometrics, as Almost All Papers Don’t Replicate. The next two reliability tests, one about parametric methods the other about robust statistics, show that there is something wrong in econometric methods, fundamentally wrong, that the methodology is plagued by replicated type-prior mistakes
6.11.1 Performance of Standard Parametric Risk Estimators, $f(x) = x^n$ (Norm $\mathbb{L}^2$)

With economic variables one single observation in 10,000, that is, one single day in 40 years, can explain the bulk of the "kurtosis", a measure of "fat tails", that is, both a measure how much the distribution under consideration departs from the standard Gaussian, or the role of remote events in determining the total properties. For the U.S. stock market, a single day, the crash of 1987, determined 80% of the kurtosis. The same problem is found with interest and exchange rates, commodities, and other variables. The problem is not just that the data had "fat tails", something people knew but sort of wanted to forget; it was that we would never be able to determine "how fat" the tails were within standard methods. Never.

The implication is that those tools used in economics that are based on squaring variables (more technically, the Euclidian, or $\mathbb{L}^2$ norm), such as standard deviation, variance, correlation, regression, the kind of stuff you find in textbooks, are not valid scientifically (except in some rare cases where the variable is bounded). The so-called "p values" you find in studies have no meaning with economic and financial variables. Even the more sophisticated techniques of stochastic calculus used in mathematical finance do not work in economics except in selected pockets.

The results of most papers in economics based on these standard statistical methods are thus not expected to replicate, and they effectively don’t. Further, these tools invite foolish risk taking. Neither do alternative techniques yield reliable measures of rare events, except that we can tell if a remote event is underpriced, without assigning an exact value.

From [65]), using Log returns, $X_t \equiv \log \left( \frac{P(t)}{P(t-i\Delta t)} \right)$, take the measure $M_t^X ((-\infty, \infty), X^4)$ of the fourth noncentral moment:

$$M_t^X ((-\infty, \infty), X^4) \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=0}^{n} X_{t-i\Delta t}^4$$

and the $n$-sample maximum quartic observation $\max(X_{t-i\Delta t}^4)_{i=0}^{n}$. $Q(n)$ is the contribution of the maximum quartic variations over $n$ samples.

$$Q(n) \equiv \frac{\max(X_{t-i\Delta t}^4)_{i=0}^{n}}{\sum_{i=0}^{n} X_{t-i\Delta t}^4}$$

For a Gaussian (i.e., the distribution of the square of a Chi-square distributed variable) show $Q(10^4)$ the maximum contribution should be around $.008 \pm .0028$. Visibly we can see that the distribution $4^{th}$ moment has the property

$$P \left( X > \max(x_i^4)_{i \leq 2 \leq n} \right) \approx P \left( X > \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^4 \right)$$

Recall that, naively, the fourth moment expresses the stability of the second moment. And the second moment expresses the stability of the measure across samples.
Figure 6.20: Max quartic across securities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Max Q</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>46.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP500</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>56.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CrudeOil</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>26.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Sterling</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heating Oil</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>31.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikkei</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTSE</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGB</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>24.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurodollar Depo 1M</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar #11</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>48.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yen</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>38.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bovespa</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurodollar Depo 3M</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>28.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>48.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAX</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>18.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that taking the snapshot at a different period would show extremes coming from other variables while these variables showing high maximma for the kurtosis, would drop, a mere result of the instability of the measure across series and time. Description of the dataset:

All tradable macro markets data available as of August 2008, with "tradable" meaning actual closing prices corresponding to transactions (stemming from markets not bureaucratic evaluations, includes interest rates, currencies, equity indices).

6.11.2 Performance of Standard NonParametric Risk Estimators, \( f(x) = x \) or \( |x| \) (Norm \( \mathcal{L}1 \)), \( A = (-\infty, K] \)

Does the past resemble the future in the tails? The following tests are nonparametric, that is entirely based on empirical probability distributions.

So far we stayed in dimension 1. When we look at higher dimensional properties, such as covariance matrices, things get worse. We will return to the point with the treatment...
6.11. THE MOTHER OF ALL TURKEY PROBLEMS: HOW ECONOMICS TIME SERIES ETC

Figure 6.21: Kurtosis across nonoverlapping periods


Figure 6.22: Monthly delivered volatility in the SP500 (as measured by standard deviations). The only structure it seems to have comes from the fact that it is bounded at 0. This is standard.

Monthly Vol

Figure 6.23: Monthly volatility of volatility from the same dataset, predictably unstable.
CHAPTER 6. SOME MISUSES OF STATISTICS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

Figure 6.24: Comparing $M[t-1, t]$ and $M[t,t+1]$, where $\tau = 1$ year, 252 days, for macroeconomic data using extreme deviations, $A = (-\infty, -2 \text{ standard deviations (equivalent)})$, $f(x) = x$ (replication of data from The Fourth Quadrant, Taleb, 2009)

Figure 6.25: The "regular" is predictive of the regular, that is mean deviation. Comparing $M[t]$ and $M[t+1 \text{ year}]$ for macroeconomic data using regular deviations, $A = (-\infty, \infty)$, $f(x) = |x|

Figure 6.26: The figure shows how things gets a lot worse for large deviations $A = (-\infty, -4 \text{ standard deviations (equivalent)})$, $f(x) = x$
When $x_t$ are now in $\mathbb{R}^N$, the problems of sensitivity to changes in the covariance matrix makes the estimator $M$ extremely unstable. Tail events for a vector are vastly more difficult to calibrate, and increase in dimensions.

![Figure 6.27: Correlations are also problematic, which flows from the instability of single variances and the effect of multiplication of the values of random variables.](image)

The Responses so far by members of the economics/econometrics establishment. : "his books are too popular to merit attention", "nothing new" (sic), "egomaniac" (but I was told at the National Science Foundation that "egomaniac" does not appear to have a clear econometric significance). No answer as to why they still use STD, regressions, GARCH, value-at-risk and similar methods.

Peso problem. : Note that many researchers [CITATION] invoke "outliers" or "peso problem" as acknowledging fat tails, yet ignore them analytically (outside of Poisson models that we will see are not possible to calibrate except after the fact). Our approach here is exactly the opposite: do not push outliers under the rug, rather build everything around them. In other words, just like the FAA and the FDA who deal with safety by focusing on catastrophe avoidance, we will throw away the ordinary under the rug and retain extremes as the sole sound approach to risk management. And this extends beyond safety since much of the analytics and policies that can be destroyed by tail events are unusable.

Peso problem confusion about the Black Swan problem. : "(...) "black swans" (Taleb, 2007). These cultural icons refer to disasters that occur so infrequently that they are virtually impossible to analyze using..."
standard statistical inference. However, we find this perspective less than helpful because it suggests a state of hopeless ignorance in which we resign ourselves to being buffeted and battered by the unknowable."

(Andrew Lo, who obviously did not bother to read the book he was citing. The comment also shows the lack of the common sense to look for robustness to these events instead of just focusing on probability).

**Lack of Skin in the Game.** Indeed one wonders why econometric methods can be used while being wrong, so shockingly wrong, how "University" researchers (adults) can partake of such acts of artistry. Basically these capture the ordinary and mask higher order effects. Since blowups are not frequent, these events do not show in data and the researcher looks smart most of the time while being fundamentally wrong. At the source, researchers, "quant" risk manager, and academic economist do not have skin in the game so they are not hurt by wrong risk measures: other people are hurt by them. And the artistry should continue perpetually so long as people are allowed to harm others with impunity. (More in Taleb and Sandis, 2013)

### 6.12 A General Summary of The Problem of Reliance on Past Time Series

The four aspects of what we will call the nonreplicability issue, particularly for measures that are in the tails. These are briefly presented here and developed more technically throughout the book:

a- **Definition of statistical rigor (or Pinker Problem).** The idea that an estimator is not about fitness to past data, but related to how it can capture future realizations of a process seems absent from the discourse. Much of econometrics/risk management methods do not meet this simple point and the rigor required by orthodox, basic statistical theory.

b- **Statistical argument on the limit of knowledge of tail events.** Problems of replicability are acute for tail events. Tail events are impossible to price owing to the limitations from the size of the sample. Naively rare events have little data hence what estimator we may have is noisier.

c- **Mathematical argument about statistical decidability.** No probability without metaprobability. Metadistributions matter more with tail events, and with fat-tailed distributions.

1. The soft problem: we accept the probability distribution, but the imprecision in the calibration (or parameter errors) percolates in the tails.

2. The hard problem (Taleb and Pilpel, 2001, Taleb and Douady, 2009): We need to specify an *a priori* probability distribution from which we depend, or alternatively, propose a metadistribution with compact support.

3. Both problems are bridged in that a nested stochastization of standard deviation (or the scale of the parameters) for a Gaussian turn a thin-tailed distribution into a power law (a.k.a. lognormal), that includes the negative, it is a jump diffusion.
d- **Economic arguments:** The Friedman-Phelps and Lucas critiques, Goodhart’s law. Acting on statistical information (a metric, a response) changes the statistical properties of some processes.

### 6.13 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the problem of "surprises" from the past of time series, and the invalidity of a certain class of estimators that seem to only work in-sample. Before examining more deeply the mathematical properties of fat-tails, let us look at some practical aspects.
## On the Instability of Econometric Data

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$K(1)$</th>
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Table 7.1: True and False Biases in the Psychology Literature

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<thead>
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<th>Alleged Bias</th>
<th>Erroneous domain</th>
<th>Justified domain</th>
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<td>Dread Risk</td>
<td>Comparing Terrorism to fall from ladders</td>
<td>Comparing risks of driving vs flying</td>
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<td>Overestimation of small</td>
<td>Open-ended payoffs in fat-tailed domains</td>
<td>Bounded bets in laboratory setting</td>
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<tr>
<td>probabilities</td>
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<td>Long shot bias</td>
<td>Convex financial payoffs</td>
<td>Lotteries</td>
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<td>Prediction markets</td>
<td>Revolutions</td>
<td>Elections</td>
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<td>Prediction markets</td>
<td>&quot;Crashes&quot; in Natural Markets (Finance)</td>
<td>Sports</td>
</tr>
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CHAPTER 7. ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BINARY AND VARIABLE EXPOSURES

Figure 7.1: Comparing digital payoff (left) to the variable (right). The vertical payoff shows \( x_i \), \((x_1, x_2, \ldots)\) and the horizontal shows the index \( i = (1, 2, \ldots)\), as \( i \) can be time, or any other form of classification. We assume in the first case payoffs of \{ -1, 1 \}, and open-ended (or with a very remote and unknown bounds) in the second.

and those that have varying payoffs, which we call standard, multi-payoff (or "variables"). Real world exposures tend to belong to the multi-payoff category, and are poorly captured by binaries. Yet much of the economics and decision making literature confuses the two. variables exposures are sensitive to Black Swan effects, model errors, and prediction problems, while the binaries are largely immune to them. The binaries are mathematically tractable, while the variables are much less so. Hedging variables exposures with binary bets can be disastrous—and because of the human tendency to engage in attribute substitution when confronted by difficult questions, decision-makers and researchers often confuse the variable for the binary.

7.1 Binary vs variable Predictions and Exposures

Binary: Binary predictions and exposures are about well defined discrete events, with yes/no types of answers, such as whether a person will win the election, a single individual will die, or a team will win a contest. We call them binary because the outcome is either 0 (the event does not take place) or 1 (the event took place), that is the set \{0, 1\} or the set \( \{a_L, a_H\} \), with \( a_L < a_H \) any two discrete and exhaustive values for the outcomes. For instance, we cannot have five hundred people winning a presidential election. Or a single candidate running for an election has two exhaustive outcomes: win or lose.

Standard: “variable” predictions and exposures, also known as natural random variables, correspond to situations in which the payoff is continuous and can take several values. The designation “variable” originates from definitions of financial contracts\(^1\); it is fitting outside option trading because the exposures they designate are naturally occurring continuous variables, as opposed to the binary that which tend to involve abrupt institution-mandated discontinuities. The variables add a layer of complication: profits
for companies or deaths due to terrorism or war can take many, many potential values. You can predict the company will be “profitable”, but the profit could be $1 or $10 billion.

There is a variety of exposures closer to the variables, namely bounded exposures that we can subsume mathematically into the binary category.

The main errors are as follows.

- Binaries always belong to the class of thin-tailed distributions, because of boundedness, while the variableness don’t. This means the law of large numbers operates very rapidly there. Extreme events wane rapidly in importance: for instance, as we will see further down in the discussion of the Chernoff bound, the probability of a series of 1000 bets to diverge more than 50% from the expected average is less than $1 \times 10^{18}$, while the variables can experience wilder fluctuations with a high probability, particularly in fat-tailed domains. Comparing one to another can be a lunacy.

- The research literature documents a certain class of biases, such as "dread risk" or "long shot bias", which is the overestimation of some classes of rare events, but derived from binary variables, then falls for the severe mathematical mistake of extending the result to variables exposures. If ecological exposures in the real world tends to have variables, not binary properties, then much of these results are invalid.

Let us return to the point that the variations of variables are not bounded, or have a remote boundary. The consequence is that the prediction of the variable is marred by Black Swan effects and need to be considered from such a viewpoint. For instance, a few prescient observers saw the potential for war among the Great Power of Europe in the early 20th century but virtually everyone missed the second dimension: that the war would wind up killing an unprecedented twenty million persons, setting the stage for both Soviet communism and German fascism and a war that would claim an additional 60 million, followed by a nuclear arms race from 1945 to the present, which might some day claim 600 million lives.

7.2 The Applicability of Some Psychological Biases

Without going through specific identifying biases, Table 1 shows the effect of the error across domains. We are not saying that the bias does not exist; rather that, if the error is derived in a binary environment, or one with a capped payoff, it does not port outside the domain in which it was derived.

The Black Swan is Not About Probability But Payoff

In short, the variable has another dimension, the payoff, in addition to the probability, while the binary is limited to the probability. Ignoring this additional dimension is equivalent to living in a 2-D world but discussing it as if it were 3-D, promoting the illusion to all who will listen that such an analysis captures all worth capturing.
Now the Black Swan problem has been misunderstood. We are saying neither that there must be more volatility in our complexified world nor that there must be more outliers. Indeed, we may well have fewer such events but it has been shown that, under the mechanisms of “fat tails”, their “impact” gets larger and larger and more and more unpredictable. The main cause is globalization and the spread of winner-take-all effects across variables (just think of the Google effect), as well as effect of the increased physical and electronic connectivity in the world, causing the weakening of “island effect” a well established fact in ecology by which isolated areas tend to have more varieties of species per square meter than larger ones. In addition, while physical events such as earthquakes and tsunamis may not have changed much in incidence and severity over the last 65 million years (when the dominant species on our planet, the dinosaurs, had a very bad day), their effect is compounded by interconnectivity.

So there are two points here.

**Binary predictions are more tractable than standard ones.** First, binary predictions tend to work; we can learn to be pretty good at making them (at least on short timescales and with rapid accuracy feedback that teaches us how to distinguish signals from noise — all possible in forecasting tournaments as well as in electoral forecasting — see Silver, 2012). Further, these are mathematically tractable: your worst mistake is bounded, since probability is defined on the interval between 0 and 1. But the applications of these binaries tend to be restricted to manmade things, such as the world of games (the “ludic” domain).

It is important to note that, ironically, not only do Black Swan effects not impact the binaries, but they even make them more mathematically tractable, as will see further down.

**Binary predictions are often taken as a substitute for standard ones.** Second, most non-decision makers tend to confuse the binary and the variable. And well-intentioned efforts to improve performance in binary prediction tasks can have the unintended consequence of rendering us oblivious to catastrophic variable exposure.

The confusion can be traced to attribute substitution and the widespread tendency to replace difficult-to-answer questions with much-easier-to-answer ones. For instance, the extremely-difficult-to-answer question might be whether China and the USA are on an historical trajectory toward a rising-power/hegemon confrontation with the potential to claim far more lives than the most violent war thus far waged (say 10X more the 60M who died in World War II). The much-easier-binary-replacement questions — the sorts of questions likely to pop up in forecasting tournaments or prediction markets — might be whether the Chinese military kills more than 10 Vietnamese in the South China Sea or 10 Japanese in the East China Sea in the next 12 months or whether China publicly announces that it is restricting North Korean banking access to foreign currency in the next 6 months.

The nub of the conceptual confusion is that although predictions and payoffs are completely separate mathematically, both the general public and researchers are under constant temptation to substitute predictions for information about important questions.
We often observe such attribute substitution in financial hedging strategies. For instance, Morgan Stanley correctly predicted the onset of a subprime crisis, but they had a binary hedge and ended up losing billions as the crisis ended up much deeper than predicted (Bloomberg Magazine, March 27, 2008).

Or, consider the performance of the best forecasters in geopolitical forecasting tournaments over the last 25 years (Tetlock, 2005; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011; Mellers et al, 2013). These forecasters may well be right when they say that the risk of a lethal confrontation claiming 10 or more lives in the East China Sea by the end of 2013 is only 0.04. They may be very “well calibrated” in the narrow technical sense that when they attach a 4% likelihood to events, those events occur only about 4% of the time. But framing a "variable" question as a binary question is dangerous because it masks exponentially escalating tail risks: the risks of a confrontation claiming not just 10 lives of 1000 or 1 million. No one has yet figured out how to design a forecasting tournament to assess the accuracy of probability judgments that range between .0000001% and 1% — and if someone ever did, it is unlikely that anyone would have the patience — or lifespan — to run the forecasting tournament for the necessary stretches of time (requiring us to think not just in terms of decades, centuries and millennia).

The deep ambiguity of objective probabilities at the extremes—and the inevitable instability in subjective probability estimates—can also create patterns of systematic mispricing of options. An option or option like payoff is not to be confused with a lottery, and the “lottery effect” or “long shot bias” often discussed in the economics literature that documents that agents overpay for these bets should not apply to the properties of actual options.

In Fooled by Randomness, the narrator is asked “do you predict that the market is going up or down?” “Up”, he said, with confidence. Then the questioner got angry when he discovered that the narrator was short the market, i.e., would benefit from the market going down. The trader had a difficulty conveying the idea that someone could hold the belief that the market had a higher probability of going up, but that, should it go down, it would go down a lot. So the rational response was to be short.

This divorce between the binary (up is more likely) and the variable is very prevalent in real-world variables. Indeed we often see reports on how a certain financial institution “did not have a losing day in the entire quarter”, only to see it going near-bust from a monstrously large trading loss. Likewise some predictors have an excellent record, except that following their advice would result in large losses, as they are rarely wrong, but when they miss their forecast, the results are devastating.

**Remark:** More technically, for a heavy tailed distribution (defined as part of the subexponential family, see Taleb 2013), with at least one unbounded side to the random variable (one-tailedness), the variable prediction record over a long series will be of the same order as the best or worst prediction, whichever in largest in absolute value, while no single outcome can change the record of the binary.

Another way to put the point: to achieve the reputation of “Savior of Western civilization,” a politician such as Winston Churchill needed to be right on almost an entire series of events, with a very high probability of being wrong on any specific event.
smaller errors that politician made (e.g. Gallipoli, gold standard, autonomy for India). Churchill could have a terrible Brier score (binary accuracy) and a wonderful reputation (albeit one that still pivots on historical counterfactuals).

Finally, one of the authors wrote an entire book (Taleb, 1997) on the hedging and mathematical differences between binary and variable. When he was an option trader, he realized that binary options have nothing to do with variable options, economically and mathematically. Seventeen years later people are still making the mistake.

![Figure 7.2: Fatter and fatter tails: different values for \( a \). Note that higher peak implies a lower probability of leaving the \( \pm 1 \sigma \) tunnel](image)

### 7.3 The Mathematical Differences

**The Generalized Payoff Function.** We have a variable, with its own statistical properties. The exercise consists in isolating the payoff, or "derivative" from such a variable, as the payoff will itself be a random variable with its own statistical properties. In this case we call \( S \) the primitive, or variable under consideration, and \( \Phi \) the derived payoff. Let us stay in dimension \( 1 \).

Let \( \Phi \) be a family the one-dimensional payoff functions \( \{ \Phi^i \}_{i=0}^{3} \) indexed by \( i \) the degree of complexity, considered as of time \( t_0 \) over a certain horizon \( t \in \mathbb{R}^+ \), for a variable \( S \in \mathcal{D} = (\mathcal{D}^-, \mathcal{D}^+) \), the upper bound \( \mathcal{D}^+ \geq 0 \) and lower bound \( \mathcal{D}^- \leq 0 \), with initial value \( S_{t_0} \) and value \( S_t \) at time of the payoff. Where \( \delta(\cdot) \) is the Dirac delta function satisfying \( \delta(x) = 0 \) for \( x \in \mathcal{D}, x \neq 0 \) and \( \int_{\mathcal{D}} \delta(x) \, dx = 1 \), let \( I \) be an indicator function \( \in \{1, -1\} \), \( q \) the size of the exposure, and \( P \) a constant(set at time \( t_0 \)) (meant to represent the initial outlay, investment, or exposure).

**Level 0, The Building Block of All Payoffs.** For \( i = 0 \) we get the elementary security, also called "atomic" Arrow-Debreu security, "state price density", or "butterfly":

\[
\Phi^0_{t_0,t}(S_t, K) = \delta(K - S_t)
\]
7.3. THE MATHEMATICAL DIFFERENCES

**Level 1, The Binary.** The first payoff is the binary \( \Phi^1 \) obtained by integrating once, which delivers a unit above \( K \):

\[
\Phi^1_{t_0,t}(S_t, K, I, \delta) \equiv \begin{cases} 
\int_{\delta^-}^{S_t} \Phi^0_{t_0,t}(x, K) \, dx & \text{if } I = 1, \, \delta = \delta^- \text{ and } K \geq \delta^- \\
\int_{S_t}^{\delta^+} \Phi^0_{t_0,t}(x, K) \, dx & \text{if } I = -1 \& \, \delta = \delta^+ \text{ and } K < \delta^- 
\end{cases} 
\]  

(7.1)

which can be expressed as the Heaviside \( \theta \) function: \( \theta(S_t - K) \) and \( \theta(K - S_t) \), respectively.

By Combining \( q(I \Phi^1_{t_0,t}(S_t, K, I, \delta) - I P) \) we get all possible binary payoffs in \( \mathcal{D} \), as seen in 7.3.

**Level 2, Standard Payoffs.**

\[
\Phi^2_{t_0,t}(S_t, K, I, \delta) \equiv \begin{cases} 
\int_{\delta^-}^{S_t} \Phi^1_{t_0,t}(x, K, \ldots) \, dx \\
\int_{S_t}^{\delta^+} \Phi^1_{t_0,t}(x, K, \ldots) \, dx \\
\int_{-\delta^+}^{-\delta^-} \Phi^1_{t_0,t}(x, K, \ldots) \, dx
\end{cases} 
\]  

(7.2)
Chernoff Bound. The binary is subjected to very tight bounds. Let \((X_i)_{1 \leq i \leq n}\) be a sequence independent Bernoulli trials taking values in the set \(\{0, 1\}\), with \(\mathbb{P}(X = 1) = p\) and \(\mathbb{P}(X = 0) = 1 - p\). Take the sum \(S_n = \sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} X_i\) with expectation \(\mathbb{E}(S_n) = np = \mu\). Taking \(\delta\) as a “distance from the mean”, the Chernoff bounds gives:

For any \(\delta > 0\)

\[
\mathbb{P}(S \geq (1 + \delta)\mu) \leq \left(\frac{e^\delta}{(1 + \delta)^{1 + \delta}}\right)^\mu
\]

and for \(0 < \delta \leq 1\)

\[
\mathbb{P}(S \geq (1 + \delta)\mu) \leq 2e^{-\mu\delta^2/4}
\]

Let us compute the probability of coin flips \(n\) of having 50% higher than the true mean, with \(p = \frac{1}{2}\) and \(\mu = \frac{n}{2}\):

\[
\mathbb{P}(S \geq (\frac{3}{2} \cdot \frac{n}{2})) \leq 2e^{-\mu\delta^2/4} = e^{-n/24}
\]

which for \(n = 1000\) happens every \(1.24 \times 10^{18}\).

Fatter tails lower the probability of remote events (the binary) and raise the value of the variable.

The following intuitive exercise will illustrate what happens when one conserves the variance of a distribution, but “fattens the tails” by increasing the kurtosis. The probability of a certain type of intermediate and large deviation drops, but their impact increases. Counterintuitively, the possibility of staying within a band increases.

Let \(x\) be a standard Gaussian random variable with mean 0 (with no loss of generality) and standard deviation \(\sigma\). Let \(P_{>1\sigma}\) be the probability of exceeding one standard deviation. \(P_{>1\sigma} = 1 - \frac{1}{2}\text{erfc}\left(-\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)\), where \(\text{erfc}\) is the complementary error function, 

\[
\text{erfc} \approx 15.996\% \quad \text{and the probability of staying within the “stability tunnel”}
\]

\[
\text{erfc} \approx 1 - 15.996\% = 84.004\%.
\]
Let us fatten the tail in a variance-preserving manner, using the “barbell” standard method of linear combination of two Gaussians with two standard deviations separated by $\sigma \sqrt{1 + a}$ and $\sigma \sqrt{1 - a}$, $a \in (0,1)$, where $a$ is the “vvol” (which is variance preserving, technically of no big effect here, as a standard deviation-preserving spreading gives the same qualitative result). Such a method leads to the immediate raising of the standard Kurtosis by $(1 + a^2)$ since $\frac{\mathbb{E}(x^4)}{\mathbb{E}(x^2)^2} = 3(a^2 + 1)$, where $\mathbb{E}$ is the expectation operator.

\begin{equation}
P_{>1\sigma} = P_{<1\sigma} = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \text{erfc} \left( -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}\sqrt{1-a}} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \text{erfc} \left( -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}\sqrt{a+1}} \right)
\end{equation}

So then, for different values of $a$ in Eq. 1 as we can see in Figure 2, the probability of staying inside 1 sigma rises, “rare” events become less frequent.

Note that this example was simplified for ease of argument. In fact the “tunnel” inside of which fat tailedness increases probabilities is between $-\sqrt{\frac{1}{2} (5 - \sqrt{17}) \sigma}$ and $\sqrt{\frac{1}{2} (5 - \sqrt{17}) \sigma}$ (even narrower than 1 $\sigma$ in the example, as it numerically corresponds to the area between -.66 and .66), and the outer one is $\pm \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} (5 + \sqrt{17}) \sigma}$, that is the area beyond $\pm 2.13 \sigma$.

The law of large numbers works better with the binary than the variable

Getting a bit more technical, the law of large numbers works much faster for the binary than the variable (for which it may never work, see Taleb, 2013). The more convex the payoff, the more observations one needs to make a reliable inference. The idea is as follows, as can be illustrated by an extreme example of very tractable binary and intractable variable.

Let $x_t$ be the realization of the random variable $X \in (-\infty, \infty)$ at period $t$, which follows a Cauchy distribution with p.d.f. $f(x) = \frac{1}{\pi((x_0-1)x+1)}$. Let us set $x_0 = 0$ to simplify and make the exposure symmetric around 0. The variable exposure maps to the variable $x_t$ and has an expectation $\mathbb{E}(x_t) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x_t f(x) dx$, which is undefined (i.e., will never converge to a fixed value). A bet at $x_0$ has a payoff mapped by as a Heaviside Theta Function $\theta_{>x_0}(x_t)$ paying 1 if $x_t > x_0$ and 0 otherwise. The expectation of the payoff is simply $\mathbb{E}(\theta(x)) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \theta_{>x_0}(x) f(x) dx = \int_{x_0}^{\infty} f(x) dx$, which is simply $P(x > 0)$. So long as a distribution exists, the binary exists and is Bernouilli distributed with probability of success and failure $p$ and $1-p$ respectively.

The irony is that the payoff of a bet on a Cauchy, admittedly the worst possible distribution to work with since it lacks both mean and variance, can be mapped by a Bernouilli distribution, about the most tractable of the distributions. In this case the variable is the hardest thing to estimate, and the binary is the easiest thing to estimate.

Set $S_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{t_i}$, the average payoff of a variety of variable bets $x_{t_i}$ across periodic $t_i$, the average of the $x_{t_i}$'s. Now we have the most tractable of the distributions. So long as a distribution exists, the binary exists and is Bernouilli distributed with probability of success and failure $p$ and $1-p$ respectively.

The law of large numbers works better with the binary than the variable
Figure 7.3: The different classes of payoff \( f(x) \) seen in relation to an event \( x \). (When considering options, the variable can start at a given bet level, so the payoff would be continuous on one side, not the other).

Hand \( \lim_{n \to \infty} S^\theta_n = p \); further the presymptotics of \( S^\theta_n \) are tractable since it converges to \( \frac{1}{2} \) rather quickly, and the standard deviations declines at speed \( \sqrt{n} \), since \( \sqrt{V(S^\theta_n)} = \sqrt{\frac{V(S^\theta_1)}{n}} = \sqrt{\frac{(1-p)p}{n}} \) (given that the moment generating function for the average is \( M(z) = (pe^{z/n} - p + 1)^n \)).

The binary has necessarily a thin-tailed distribution, regardless of domain

More, generally, for the class of heavy tailed distributions, in a long time series, the sum is of the same order as the maximum, which cannot be the case for the binary:

\[
\lim_{X \to \infty} \frac{P(X > \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{t_i})}{P(X > \max (x_{t_i})_{i \leq 2 \leq n})} = 1 \tag{7.4}
\]

Compare this to the binary for which

\[
\lim_{X \to \infty} P(X > \max (\theta(x_{t_i}))_{i \leq 2 \leq n}) = 0 \tag{7.5}
\]

The binary is necessarily a thin-tailed distribution, regardless of domain.

We can assert the following:

- The sum of binaries converges at a speed faster or equal to that of the variable.
- The sum of binaries is never dominated by a single event, while that of the variable can be.

How is the binary more robust to model error?

In the more general case, the expected payoff of the variable is expressed as \( \int_A x dF(x) \) (the unconditional shortfall) while that of the binary= \( \int_A dF(x) \), where \( A \) is the part of the support of interest for the exposure, typically \( A=[K,\infty) \), or \( (-\infty,K] \). Consider model error as perturbations in the parameters that determine the calculations of the probabilities. In the case of the variable, the perturbation’s effect on the probability is multiplied by a larger value of \( x \).
expected payoff of variable, \( B \) is that of the binary, \( K \) is the “strike” equivalent for the bet level, and with \( x \in [1, \infty) \) let \( p_\alpha(x) \) be the density of the Pareto distribution with minimum value 1 and tail exponent \( \alpha \), so \( p_\alpha(x) \equiv \alpha x^{-\alpha-1} \).

Set the binary at .02, that is, a 2\% probability of exceeding a certain number \( K \), corresponds to an \( \alpha=1.2275 \) and a \( K=24.2 \), so the binary is expressed as \( B(1.2, 24.2) \). Let us perturbate \( \alpha \), the tail exponent, to double the probability from .02 to .04. The result is \( \frac{B(1.01, 24.2)}{B(1.2, 24.2)} = 2 \). The corresponding effect on the variable is \( \frac{V(1.01, 24.2)}{V(1.2, 24.2)} = 37.4 \). In this case the variable was \(~18\) times more sensitive than the binary.

Acknowledgments

Bruno Dupire, Raphael Douady, Daniel Kahneman, Barbara Mellers, Peter Ayton.

References


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8 | FAT TAILS FROM RECURSIVE UNCERTAINTY

Chapter Summary 8: Error about Errors. Probabilistic representations require the inclusion of model (or representation) error (a probabilistic statement has to have an error rate), and, in the event of such treatment, one also needs to include second, third and higher order errors (about the methods used to compute the errors) and by a regress argument, to take the idea to its logical limit, one should be continuously reapplying the thinking all the way to its limit unless when one has a reason to stop, as a declared a priori that escapes quantitative and statistical method. We show how power laws emerge from nested errors on errors of the standard deviation for a Gaussian distribution. We also show under which regime regressed errors lead to non-power law fat-tailed distributions.

8.1 Layering uncertainty

With the Central Limit Theorem: we start with a distribution and, under some conditions, end with a Gaussian. The opposite is more likely to be true. We start with a Gaussian and under error rates we end with a fat-tailed distribution.

Unlike with the Bayesian compounding the:
1. Numbers of recursions

and
2. Structure of the error of the error (declining, flat, multiplicative or additive) determine the final moments and the type of distribution.

Note that historically, derivations of power laws have been statistical (cumulative advantage, preferential attachment, winner-take-all effects, criticality), and the properties derived by Yule, Mandelbrot, Zipf, Simon, Bak, and others result from structural conditions or breaking the independence assumptions in the sums of random variables allowing for the application of the central limit theorem. This work is entirely epistemic, based on the projection of standard ethical and philosophical doubts.
Figure 8.1: Three levels of multiplicative relative error rates for the standard deviation $\sigma$, with $(1 \pm a_n)$ the relative error on $a_{n-1}$

### 8.1.1 Layering Uncertainties

Take a standard probability distribution, say the Gaussian. The measure of dispersion, here $\sigma$, is estimated, and we need to attach some measure of dispersion around it. The uncertainty about the rate of uncertainty, so to speak, or higher order parameter, similar to what called the “volatility of volatility” in the lingo of option operators –here it would be “uncertainty rate about the uncertainty rate”. And there is no reason to stop there: we can keep nesting these uncertainties into higher orders, with the uncertainty rate of the uncertainty rate of the uncertainty rate, and so forth. There is no reason to have certainty anywhere in the process.

### 8.1.2 Main Results

Note that unless one stops the branching at an early stage, all the results raise small probabilities (in relation to their remoteness; the more remote the event, the worse the relative effect).
1. Under the first regime of proportional constant (or increasing) recursive layers of uncertainty about rates of uncertainty expressed as standard deviation, the distribution converges to a power law with infinite variance, even when one starts with a standard Gaussian.

2. Under the same first regime, expressing uncertainty about uncertainty in terms of variance, the distribution converges to a power law with finite variance but infinite (or undefined) higher moments.

3. Under the other regime, where the errors are decreasing (proportionally) for higher order errors, the ending distribution becomes fat-tailed but in a benign way as it retains its finite variance attribute (as well as all higher moments), allowing convergence to Gaussian under Central Limit.

We manage to set a boundary between these two regimes.

In both regimes the use of a thin-tailed distribution is not warranted unless higher order errors can be completely eliminated a priori.

### 8.1.3 Higher order integrals in the Standard Gaussian Case

We start with the case of a Gaussian and focus the uncertainty on the assumed standard deviation. Define $\phi(\mu, \sigma, x)$ as the Gaussian PDF for value $x$ with mean $\mu$ and standard deviation $\sigma$.

A $2^{nd}$ order stochastic standard deviation is the integral of $\phi$ across values of $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}^+$, under the measure $f(\bar{\sigma}, \sigma_1, \sigma)$, with $\sigma_1$ its scale parameter (our approach to track the error of the error), not necessarily its standard deviation; the expected value of $\sigma_1$ is $\overline{\sigma_1}$.

$$f(x)_1 = \int_0^\infty \phi(\mu, \sigma, x) f(\bar{\sigma}, \sigma_1, \sigma) \, d\sigma$$

Generalizing to the $N^{th}$ order, the density function $f(x)$ becomes

$$f(x)_N = \int_0^\infty \cdots \int_0^\infty \phi(\mu, \sigma, x) f(\bar{\sigma}, \sigma_1, \sigma)$$

$$f(\overline{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_1}) \cdots f(\overline{\sigma_{N-1}, \sigma_N, \sigma_{N-1}}) d\sigma d\sigma_1 d\sigma_2 \cdots d\sigma_N \quad (8.1)$$

The problem is that this approach is parameter-heavy and requires the specifications of the subordinated distributions (in finance, the lognormal has been traditionally used for $\sigma^2$ (or Gaussian for the ratio $\log[\frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma_1}]$ since the direct use of a Gaussian allows for negative values). We would need to specify a measure $f$ for each layer of error rate. Instead this can be approximated by using the mean deviation for $\sigma$, as we will see next$^1$.

\[\text{\underline{Reference:}} \quad [50] \]
8.1.4 Discretization using nested series of two-states for $\sigma$- a simple multiplicative process

There are quite effective simplifications to capture the convexity, the ratio of (or difference between) $\phi(\mu, \sigma, x)$ and $\int_0^\infty \phi(\mu, \sigma, x) f(\bar{\sigma}, \sigma_1, \sigma) d\sigma$ (the first order standard deviation) by using a weighted average of values of $\sigma$, say, for a simple case of one-order stochastic volatility:

$$\sigma(1 \pm a_1)$$

with $0 \leq a_1 < 1$, where $a_1$ is the proportional mean absolute deviation for $\sigma$, in other word the measure of the absolute error rate for $\sigma$. We use $\frac{1}{2}$ as the probability of each state. Such a method does not aim at preserving the variance as in standard stochastic volatility modeling, rather the STD.

Thus the distribution using the first order stochastic standard deviation can be expressed as:

$$f(x)_1 = \frac{1}{2} \left( \phi(\mu, \sigma (1 + a_1), x) + \phi(\mu, \sigma(1 - a_1), x) \right) \quad (8.2)$$

Now assume uncertainty about the error rate $a_1$, expressed by $a_2$, in the same manner as before. Thus, as a first method, the multiplicative effect, in place of $1 \pm a_1$ we have $(1 \pm a_1)(1 \pm a_2)$. Later we will use the non-multiplicative (or, rather, weakly multiplicative) error expansion $\sigma(1 \pm (a_1(1 \pm a_2(1 \pm a_3(...)))).$

The second order stochastic standard deviation:

$$f(x)_2 = \frac{1}{4} \left( \phi(\mu, \sigma (1 + a_1)(1 + a_2), x) + \phi(\mu, \sigma(1 - a_1)(1 + a_2), x) + \phi(\mu, \sigma(1 + a_1)(1 - a_2), x) + \phi(\mu, \sigma(1 - a_1)(1 - a_2), x) \right) \quad (8.3)$$

and the $N^{th}$ order:

$$f(x)_N = \frac{1}{2^N} \sum_{i=1}^{2^N} \phi(\mu, \sigma M_i^N, x)$$

where $M_i^N$ is the $i^{th}$ scalar (line) of the matrix $M^N (2^N \times 1)$

$$M^N = \left( \prod_{j=1}^{N} (a_j T_{i,j} + 1) \right)^{2^N}_{i=1}$$

and $T_{i,j}$ the element of $i^{th}$line and $j^{th}$column of the matrix of the exhaustive combinations for $T_i$ of the set {0, 1} that is the error rate of each of the multiplicative process.
for $N=3$,

$$T = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & -1 \\
1 & -1 & 1 \\
1 & -1 & -1 \\
-1 & 1 & 1 \\
-1 & 1 & -1 \\
-1 & -1 & 1 \\
-1 & -1 & -1
\end{pmatrix}$$

and

$$M^3 = \begin{pmatrix}
(1 - a_1)(1 - a_2)(1 - a_3) \\
(1 - a_1)(1 - a_2)(a_3 + 1) \\
(1 - a_1)(a_2 + 1)(1 - a_3) \\
(1 - a_1)(a_2 + 1)(a_3 + 1) \\
(a_1 + 1)(1 - a_2)(1 - a_3) \\
(a_1 + 1)(1 - a_2)(a_3 + 1) \\
(a_1 + 1)(a_2 + 1)(1 - a_3) \\
(a_1 + 1)(a_2 + 1)(a_3 + 1)
\end{pmatrix}$$

So $M^3_1 = ((1 - a_1)(1 - a_2)(1 - a_3))$, etc.

Note that the various error rates $a_i$ are not similar to sampling errors, but rather projection of error rates into the future. They are, to repeat, *epistemic*.

**The Final Mixture Distribution.** The mixture weighted average distribution (recall that $\phi$ is the ordinary Gaussian PDF with mean $\mu$, std $\sigma$ for the random variable $x$).
It could be approximated by a lognormal distribution for $\sigma$ and the corresponding $V$ as its own variance. But it is precisely the $V$ that interest us, and $V$ depends on how higher order errors behave.

Next let us consider the different regimes for higher order errors.

8.2 Regime 1 (Explosive): Case of a constant error parameter $a$

8.2.1 Special case of constant $a$

Assume that $a_1 = a_2 = \ldots a_n = a$, i.e. the case of flat proportional error rate $a$. The Matrix $M$ collapses into a conventional binomial tree for the dispersion at the level $N$.

$$f(x|\mu, \sigma, N) = 2^{-N} \sum_{j=0}^{N} \binom{N}{j} \phi(\mu, \sigma(a+1)^j(1-a)^{N-j}, x)$$  \hspace{1cm} (8.4)

Because of the linearity of the sums, when $a$ is constant, we can use the binomial distribution as weights for the moments (note again the artificial effect of constraining the first moment $\mu$ in the analysis to a set, certain, and known a priori).

- $M_1(N) = \mu$
- $M_2(N) = \sigma^2 (a^2 + 1)^N + \mu^2$
- $M_3(N) = 3 \mu \sigma^2 (a^2 + 1)^N + \mu^3$
- $M_4(N) = 6 \mu^2 \sigma^2 (a^2 + 1)^N + \mu^4 + 3 (a^4 + 6a^2 + 1)^N \sigma^4$

For clarity, we simplify the table of moments, with $\mu=0$

- $M_1(N) = 0$
- $M_2(N) = (a^2 + 1)^N \sigma^2$
- $M_3(N) = 0$
- $M_4(N) = 3 (a^4 + 6a^2 + 1)^N \sigma^4$
- $M_5(N) = 0$
- $M_6(N) = 15 (a^6 + 15a^4 + 15a^2 + 1)^N \sigma^6$
- $M_7(N) = 0$
- $M_8(N) = 105 (a^8 + 28a^6 + 70a^4 + 28a^2 + 1)^N \sigma^8$

Note again the oddity that in spite of the explosive nature of higher moments, the expectation of the absolute value of $x$ is both independent of $a$ and $N$, since the perturbations of $\sigma$ do not affect the first absolute moment $= \sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} \sigma$ (that is, the initial assumed $\sigma$). The situation would be different under addition of $x$.

Every recursion multiplies the variance of the process by $(1 + a^2)$. The process is similar to a stochastic volatility model, with the standard deviation (not the variance) following a lognormal distribution, the volatility of which grows with $M$, hence will reach infinite variance at the limit.
8.3. **CONVERGENCE TO POWER LAWS**

8.2.2 **Consequences**

For a constant  $a > 0$, and in the more general case with variable $a$ where $a_n \geq a_{n-1}$, the moments explode.

- Even the smallest value of $a > 0$, since $(1 + a^2)^N$ is unbounded, leads to the second moment going to infinity (though not the first) when $N \to \infty$. So something as small as a .001% error rate will still lead to explosion of moments and invalidation of the use of the class of $L^2$ distributions.

- In these conditions, we need to use power laws for epistemic reasons, or, at least, distributions outside the $L^2$ norm, regardless of observations of past data.

Note that we need an *a priori* reason (in the philosophical sense) to cutoff the $N$ somewhere, hence bound the expansion of the second moment.

8.3 **Convergence to Power Laws**

Convergence to power law would require the following from the limit distribution. Where $P > x$ is short for $P(X > x)$, $P > x = L(x) \times^{-\alpha^*}$ and $L(x)$ is a slowly varying function.

$$\alpha^* = \lim_{x \to \infty} \lim_{N \to \infty} \alpha(x, N)$$

We know from the behavior of moments that, if convergence is satisfied, $\alpha^* \in (1, 2)$.

We can have a visual idea with the Log-Log plot (Figure 8.3) how, at higher orders of stochastic volatility, with equally proportional stochastic coefficient, (where $a_1 = a_2 = \ldots = a_n = \frac{1}{10}$) the density approaches that of a power law, as shown in flatter density on the LogLog plot. The probabilities keep rising in the tails as we add layers of uncertainty until they seem to reach the boundary of the power law, while ironically the first moment remains invariant.

The same effect takes place even in small $a$ values at the limit the tails concept...
\( \alpha(x, N) = -1 - \frac{\partial \log f(x|\mu, \sigma, N)}{\partial x} \)

Simplifying and normalizing, with \( \mu = 0, \sigma = 1, \)

\[ \alpha(x, N) = -1 - \frac{x \kappa_1(N)}{\kappa_2(N)} \]  

where

\[ \kappa_1(N) = \sum_{j=0}^{K} x(a+1)^{-3j} \left(-1 \right)^{3j-3} \]

\[ \kappa_2(N) = \sum_{j=0}^{K} (a+1)^{-j} \left(1 - a \right)^{j-K} \]

Making the variable continuous (binomial as ratio of gamma functions) makes it equivalent, at large \( N, \) to:

\[ \alpha(x, N) = 1 - \frac{x(1-a)^{N} \kappa_1(N)}{\sqrt{2} \ k_2(N)} \]  

where

\[ \kappa_1^*(N) = \int_{0}^{N} \frac{x(a + 1)^{-3y} \Gamma(N + 1)(1 - a)^{3(y-N)}}{\Gamma(y + 1) \Gamma(N - y + 1)} \exp \left(-\frac{1}{2} x^2 (a + 1)^{-2y} (1 - a)^{2y-2N} \right) dy \]

\[ \kappa_2^*(N) = \int_{0}^{N} \frac{\left(\frac{2}{a+1} - 1 \right)^y \Gamma(N + 1)}{\sqrt{2} \Gamma(y + 1) \Gamma(N - y + 1)} \]
8.3.1 Effect on Small Probabilities

Next we measure the effect on the thickness of the tails. The obvious effect is the rise of small probabilities.

Take the exceedant probability, that is, the probability of exceeding $K$, given $N$, for parameter $a$ constant:

$$P > K | N = \sum_{j=0}^{N} 2^{-N-1} \binom{N}{j} \text{erfc} \left( \frac{K}{\sqrt{2\sigma(a+1)^j(1-a)^{N-j}}} \right) \quad (8.7)$$

where $\text{erfc}(.)$ is the complementary of the error function, $1-\text{erf}(.)$, $\text{erf}(z) = \frac{2}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{0}^{z} e^{-t^2} dt$

Convexity effect. The next two tables show the ratio of exceedant probability under different values of $N$ divided by the probability in the case of a standard Gaussian.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>$N$</th>
<th>Case of $a = \frac{1}{10}$</th>
<th>Case of $a = \frac{1}{100}$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$P_{&gt;3_N}$</td>
<td>$P_{&gt;5_N}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.01724</td>
<td>1.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.0345</td>
<td>1.326</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>1.05178</td>
<td>1.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.06908</td>
<td>1.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.0864</td>
<td>1.943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>Case of $a = \frac{1}{10}$</th>
<th>Case of $a = \frac{1}{100}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$P_{&gt;3_N}$</td>
<td>$P_{&gt;5_N}$</td>
</tr>
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<td>1980</td>
</tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>3529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>5321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4 Regime 1b: Preservation of Variance

$$M_1(N) = \mu$$
$$M_2(N) = \mu^2 + \sigma^2$$
$$M_3(N) = \mu^3 + 3\sigma^2\mu$$
$$M_4(N) = 3\sigma^4(a^2+1)^N + \mu^4 + 6\mu^2\sigma^2$$

Hence $\alpha \in (3,4)$

8.5 Regime 2: Cases of decaying parameters $a_n$

As we said, we may have (actually we need to have) a priori reasons to decrease the parameter $a$ or stop $N$ somewhere when the higher order of $a_i$ declines.
8.5.1 Regime 2-a;'bleed' of higher order error

Take a 'bleed' of higher order errors at the rate $\lambda$, $0 \leq \lambda < 1$, such as $a_n = \lambda a_{N-1}$, hence $a_N = \lambda^N a_1$, with $a_1$ the conventional intensity of stochastic standard deviation. Assume $\mu = 0$.

With $N=2$, the second moment becomes:

$$M_2(2) = (a_1^2 + 1) \sigma^2 (a_1^2 \lambda^2 + 1)$$

With $N=3$,

$$M_2(3) = \sigma^2 (1 + a_1^2) (1 + \lambda^2 a_1^2) (1 + \lambda^4 a_1^2)$$

finally, for the general $N$:

$$M_2(N) = \sigma^2 (1 + a_1^2) \prod_{i=1}^{N-1} (1 + \lambda^i a_1^2)$$
We can reexpress (8.8) using the Q-Pochhammer symbol \((a; q)_N = \prod_{i=1}^{N-1} (1 - aq^i)\)

\[
M_2(N) = \sigma^2 (-a_1^2; \lambda^2)_N
\]

Which allows us to get to the limit

\[
\lim_{N \to \infty} M_2(N) = \sigma^2 \frac{(\lambda^2; \lambda^2)}{(\lambda^2 - 1)^2 (\lambda^2 + 1)}
\]

As to the fourth moment:

By recursion:

\[
M_4(N) = 3\sigma^4 \prod_{i=0}^{N-1} (6a_1^2\lambda^{2i} + a_1^4\lambda^{4i} + 1)
\]

\[
M_4(N) = 3\sigma^4 \left( \left( 2\sqrt{2} - 3 \right) a_1^2; \lambda^2 \right)_N \left( - \left( 3 + 2\sqrt{2} \right) a_1^2; \lambda^2 \right)_N \quad (8.9)
\]

\[
\lim_{N \to \infty} M_4(N) = 3\sigma^4 \left( \left( 2\sqrt{2} - 3 \right) a_1^2; \lambda^2 \right)_\infty \left( - \left( 3 + 2\sqrt{2} \right) a_1^2; \lambda^2 \right)_\infty \quad (8.10)
\]

So the limiting second moment for \(\lambda=.9\) and \(a_1=.2\) is just 1.28 \(\sigma^2\), a significant but relatively benign convexity bias. The limiting fourth moment is just 9.88\(\sigma^4\), more than 3 times the Gaussian’s (3 \(\sigma^4\)), but still finite fourth moment. For small values of \(a\) and values of \(\lambda\) close to 1, the fourth moment collapses to that of a Gaussian.

### 8.5.2 Regime 2-b; Second Method, a Non Multiplicative Error Rate

In place of \((1 \pm a_1)(1 \pm a_2)\), we use, for \(N\) recursions,

\[
\sigma(1 \pm (a_1(1 \pm (a_2(1 \pm a_3( ...))))))
\]

Assume \(a_1 = a_2 = \ldots = a_N\)

\[
P(x, \mu, \sigma, N) = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{i=1}^{L} f \left( x, \mu, \sigma \left( 1 + (T^N.A^N)_i \right) \right)
\]
\[ A^N = (a^j)_{j=1,...,N} \]

So for instance, for \( N = 3 \), \( T = (1, a, a^2, a^3) \)

\[
A^3 T^3 = \begin{pmatrix}
a^3 + a^2 + a \\
-a^3 + a^2 + a \\
a^3 - a^2 + a \\
-a^3 - a^2 + a \\
a^3 + a^2 - a \\
-a^3 + a^2 - a \\
a^3 - a^2 - a \\
-a^3 - a^2 - a
\end{pmatrix}
\]

The moments are as follows:

\[
M_1(N) = \mu \\
M_2(N) = \mu^2 + 2\sigma \\
M_4(N) = \mu^4 + 12\mu^2\sigma + 12\sigma^2 \sum_{i=0}^{N} a^{2i}
\]

At the limit:

\[
\lim_{N \to \infty} M_4(N) = \frac{12\sigma^2}{1 - a^2} + \mu^4 + 12\mu^2\sigma
\]

which is very mild.

8.6 Conclusion and Suggested Application

8.6.1 Counterfactuals, Estimation of the Future v/s Sampling Problem

Note that it is hard to escape higher order uncertainties, even outside of the use of counterfactual: even when sampling from a conventional population, an error rate can come from the production of information (such as: is the information about the sample size correct? is the information correct and reliable?), etc. These higher order errors exist and could be severe in the event of convexity to parameters, but they are qualitatively different with forecasts concerning events that have not taken place yet.

This discussion is about an epistemic situation that is markedly different from a sampling problem as treated conventionally by the statistical community, particularly the Bayesian one. In the classical case of sampling by Gosset ("Student", 1908) from a normal distribution with an unknown variance (Fisher, 1925), the Student T Distribution (itself a power law) arises for the estimated mean since the square of the variations (i.e., the Student) will be Chi-squared distributed. The initial situation is one of
degrees of freedom (from an increase in sample size) rapidly shrink the tails involved in the underlying distribution.

The case here is the exact opposite, as we have an a priori approach with no data: we start with a known priorly estimated or "guessed" standard deviation, but with an unknown error on it expressed as a spread of branching outcomes, and, given the a priori aspect of the exercise, we have no sample increase helping us to add to the information and shrink the tails. We just deal with nested counterfactuals.

Note that given that, unlike the Gosset’s situation, we have a finite mean (since we don’t hold it to be stochastic and know it a priori) hence we necessarily end in a situation of finite first moment (hence escape the Cauchy distribution), but, as we will see, a more complicated second moment. ² ³
On the Difficulty of Risk Parametrization With Fat Tails

Chapter Summary 9: We present case studies around the point that, simply, some models depend quite a bit on small variations in parameters. The effect on the Gaussian is easy to gauge, and expected. But many believe in power laws as panacea. Even if one believed the r.v. was power law distributed, one still would not be able to make a precise statement on tail risks. Shows weaknesses of calibration of Extreme Value Theory.

This chapter is illustrative; it will initially focus on nonmathematical limits to producing estimates of $M^X_T(A, f)$ when $A$ is limited to the tail. We will see how things get worse when one is sampling and forecasting the maximum of a random variable.

9.1 Some Bad News Concerning power laws

We saw the shortcomings of parametric and nonparametric methods so far. What are left are power laws; they are a nice way to look at the world, but we can never really get to know the exponent $\alpha$, for a spate of reasons we will see later (the concavity of the exponent to parameter uncertainty). Suffice for now to say that the same analysis on exponents yields a huge in-sample variance and that tail events are very sensitive to small changes in the exponent.

For instance, for a broad set of stocks over subsamples, using a standard estimation method (the Hill estimator), we get subsamples of securities. Simply, the variations are too large for a reliable computation of probabilities, which can vary by $>2$ orders of magnitude. And the effect on the mean of these probabilities is large since they are way out in the tails.

The way to see the response to small changes in tail exponent with probability: considering $P_{>K} \sim K^{-\alpha}$, the sensitivity to the tail exponent $\frac{\partial P_{>K}}{\partial \alpha} = -K^{-\alpha} \log(K)$.

Now the point that probabilities are sensitive to assumptions brings us back to the Black Swan problem. One might wonder, the change in probability might be large in percentage, but who cares, they may remain small. Perhaps, but in fat tailed domains, the event multiplying the probabilities is large. In life, it is not the probability that matters, but what one does with it, such as the expectation or other moments, and the contribution of the small probability to the total moments is large in power law domains.
CHAPTER 9. ON THE DIFFICULTY OF RISK PARAMETRIZATION WITH FAT TAILS

1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0

50
100
150
200
250
300
350

1/Pr

Figure 9.1: The effect of small changes in tail exponent on a probability of exceeding a certain point. To the left, a histogram of possible tail exponents across \( >4 \times 10^3 \) variables. To the right the probability, probability of exceeding 7 times the scale of a power law ranges from 1 in 10 to 1 in 350. For further in the tails the effect is more severe.

For all powerlaws, when \( K \) is large, with \( \alpha > 1 \), the unconditional shortfall \( S_+ = \int_K^\infty x \phi(x)dx \) and \( S_- = \int_{-\infty}^{-K} x \phi(x)dx \) approximate to \( \frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} K^{-\alpha+1} \) and \( -\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} K^{-\alpha+1} \), which are extremely sensitive to \( \alpha \) particularly at higher levels of \( K \),

\[
\frac{\partial S_+}{\partial \alpha} = -\frac{K^{1-\alpha}((\alpha-1)\log(K)+1)}{(\alpha-1)^2}.
\]

There is a deeper problem related to the effect of model error on the estimation of \( \alpha \), which compounds the problem, as \( \alpha \) tends to be underestimated by Hill estimators and other methods, but let us leave it for now.

9.2 Extreme Value Theory: Not a Panacea

We saw earlier how difficult it is to compute risks using power laws, owing to excessive model sensitivity. Let us apply this to the Extreme Value Theory, EVT. (The idea is that is useable by the back door as test for nonlinearities exposures not to get precise probabilities).

On its own it can mislead. The problem is the calibration and parameter uncertainty – in the real world we don’t know the parameters. The ranges in the probabilities generated we get are monstrous.

We start with a short presentation of the idea, followed by an exposition of the difficulty.

9.2.1 What is Extreme Value Theory? A Simplified Exposition

Let us proceed with simple examples.

Case 1, Thin Tailed Distribution

The Extremum of a Gaussian variable: Say we generate \( n \) Gaussian variables \( (X_i)_{i=1}^n \) with mean 0 and unitary standard deviation, and take the highest value we find. We take the upper bound \( M \) for the \( n \)-size sample run \( i \)
9.2. EXTREME VALUE THEORY: NOT A PANACEA

Figure 9.2: Taking $p$ samples of Gaussian maxima; here $N = 30K$, $M = 10K$. We get the Mean of the maxima = 4.11159, Standard Deviation= 0.286938; Median = 4.07344

Figure 9.3: Fitting an extreme value distribution (Gumbel for the maxima) $\alpha = 3.97904$, $\beta = 0.235239$

Assume we do so $p$ times, to get $p$ samples of maxima for the sequence $M$

$$M = \left( \text{Max} \left\{ X_{i,j} \right\}_{i=1}^{n} \right)_{j=1}^{p}$$

The next figure will plot a histogram of the result of both the simulation and.

Let us now fit to the sample from the simulation to $g$, the density of an Extreme Value Distribution for $x$ (or the Gumbel for the negative variable $-x$), with location and scale parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$, respectively: $g(x; \alpha, \beta) = \frac{e^{\frac{\alpha-x}{\beta}} - e^{\frac{\alpha}{\beta}}}{\beta}$.

9.2.2 A Note. How does the Extreme Value Distribution emerge?

Consider that the probability of exceeding the maximum corresponds to the rank statistics, that is the probability of all variables being below the observed sample. $P(X_1 < x, X_2 < x, \ldots, X_n < x) = F(x)^n$, where $F$ is the cumulative Gaussian. Taking the first derivative of the cumulative distribution to get the density of the distribution of the maximum,
Now we have norming constants $a_n$ and $b_n$ such that

$$G(x) \equiv P \left( \frac{M(n) - a_n}{b_n} > x \right)$$

But there is a basin of attraction condition for that. We need to find an $x_0 < \infty$ beyond which at the limit of $n \to \infty$, $x_0 = \sup\{x : F(x) < 1\}$

**Derivations**

$$(1 - P(X > a(n)x + b(n)))^N = G(x)$$

$$\exp(-NP(X > ax + b)) = G(x)$$

After some derivations[see below], $g(x) = \frac{e^{\frac{\alpha - x}{\beta}} - e^{\frac{\alpha - x}{\beta^2}}}{\beta}$, where

$\alpha = -\sqrt{2} \text{erfc}^{-1} \left( 2 - \frac{2}{n} \right)$, where \(\text{erfc}^{-1}\) is the inverse error function, and

$\beta = \sqrt{2} \left( \text{erfc}^{-1} \left( 2 - \frac{2}{n} \right) - \text{erfc}^{-1} \left( 2 - \frac{2}{n^2} \right) \right)$

For $n = 30K$, \(\{\alpha, \beta\} = \{3.98788, 0.231245\}$

The approximations become $\sqrt{2} \log(n) - \frac{\log(\log(n)) + \log(4\pi)}{2\sqrt{2} \log(n)}$ and $(2 \log(n))^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ respectively $+ o \left( (\log n)^{-\frac{1}{2}} \right)$

**9.2.3 Extreme Values for Fat-Tailed Distribution**

Now let us generate, exactly as before, but change the distribution, with $N$ random power law distributed variables $X_i$, with tail exponent $\alpha=3$, generated from a Student T Distribution with 3 degrees of freedom. Again, we take the upper bound. This time it is not the Gumbel, but the Fréchet distribution that would fit the result, using -critically- the same $\alpha$, Fréchet $\phi(x; \alpha, \beta)$=

$$\frac{\alpha e^{-\left( \frac{x}{\beta} \right)^{-\alpha}} \left( \frac{x}{\beta} \right)^{-\alpha - 1}}{\beta},$$

for $x > 0$

**9.2.4 A Severe Inverse Problem for EVT**

In the previous case we started with the distribution, with the assumed parameters, then obtained the corresponding values, just as these "risk modelers" do. In the real world, we don’t quite know the calibration, the $\alpha$ of the distribution, assuming (generously) that we know the distribution. So here we go with the inverse problem. The next table illustrates the different calibrations of Fréchet probabilities that the variance can have.
9.2. EXTREME VALUE THEORY: NOT A PANACEA

Figure 9.4: Fitting a Fréchet distribution to the Student T generated with $\alpha=3$ degrees of freedom. The Frechet distribution $\alpha=3, \beta=32$ fits up to higher values of $E$. But next two graphs shows the fit more closely.

Figure 9.5: Seen more closely.
Consider that the error in estimating the $\alpha$ of a distribution is quite large, often $>\frac{1}{2}$, and typically overestimated. So we can see that we get the probabilities mixed up $>\alpha$ an order of magnitude. In other words the imprecision in the computation of the $\alpha$ compounds in the evaluation of the probabilities of extreme values.

### 9.3 Using Power Laws Without Being Harmed by Mistakes

We can use power laws in the "near tails" for information, not risk management. That is, not pushing outside the tails, staying within a part of the distribution for which errors are not compounded.

I was privileged to get access to a database with cumulative sales for editions in print that had at least one unit sold that particular week (that is, conditional of the specific edition being still in print). I fit a powerlaw with tail exponent $\alpha \simeq 1.3$ for the upper $10\%$ of sales (graph), with $N=30K$. Using the Zipf variation for ranks of powerlaws, with $r_x$ and $r_y$ the ranks of book $x$ and $y$, respectively, $S_x$ and $S_y$ the corresponding sales

$$\frac{S_x}{S_y} = \left(\frac{r_x}{r_y}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$

So for example, if the rank for $x$ is $100$ and for $y$ is $1000$ we get $(100)^{-\frac{1}{1.3}} \approx 0.074$. 

---

Table 9.1: EVT for different tail parameters $\alpha$. We can see how a perturbation of $\alpha$ moves the probability of a tail event from 6,000 to $1.5 \times 10^6$. [ADDING A TABLE FOR HIGHER DIMENSION WHERE THINGS ARE A LOT WORSE]
Note this is only robust in deriving the sales of the lower ranking edition \( (r_y > r_x) \) because of inferential problems in the presence of fat-tails.

This works best for the top 10,000 books, but not quite the top 20 (because the tail is vastly more unstable). Further, the effective \( \alpha \) for large deviations is lower than 1.3. But this method is robust as applied to rank within the "near tail".
Distinguishing Between Poisson and Power Law Tails

G.1 Beware The Poisson

By the masquerade problem, any power law can be seen backward as a Gaussian plus a series of simple (that is, noncompound) Poisson jumps, the so-called jump-diffusion process. So the use of Poisson is often just a backfitting problem, where the researcher fits a Poisson, happy with the "evidence".

The next exercise aims to supply convincing evidence of scalability and NonPoisson-ness of the data (the Poisson here is assuming a standard Poisson). Thanks to the need for the probabilities add up to 1, scalability in the tails is the sole possible model for such data. We may not be able to write the model for the full distribution—but we know how it looks like in the tails, where it matters.

The Behavior of Conditional Averages. With a scalable (or "scale-free") distribution, when K is "in the tails" (say you reach the point when \(1 - F(X > x) = Cx^{-\alpha}\) where C is a constant and \(\alpha\) the power law exponent), the relative conditional expectation of X (knowing that \(X > K\)) divided by K, that is, \(\frac{E[X|X>K]}{K}\) is a constant, and does not depend on K. More precisely, the constant is \(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}\).

\[
\frac{\int_{K}^{\infty} xf(x, \alpha) \, dx}{\int_{K}^{\infty} f(x, \alpha) \, dx} = \frac{K\alpha}{\alpha - 1}
\]

This provides for a handy way to ascertain scalability by raising K and looking at the averages in the data.

Note further that, for a standard Poisson, (too obvious for a Gaussian): not only the conditional expectation depends on K, but it "wanes", i.e.

\[
\lim_{K \to \infty} \left( \frac{\int_{K}^{\infty} \frac{m^x}{x!} \, dx}{\int_{K}^{\infty} \frac{m^x}{x!} \, dx} / K \right) = 1
\]

Calibrating Tail Exponents. In addition, we can calibrate tail exponents. Using K.

The next exercise aims to supply convincing evidence of scalability and NonPoisson-ness of the data (the Poisson here is assuming a standard Poisson). Thanks to the need for the probabilities add up to 1, scalability in the tails is the sole possible model for such data. We may not be able to write the model for the full distribution—but we know how it looks like in the tails, where it matters.
estimator or ran a regression above some point.

We heuristically defined fat tails as the contribution of the low frequency events to the total properties. But fat tails can come from different classes of distributions. This chapter will present the difference between two broad classes of distributions.

This brief test using 12 million pieces of exhaustive returns shows how equity prices (as well as short term interest rates) do not have a characteristic scale. No other possible method than a Paretan tail, albeit of unprecise calibration, can characterize them.

G.2 Leave it to the Data

This exercise was done using about every piece of data in sight: single stocks, macro data, futures, etc.

**Equity Dataset.** We collected the most recent 10 years (as of 2008) of daily prices for U.S. stocks (no survivorship bias effect as we included companies that have been delisted up to the last trading day), n= 11,674,825, deviations expressed in logarithmic returns. We scaled the data using various methods.

The expression in "numbers of sigma" or standard deviations is there to conform to industry language (it does depend somewhat on the stability of sigma). In the "MAD" space test we used the mean deviation.

\[
\text{MAD}(i) = \frac{\log S^i_t}{S^i_{t-1}} \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{t \leq n} \left| \frac{\log S^i_{t-j}}{S^i_{t-j} - 1} \right|}
\]

We focused on negative deviations. We kept moving \( K \) up until to 100 MAD (indeed) –and we still had observations.

\[
\text{Implied } \alpha|_K = \frac{E[X|X<K]}{E[X|X<K] - K}
\]

**Sigma-Space.** In the "sigma space" test we used a rolling 22 day window scaled by the noncentral standard deviations. We did not add a mean for reasons explained elsewhere.

**Short term Interest Rates.** Literally, you do not even have a large number \( K \) for which scalability drops from a small sample effect.

G.2.1 Global Macroeconomic data
Conditional expectation for moves > $K$, 43 economic variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$K$, Mean deviations</th>
<th>Mean move (in MAD) in excess of $K$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.01443</td>
<td>65,958</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0814</td>
<td>23,450</td>
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<td>4.19842</td>
<td>8,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.33587</td>
<td>3,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.52524</td>
<td>1,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.74405</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
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<td>340</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>120</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>35.9036</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX G. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN POISSON AND POWER LAW TAILS

| MAD  | $E[X|X<K]$ | $n$ (for $X < K$) | $E[X|X<K]/K$ | Implied $\alpha$ |
|------|------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|
| -1.  | -1.75      | $1.32 \times 10^6$ | 1.75           | 2.32             |
| -2.  | -3.02      | 300806.         | 1.51           | 2.95             |
| -5.  | -7.96      | 19285.          | 1.59           | 2.68             |
| -10. | -15.32     | 3198.           | 1.53           | 2.87             |
| -15. | -22.32     | 1042.           | 1.48           | 3.04             |
| -20. | -30.24     | 418.            | 1.51           | 2.95             |
| -25. | -40.87     | 181.            | 1.63           | 2.57             |
| -50. | -101.75    | 24.             | 2.03           | 1.96             |
| -70. | -156.70    | 11.             | 2.23           | 1.80             |
| -75. | -175.42    | 9.              | 2.33           | 1.74             |
| -100.| -203.99    | 7.              | 2.03           | 1.96             |

| STD  | $E[X|X<K]$ | $n$ (for $X < K$) | $E[X|X<K]/K$ | Implied $\alpha$ |
|------|------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|
| -2.  | -3.01      | 343952.         | 1.50           | 2.97             |
| -5.  | -8.02      | 21156.          | 1.60           | 2.65             |
| -10. | -15.60     | 3528.           | 1.56           | 2.78             |
| -20. | -30.41     | 503.            | 1.52           | 2.91             |
| -50. | -113.324   | 20.             | 2.26           | 1.78             |
| -70. | -170.105   | 10.             | 2.43           | 1.69             |
| -80. | -180.84    | 9.              | 2.26           | 1.79             |
| -90. | -192.543   | 8.              | 2.13           | 1.87             |
| -100.| -251.691   | 5.              | 2.51           | 1.65             |

### EuroDollars Front Month 1986-2006

$n=4,947$

| MAD  | $E[X|X<K]$ | $n$ (for $X < K$) | $E[X|X<K]/K$ | Implied $\alpha$ |
|------|------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|
| -0.5 | -1.8034    | 1520            | 3.6068         | 1.38361          |
| -1.  | -2.41323   | 969             | 2.41323        | 1.7076           |
| -5.  | -7.96752   | 69              | 1.5935         | 2.68491          |
| -6.  | -9.2521    | 46              | 1.54202        | 2.84496          |
| -7.  | -10.2338   | 34              | 1.46197        | 3.16464          |
| -8.  | -11.4367   | 24              | 1.42959        | 3.32782          |

### UK Rates 1990-2007

$n=4,143$

| MAD  | $E[X|X<K]$ | $n$ (for $X < K$) | $E[X|X<K]/K$ | Implied $\alpha$ |
|------|------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|
| 0.5  | 1.68802    | 1270            | 3.37605        | 1.42087          |
| 1    | 2.23822    | 806             | 2.23822        | 1.80761          |
| 3    | 4.97319    | 140             | 1.65773        | 2.52038          |
| 5    | 8.43269    | 36              | 1.68654        | 2.45658          |
| 6    | 9.56132    | 26              | 1.59355        | 2.68477          |
Chapter Summary 10: Much of the work concerning martingales and Brownian motion has been idealized; we look for holes and pockets of mismatch to reality, with consequences. Infinite moments are not compatible with Ito calculus—outside the asymptote. Path dependence as a measure of fragility.

10.1 Path Dependence and History as Revelation of Antifragility

Figure 10.1: Brownian Bridge Pinned at 100 and 120, with multiple realizations \( \{S_0^j, S_1^j, \ldots, S_T^j\} \), each indexed by \( j \); the idea is to find the path \( j \) that satisfies the maximum distance \( D_j = |S_T - S_{\min}^j| \).
times but did not fall apart is giving us information about its solidity, compared to something that has not been subjected to such stressors.

(The Markov Property for, say, a Brownian Motion $X_N | \{X_1, X_2, ..., X_{N-1}\} = X_N | \{X_{N-1}\}$, that is the last realization is the only one that matters. Now if we take fat tailed models, such as stochastic volatility processes, the properties of the system are Markov, but the history of the past realizations of the process matter in determining the present variance.)

Take $M$ realizations of a Brownian Bridge process pinned at $S_{t_0} = 100$ and $S_T = 120$, sampled with $N$ periods separated by $\Delta t$, with the sequence $S$, a collection of Brownian-looking paths with single realizations indexed by $j$, $S_j = \int_{i=0}^{N_j} \left( S_j^{i} + t_0 \right)^M_{i=1}$

Take $m^* = \min_j \min_i S_i^j$ and $\{ j : \min S_i^j = m^* \}$

Take 1) the sample path with the most direct route (Path 1) defined as its lowest minimum, and 2) the one with the lowest minimum $m^*$ (Path 2). The state of the system at period $T$ depends heavily on whether the process $S_T$ exceeds its minimum (Path 2), that is whether arrived there thanks to a steady decline, or rose first, then declined.

If the properties of the process depend on $(S_T - m^*)$, then there is path dependence. By properties of the process we mean the variance, projected variance in, say, stochastic volatility models, or similar matters.

## 10.2 Brownian Motion in the Real World

We mentioned in the discussion of the Casanova problem that stochastic calculus requires a certain class of distributions, such as the Gaussian. It is not as we expect because of the convenience of the smoothness in squares (finite $\Delta x^2$), rather because the distribution conserves across time scales. By central limit, a Gaussian remains a Gaussian under summation, that is sampling at longer time scales. But it also remains a Gaussian at shorter time scales. The foundation is infinite dividability.

The problems are as follows:

The results in the literature are subjected to the constraints that the Martingale $M$ is member of the subset $(H^2)$ of square integrable martingales, $\sup_{t \leq T} E[|M|^2] < \infty$

We know that the restriction does not work for lot or time series.

We know that, with $\theta$ an adapted process, without $\int_0^T \theta_s^2 ds < \infty$ we can’t get most of the results of Ito’s lemma.

Even with $\int_0^T dW^2 < \infty$, The situation is far from solved because of powerful, very powerful presamptotics.

Hint: See the case of $\int_0^T dW^2$ being independent. But the continuous limit...
Take the normalized (i.e. sum=1) cumulative variance (see Bouchaud & Potters),
\[ \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (W[i\Delta t] - W)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} W[i\Delta t]} \]
Let us play with finite variance situations.

\[ \text{10.3 Stochastic Processes and Nonanticipating Strategies} \]

There is a difference between the Stratonovich and Ito's integration of a functional of a stochastic process. But there is another step missing in Ito's approach. Information...
10.4 Finite Variance not Necessary for Anything Ecological (incl. quant finance)

[Summary of article in Complexity (2008)]
Chapter Summary 11: A less technical demarcation between Black Swan Domains and others

Let us return to $M[A,f(x)]$ of Chapter 2. A quite significant result is that $M[A,x^n]$ may not converge, in the case of, say power laws with exponent $\alpha < n$, but $M[A,x^m]$ where $m < n$, would converge. Well, where the integral $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x)p(x)\,dx$ does not exist, by “clipping tails”, we can make the payoff integrable. There are two routes;

1) **Limiting $f$ (turning an open payoff to a binary):** when $f(x)$ is a constant as in a binary $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} Kp(x)\,dx$ will necessarily converge if $p$ is a probability distribution.

2) **Clipping tails:** (and this is the business we will deal with in *Antifragile*, Part II), where the payoff is bounded, $A = [L,H]$, or the integral $\int_{L}^{H} f(x)p(x)\,dx$ will necessarily converge.

### 11.1 Two types of Decisions

M0 depends on the 0th moment, that is, “Binary”, or simple, i.e., as we saw, you just care if something is true or false. Very true or very false does not matter. Someone is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11.1: The Four Quadrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution 1</strong> (&quot;thin tailed&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple pay-offs: First Quadrant: Extremely Safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex pay-offs: Second Quadrant: Safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution 2</strong> (no or unknown characteristic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Quadrant: Safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Quadrant:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THE FOURTH QUADRANT MITIGATION (or “SOLUTION”)**
either pregnant or not pregnant. A statement is “true” or “false” with some confidence interval. (I call these M0 as, more technically, they depend on the zeroth moment, namely just on probability of events, and not their magnitude — you just care about “raw” probability). A biological experiment in the laboratory or a bet with a friend about the outcome of a soccer game belong to this category.

M1+ Complex, depend on the 1st or higher moments. You do not just care of the frequency—but of the impact as well, or, even more complex, some function of the impact. So there is another layer of uncertainty of impact. (I call these M1+, as they depend on higher moments of the distribution). When you invest you do not care how many times you make or lose, you care about the expectation: how many times you make or lose times the amount made or lost.

Two types of probability structures:

There are two classes of probability domains—very distinct qualitatively and quantitatively. The first, thin-tailed: Mediocristan", the second, thick tailed Extremistan:

Conclusion. The 4th Quadrant is mitigated by changes in exposures. And exposures in the 4th quadrant can be to the negative or the positive, depending on if the domain subset A exposed on the left or on the right.
### Table 11.2: Tableau of Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$M_0$</th>
<th>$M_1$</th>
<th>$M_2+$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“True/False”</td>
<td>Expectations</td>
<td>NONLINEAR PAYOFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f(x)=0$</td>
<td>LINEAR PAYOFF</td>
<td>$f(x)=1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine (health not epidemics)</td>
<td>Insurance, measures of expected shortfall</td>
<td>Dynamically hedged portfolios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology experiments</td>
<td>General risk management</td>
<td>Leveraged portfolios (around the loss point)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bets (prediction markets)</td>
<td>Climate</td>
<td>Cubic payoffs (strips of out of the money options)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary/Digital derivatives</td>
<td>Economics (Policy)</td>
<td>Errors in analyses of volatility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life/Death</td>
<td>Security: Terrorism, Natural catastrophes</td>
<td>Calibration of nonlinear models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Epidemics</td>
<td>Expectation weighted by nonlinear utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casinos</td>
<td>Kurtosis-based positioning (“volatility trading”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Chapter Summary 12**: Standard economic theory makes an allowance for the agency problem, but not the compounding of moral hazard in the presence of informational opacity, particularly in what concerns high-impact events in fat tailed domains (under slow convergence for the law of large numbers). Nor did it look at exposure as a filter that removes nefarious risk takers from the system so they stop harming others. But the ancients did; so did many aspects of moral philosophy. We propose a global and morally mandatory heuristic that anyone involved in an action which can possibly generate harm for others, even probabilistically, should be required to be exposed to some damage, regardless of context. While perhaps not sufficient, the heuristic is certainly necessary hence mandatory. It is supposed to counter voluntary and involuntary risk hiding – and risk transfer – in the tails. We link the rule to various philosophical approaches to ethics and moral luck.

12.1 Agency Problems and Tail Probabilities

The chances of informed action and prediction can be seriously increased if we better comprehend the multiple causes of ignorance. The study of ignorance, then, is of supreme importance in our individual and social lives, from health and safety measures to politics and gambling (Rescher 2009). But how are we to act in the face of all the uncertainty that remains after we have become aware of our ignorance? The idea of *skin in the game* when involving others in tail risk exposures is crucial for the well-functioning of a complex world. In an opaque system fraught with unpredictability, there is, alas, an incentive and easy opportunity for operators to hide risk: to benefit from the upside when things go well without ever paying for the downside when one’s luck runs out.

The literature in risk, insurance, and contracts has amply dealt with the notion of information asymmetry (see Ross, 1973, Grossman and Hart, 1983, 1984, Tirole 1988, Stiglitz 1988), but not with the consequences of deeper information opacity (in spite of getting close, as in HÃ¼flemström, 1979), by which tail events are impossible to figure out for what they are in advance, and in which no one is in the "know" (Taleb, 2013).
operators, hence statistical properties involving tail events are completely opaque to the observer. And the central problem that is missing behind the abundant research on moral hazard and information asymmetry is that these rare, unobservable events represent the bulk of the properties in some domains. We define a fat tailed domain as follows: a large share of the statistical properties come from the extremum; for a time series involving \( n \) observations, as \( n \) becomes large, the maximum or minimum observation will be of the same order as the sum. Excursions from the center of the distributions happen brutally and violently; the rare event dominates. And economic variables are extremely fat tailed (Mandelbrot, 1997). Further, standard economic theory makes an allowance for the agency problem, but not for the combination of agency problem, informational opacity, and fat-tailedness. It has not yet caught up that tails events are not predictable, not measurable statistically unless one is causing them, or involved in increasing their probability by engaging in a certain class of actions with small upside and large downside. (Both parties may not be able to gauge probabilities in the tails of the distribution, but the agent knows which tail events do not affect him.) Sadly, the economics literature’s treatment of tail risks, or "peso problems" has been to see them as outliers to mention \textit{en passant} but hide under the rug, or remove from analysis, rather than a core center of the modeling and decision-making, or to think in terms of robustness and sensitivity to unpredictable events. Indeed, this pushing under the rug the determining statistical properties explains the failures of economics in mapping the real world, as witnessed by the inability of the economics establishment to see the accumulation of tail risks leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 (Taleb, 2009). The parts of the risk and insurance literature that have focused on tail events and extreme value theory, such as Embrechts (1997), build a framework to capture the large role of the tails, but then the users of these theories (in the applications) fall for the logical inconsistency of assuming that they can be figured out somehow: naively, since they are rare what do we know about them? The law of large numbers cannot be of help for things it is not made for. Alarmingly, very little has been done to make the leap that small calibration errors in models can change the probabilities (such as those involving the risks taken in Fukushima’s nuclear project) from 1 in \( 10^6 \) to 1 in 50.

Add to the fat-tailedness the asymmetry (or skewness) of the distribution, by which a random variable can take very large values on one side, but not the other. An operator who wants to hide risk from others can exploit skewness by creating a situation in which he has a small or bounded harm to him, and exposing others to large harm; thus exposing others to the bad side of the distributions by fooling them with the tail properties.

Finally, the economic literature focuses on incentives as encouragement or deterrent, but not on disincentives as potent filters that remove incompetent and nefarious risk takers from the system. Consider that the symmetry of risks incurred on the road causes the bad driver to eventually exit the system and stop killing others. An unskilled forecaster with skin-in-the-game would eventually go bankrupt or out of business. Shielded from potentially (financially) harmful exposure, he would continue contributing to the buildup of risks in the system.  

\[1\] The core of the problem is as follows. There are two effects: "crooks of randomness" and "fooled of randomness" (Nicolas Tabardel, private communication). Skin in the game eliminates the first effect in
Hence there is no possible risk management method that can replace skin in the
game in cases where informational opacity is compounded by informational asymmetry
viz. the principal-agent problem that arises when those who gain the upside resulting
from actions performed under some degree of uncertainty are not the same as those who
incur the downside of those same acts. For example, bankers and corporate managers
get bonuses for positive "performance", but do not have to pay out reverse bonuses for
negative performance. This gives them an incentive to bury risks in the tails of the
distribution, particularly the left tail, thereby delaying blowups.

The ancients were fully aware of this incentive to hide tail risks, and implemented
very simple but potent heuristics (for the effectiveness and applicability of fast and frugal
heuristics both in general and in the moral domain, see Gigerenzer, 2010). But we find
the genesis of both moral philosophy and risk management concentrated within the same
rule3. About 3,800 years ago, Hammurabi’s code specified that if a builder builds a
house and the house collapses and causes the death of the owner of the house, that
builder shall be put to death. This is the best risk-management rule ever.

What the ancients understood very well was that the builder will always know more
about the risks than the client, and can hide sources of fragility and improve his prof-
itability by cutting corners. The foundation is the best place to hide such things. The
builder can also fool the inspector, for the person hiding risk has a large informational
advantage over the one who has to find it. The same absence of personal risk is what
motivates people to only appear to be doing good, rather than to actually do it.

Note that Hammurabi’s law is not necessarily literal: damages can be "converted" into
monetary compensation. Hammurabi’s law is at the origin of the *lex talonis* ("eye for
eye", discussed further down) which, contrary to what appears at first glance, it is not
literal. *Tractate Bava Kama* in the Babylonian Talmud4, builds a consensus that "eye
for eye" has to be figurative: what if the perpetrator of an eye injury were blind? Would
he have to be released of all obligations on grounds that the injury has already been
inflicted? Wouldn’t this lead him to inflict damage to other people’s eyesight with total
impunity? Likewise, the Quran’s interpretation, equally, gives the option of the injured
party to pardon or alter the punishment5. This nonliteral aspect of the law solves many
problems of asymmetry under specialization of labor, as the deliverer of a service is not
required to have the same exposure in kind, but incur risks that are costly enough to be
a disincentive.

The problems and remedies are as follows:

First, consider policy makers and politicians. In a decentralized system, say munic-
ipalities, these people are typically kept in check by feelings of shame upon harming
others with their mistakes. In a large centralized system, the sources of error are not so

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2 Note that Pigovian mechanisms fail when, owing to opacity, the person causing the harm is not easy
to identify.

3 Economics seems to be born out of moral philosophy (mutating into the philosophy of action via
decision theory) to which was added naive and improper 19th C. statistics (Taleb, 2007, 2013). We are
trying to go back to its moral philosophy roots, to which we add more sophisticated probability theory
and risk management.


5 Quran, *Surat Al-Ma'idat*, 45: “Then, whoever proves charitable and gives up on his right for recip-
rocation, it will be an atonement for him.” (our translation).
visible. Spreadsheets do not make people feel shame. The penalty of shame is a factor that counts in favour of governments (and businesses) that are small, local, personal, and decentralized versus ones that are large, national or multi-national, anonymous, and centralised. When the latter fail, everybody except the culprit ends up paying the cost, leading to national and international measures of endebtment against future generations or "austerity". These points against "big government" models should not be confused with the standard libertarian argument against states securing the welfare of their citizens, but only against doing so in a centralized fashion that enables people to hide behind bureaucratic anonymity. Much better to have a communitarian municipal approach: in situations in which we cannot enforce skin-in-the-game we should change the system to lower the consequences of errors.

Second, we misunderstand the incentive structure of corporate managers. Counter to public perception, corporate managers are not entrepreneurs. They are not what one could call agents of capitalism. Between 2000 and 2010, in the United States, the stock market lost (depending how one measures it) up to two trillion dollars for investors, compared to leaving their funds in cash or treasury bills. It is tempting to think that since managers are paid on incentive, they would be incurring losses. Not at all: there is an irrational and unethical asymmetry. Because of the embedded option in their profession, managers received more than four hundred billion dollars in compensation. The manager who loses money does not return his bonus or incur a negative one. The built-in optionality in the compensation of corporate managers can only be removed by forcing them to eat some of the losses.

Third, there is a problem with applied and academic economists, quantitative modellers, and policy wonks. The reason economic models do not fit reality (fat-tailed reality) is that economists have no disincentive and are never penalized for their errors. So long as they please the journal editors, or produce cosmetically sound "scientific" papers, their work is fine. So we end up using models such as portfolio theory and similar methods without any remote empirical or mathematical reason. The solution is to prevent economists from teaching practitioners, simply because they have no mechanism to exit the system in the event of causing risks that harm others. Again this brings us to decentralization by a system where policy is decided at a local level by smaller units and hence in no need for economists.

Fourth, the predictors. Predictions in socioeconomic domains don't work. Predictors are rarely harmed by their predictions. Yet we know that people take more risks after they see a numerical prediction. The solution is to ask — and only take into account — what the predictor has done (what he has in his portfolio), or is committed to doing.

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6 See McQuillan (2013) and Orr (2013); cf. the "many hands" problem discussed by Thompson (1987)

7 There can be situations of overconfidence by which the CEOs of companies bear a disproportionately large amount of risk, by investing in their companies, as shown by Malmendier and Tate (2008, 2009), and end up taking more risk because they have skin in the game. But it remains that CEOs have optionality, as shown by the numbers above. Further, the heuristic we propose is necessary, but may not be sufficient to reduce risk, although CEOs with a poor understanding of risk have an increased probability of personal ruin.

8 We define "optionality" as an option-like situation by which an agent has a convex payoff, that is,
in the future. It is unethical to drag people into exposures without incurring losses. Further, predictors work with binary variables (Taleb and Tetlock, 2013), that is, "true" or "false" and play with the general public misunderstanding of tail events. They have the incentives to be right more often than wrong, whereas people who have skin in the game do not mind being wrong more often than they are right, provided the wins are large enough. In other words, predictors have an incentive to play the skewness game (more on the problem in section 2). The simple solution is as follows: predictors should be exposed to the variables they are predicting and should be subjected to the dictum "do not tell people what you think, tell them what you have in your portfolio" (Taleb, 2012, p.386). Clearly predictions are harmful to people as, by the psychological mechanism of anchoring, they increases risk taking.

Fifth, to deal with warmongers, Ralph Nader has rightly proposed that those who vote in favor of war should subject themselves (or their own kin) to the draft.

We believe Skin in the game is a heuristic for a safe and just society. It is even more necessary under fat tailed environments. Opposed to this is the unethical practice of taking all the praise and benefits of good fortune whilst disassociating oneself from the results of bad luck or miscalculation. We situate our view within the framework of ethical debates relating to the moral significance of actions whose effects result from ignorance and luck. We shall demonstrate how the idea of skin in the game can effectively resolve debates about (a) moral luck and (b) egoism vs. altruism, while successfully bypassing (c) debates between subjectivist and objectivist norms of action under uncertainty, by showing how their concerns are of no pragmatic concern.

Reputational Costs in Opaque Systems: Note that our analysis includes costs of reputation as skin in the game, with future earnings lowered as the result of a mistake, as with surgeons and people subjected to visible malpractice and have to live with the consequences. So our concern is situations in which cost hiding is effective over and above potential costs of reputation, either because the gains are too large with respect to these costs, or because these reputation costs can be "arbitraged", by shifting blame or escaping it altogether, because harm is not directly visible. The latter category includes bureaucrats in non-repeat environments where the delayed harm is not directly attributable to them. Note that in many domains the payoff can be large enough to offset reputational costs, or, as in finance and government, reputations do not seem to be aligned with effective track record. (To use an evolutionary argument, we need to avoid a system in which those who make mistakes stay in the gene pool, but throw others out of it.)

Application of The Heuristic: The heuristic implies that one should be the first consumer of one’s product, a cook should test his own food, helicopter repairpersons should be ready to take random flights on the rotorcraft that they maintain, hedge fund managers should be maximally invested in their funds. But it does not naively imply that one should always be using one’s product: a barber cannot cut his own hair, the maker of a cancer drug should not be a user of his product unless he is ill. So one should use one’s products conditionally on being called to use them. However the rule is far more rigid in matters entailing systemic risk. Simple decisions should be made...
Heuristic vs Regulation: A heuristic, unlike a regulation, does not require state intervention for implementation. It is simple contract between willing individuals: "I buy your goods if you use them", or "I will listen to your forecast if you are exposed to losses if you are wrong" and would not require the legal system any more than simple commercial transaction. It is bottom-up. (The ancients and more-or-less ancients effectively understood the contingency and probabilistic aspect in contract law, and asymmetry under opacity, as reflected in the works of Pierre de Jean Olivi. Also note that the foundation of maritime law has resided in skin-the-game unconditional sharing of losses, even as far in the past as 800 B.C. with the *Lex Rhodia*, which stipulates that all parties involved in a transaction have skin in the game and share losses in the event of damage. The rule dates back to the Phoenician commerce and caravan trades among Semitic people. The idea is still present in Islamic finance commercial law, see Wardé, 2010.)

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First we present the epistemological dimension of the hidden payoff, expressed using the mathematics of probability, showing the gravity of the problem of hidden consequences. We present the historical background in the various philosophical branches dealing with moral luck and ethics of risk. We conclude with the notion of heuristic as simple "convex" rule, simple in its application.

![Changes in Value](image)

*Figure 12.1: The most effective way to maximize the expected payoff to the agent at the expense of the principal.*

12.2 Payoff Skewness and Lack of Skin-in-the-Game

This section will analyze the probabilistic mismatch or tail risks and returns in the presence of a principal-agent problem.

Transfer of Harm: If an agent has the upside of the payoff of the random variable, with no downside, and is judged solely on the basis of past performance, then the incentive is to hide risks in the left tail using a negatively skewed (or more generally, asymmetric)
distribution for the performance. This can be generalized to any payoff for which one does not bear the full risks and negative consequences of one’s actions.

Let \( P(K, M) \) be the payoff for the operator over \( M \) incentive periods

\[
P(K, M) = \gamma \sum_{i=1}^{M} q_{t+(i-1)\Delta t} \left(x_{t+i\Delta t}^j - K\right)^+ 1_{\Delta t(i-1)+t < \tau}
\]  

with \( X^j = (x_{t+i\Delta t}^j)_{i=1}^{M} \in \mathbb{R} \), i.i.d. random variables representing the distribution of profits over a certain period \([t, t + i\Delta t] \), \( i \in \mathbb{N} \), \( \Delta t \in \mathbb{R}^+ \) and \( K \) is a “hurdle”, \( \tau = \inf \left\{ s : \left( \sum_{z<s} x_z \right) < x_{\min} \right\} \) is an indicator of stopping time when past performance conditions are not satisfied (namely, the condition of having a certain performance in a certain number of the previous years, otherwise the stream of payoffs terminates, the game ends and the number of positive incentives stops). The constant \( \gamma \in (0,1) \) is an “agent payoff”, or compensation rate from the performance, which does not have to be monetary (as long as it can be quantified as “benefit”). The quantity \( q_{t+(i-1)\Delta t} \in [1,\infty) \) indicates the size of the exposure at times \( t+(i-1)\Delta t \) (because of an Ito lag, as the performance at period \( s \) is determined by \( q \) at a a strictly earlier period \( s \)).

Let \( \{f_j\} \) be the family of probability measures \( f_j \) of \( X^j \), \( j \in \mathbb{N} \). Each measure corresponds to certain mean/skewness characteristics, and we can split their properties in half on both sides of a “centrality” parameter \( K \), as the “upper” and “lower” distributions. With some inconsequential abuse of notation we write \( dF_j(x) \) as \( f_j(x) \, dx \), so \( F_j^+ = \int_{-\infty}^{K} f_j(x) \, dx \) and \( F_j^- = \int_{-\infty}^{K} f_j(x) \, dx \), the “upper” and “lower” distributions, each corresponding to certain conditional expectation \( \mathbb{E}_j^+ = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{K} xf_j(x) \, dx}{\int_{-\infty}^{K} f_j(x) \, dx} \) and \( \mathbb{E}_j^- = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{K} x f_j(x) \, dx}{\int_{-\infty}^{K} f_j(x) \, dx} \).

Now define \( \nu \in \mathbb{R}^+ \) as a K-centered nonparametric measure of asymmetry, \( \nu_j = \frac{F_j^-}{F_j^+} \), with values >1 for positive asymmetry, and <1 for negative ones. Intuitively, skewness has probabilities and expectations moving in opposite directions: the larger the negative payoff, the smaller the probability to compensate.

We do not assume a “fair game”, that is, with unbounded returns \( m \in (-\infty,\infty) \), \( F_j^+ \mathbb{E}_j^+ + F_j^- \mathbb{E}_j^- = m \), which we can write as

\[
m^+ + m^- = m.
\]

**Simple assumptions of constant \( q \) and simple-condition stopping time.** Assume \( q \) constant, \( q = 1 \) and simplify the stopping time condition as having no loss larger than \(-K\) in the previous periods, \( \tau = \inf\{(t + i\Delta t) : x_{\Delta t(i-1)+t} < K\} \), which leads to

\[
\left\{ x_{\Delta t(i-1)+t} < K \right\}.
\]
Since assuming independent and identically distributed agent’s payoffs, the expectation at stopping time corresponds to the expectation of stopping time multiplied by the expected compensation to the agent $\gamma E^+_j$. And $E \left( \sum_{i=1}^M 1_{\Delta t(i-1)+t<\tau} \right) = E \left( \left( \sum_{i=1}^M 1_{\Delta t(i-1)+t<\tau} \right) \wedge M \right)$.

The expectation of stopping time can be written as the probability of success under the condition of no previous loss:

$$E \left( \sum_{i=1}^M 1_{t+i \Delta t<\tau} \right) = \sum_{i=1}^M F^+_j \ E \left( 1_{x\Delta t(i-1)+t>K} \right).$$

We can express the stopping time condition in terms of uninterrupted success runs. Let $\sum$ be the ordered set of consecutive success runs $\sum = \{ \{F\}, \{SF\}, \{SSF\}, \ldots, \{(M-1) \text{ consecutive } S, F\} \}$, where $S$ is success and $F$ is failure over period $\Delta t$, with associated corresponding probabilities:

$$(1 - F^+_j), F^+_j (1 - F^+_j),$$

$$F^+_j (1 - F^+_j), \ldots,$$

$$, F^+_j (1 - F^+_j),$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^M F^+_j (i-1) (1 - F^+_j) = 1 - F^+_j^M \approx 1 \quad (12.3)$$

For $M$ large, since $F^+_j \in (0,1)$ we can treat the previous as almost an equality, hence:

$$E \left( \sum_{i=1}^M 1_{t+(i-1) \Delta t<\tau} \right) =$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^M (i-1) F^+_j (i-1) (1 - F^+_j) \approx \frac{F^+_j}{1 - F^+_j}.$$

Finally, the expected payoff for the agent:

$$E \left( P(K, M) \right) \approx \gamma E^+_j \frac{F^+_j}{1 - F^+_j},$$

which increases by i) increasing $E^+_j$, ii) minimizing the probability of the loss $F^-_j$, but, and that’s the core point, even if i) and ii) take place at the expense of $m$ the total expectation from the package.

Alarmingly, since $E^+_j = \frac{m-m^-_{F^+_j}}{F^+_j}$, the agent doesn’t care about a degradation of the total expected return $m$ if it comes from the left side of the distribution, $m^-$. Seen in skewness space, the expected agent payoff maximizes under the distribution $j$ with the lowest value of $\nu_j$ (maximal negative asymmetry). The total expectation of the
Multiplicative $q$ and the explosivity of blowups. Now, if there is a positive correlation between $q$ and past performance, or survival length, then the effect becomes multiplicative. The negative payoff becomes explosive if the allocation $q$ increases with visible profitability, as seen in Figure 2 with the story of IndyMac, whose risk kept growing until the blowup\(^9\). Consider that "successful" people get more attention, more funds, more promotion. Having "beaten the odds" imparts a certain credibility. In finance we often see fund managers experience a geometric explosion of funds under management after perceived "steady" returns. Forecasters with steady strings of successes become gods. And companies that have hidden risks tend to outperform others in small samples, their executives see higher compensation. So in place of a constant exposure $q$, consider a variable one:

$$q_{\Delta t(i-1)+t} = q \omega(i),$$

where $\omega(i)$ is a multiplier that increases with time, and of course naturally collapses upon blowup.

Equation 12.1 becomes:

$$P(K, M) \equiv \gamma \sum_{i=1}^{M} q \omega(i) \left( x_{t+i\Delta t}^j - K \right) + 1_{t+(i-1)\Delta t < \tau}, \quad (12.4)$$

and the expectation, assuming the numbers of periods, $M$ is large enough

---

\(^9\)The following sad anecdote illustrate the problem with banks. It was announced that "JPMorgan Joins BofA With Perfect Trading Record in Quarter" (Dawn Kopecki and Hugh Son - Bloomberg News, May 9, 2013). Yet banks while "steady earners" go through long profitable periods followed by blowups; they end up losing back all cumulative profits in short episodes, just in 2008 they lost around 4.7 trillion...
\[
\mathbb{E}(P(K, M)) = \gamma \mathbb{E}^+_j q \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{i=1}^M \omega(i) 1_{\Delta t(i-1)+t<\tau} \right). (12.5)
\]

Assuming the rate of conditional growth is a constant \( r \in [0, \infty) \), and making the replacement \( \omega(i) \equiv e^{r i} \), we can call the last term in equation 12.5 the multiplier of the expected return to the agent:

\[
\mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{i=1}^M e^{ir} 1_{\Delta t(i-1)+t<\tau} \right) = \sum_{i=1}^M (i-1) F_j^+ e^{ir} \mathbb{E}(1_{x_{\Delta t(i-1)+t>K}}) \tag{12.6}
\]

\[
= \frac{(F^+ - 1) \left( (F^+) M e^{(M+1)r} - F^+ (M-1) e^{(M+2)r} - F^+ e^{2r} \right)}{(F^+ e^{r} - 1)^2} \tag{12.7}
\]

We can get the table of sensitivities for the "multiplier" of the payoff:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( r )</th>
<th>( F = 0.6 )</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>0.8</th>
<th>0.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>5.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>19.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>12.05</td>
<td>34.55</td>
<td>86.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>11.09</td>
<td>38.15</td>
<td>147.57</td>
<td>445.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Multiplicative effect of skewness

**Explaining why Skewed Distributions Conceal the Mean.** Note that skewed distributions conceal their mean quite well, with \( P(X < \mathbb{E}(x)) < \frac{1}{2} \) in the presence of negative skewness. And such effect increases with fat-tailedness. Consider a negatively skewed power law distribution, say the mirror image of a standard Pareto distribution, with maximum value \( x_{\text{min}} \), and domain \((-\infty, x_{\text{min}}]\), with exceedance probability \( P(X > x) = x^{-\alpha} x_{\text{min}}^\alpha \), and mean \(- \frac{\alpha x_{\text{min}}}{\alpha-1}\), with \( \alpha > 1 \), have a proportion of \( 1 - \frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} \) of its realizations rosier than the true mean. Note that fat-tailedness increases at lower values of \( \alpha \). The popular "eighty-twenty", with tail exponent \( \alpha = 1.15 \), has > 90 percent of observations above the true mean\(^{10}\). Likewise, to consider a thinner tailed skewed distribution, for a Lognormal distribution with domain \((-\infty, 0)\), with mean \( m = -e^{\mu + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}} \), the probability of exceeding the mean is \( P(X > m) = \frac{1}{2} \text{erfc} \left( -\frac{\sigma}{2\sqrt{2}} \right) \), which for \( \sigma = 1 \) is at 69%, and for \( \sigma = 2 \) is at 84%.

**Forecasters.** We can see how forecasters who do not have skin in the game have the incentive of betting on the low-impact high probability event, and ignoring the lower probability ones, even if these are high impact. There is a confusion between "digital payoffs" \( \int f_j(x) dx \) and full distribution, called "vanilla payoffs", \( \int x f_j(x) dx \), see Taleb and Tetlock (2013)\(^{11}\).

\(^{10}\)This discussion of a warped probabilistic incentive corresponds to what John Kay has called the "Taleb distribution", John Kay "A strategy for hedge funds and dangerous drivers", Financial Times, 16 January 2003.
frequency, not payoff, and tend to cluster together in packs to mitigate losses by making them look like "industry event". Many fund managers beat the odds by selling tails, say covered writes, by which one can increase the probability of gains but possibly lower the expectation. They also have the optionality
Part II

(Anti)Fragility and Nonlinear Responses to Random Variables
Chapter Summary 13: Deeper into the conflation between a random variable and exposure to it.

13.1 The Conflation Problem: Exposures to x Confused With Knowledge About x

13.1.1 Exposure, not knowledge

Take $x$ a random or nonrandom variable, and $f(x)$ the exposure, payoff, the effect of $x$ on you, the end bottom line. (To be technical, $x$ is higher dimensions, in $\mathbb{R}^N$ but less assume for the sake of the examples in the introduction that it is a simple one-dimensional variable).

The disconnect. Practitioner and risk takers observe the following disconnect: people (nonpractitioners) talking $x$ (with the implication that we practitioners should care about $x$ in running our affairs) while practitioners think about $f(x)$, nothing but $f(x)$. And the straight confusion since Aristotle between $x$ and $f(x)$ has been chronic. Sometimes people mention $f(x)$ as utility but miss the full payoff. And the confusion is at two level: one, simple confusion; second, in the decision-science literature, seeing the difference and not realizing that action on $f(x)$ is easier than action on $x$.

Examples. The variable $x$ is unemployment in Senegal, $F_1(x)$ is the effect on the bottom line of the IMF, and $F_2(x)$ is the effect on your grandmother (which I assume is minimal).

$x$ can be a stock price, but you own an option on it, so $f(x)$ is your exposure an option value for $x$, or, even more complicated the utility of the exposure to the option value.

$x$ can be changes in wealth, $f(x)$ the convex-concave value function of Kahneman-Tversky, how these “affect” you. One can see that $f(x)$ is vastly more stable or robust than $x$ (it has thinner tails).

A convex and linear function of a variable $x$. Confusing $f(x)$ (on the vertical) and $x$ (the horizontal) is more and more significant when $f(x)$ is nonlinear. The more convex $f(x)$, the more the statistical work. The expectation of $f(x)$ will be discussed for another...
inequality. But beyond Jensen’s inequality, the difference in risks between the two will be more and more considerable. When it comes to probability, the more nonlinear \( f \), the less the probabilities of \( x \) matter compared to the nonlinearity of \( f \). Moral of the story: focus on \( f \), which we can alter, rather than the measurement of the elusive properties of \( x \).

There are infinite numbers of functions \( F \) depending on a unique variable \( x \). All utilities need to be embedded in \( F \).

### 13.1.2 Limitations of knowledge

. What is crucial, our limitations of knowledge apply to \( x \) not necessarily to \( f(x) \). We have no control over \( x \), some control over \( F(x) \). In some cases a very, very large control over \( f(x) \).

This seems naive, but people do, as something is lost in the translation.

The danger with the treatment of the Black Swan problem is as follows: people focus on \( x \) ("predicting \( x \")). My point is that, although we do not understand \( x \), we can deal with it by working on \( F \) which we can understand, while others work on predicting \( x \) which we can’t because small probabilities are incomputable, particularly in “fat tailed” domains. \( f(x) \) is how the end result affects you.

The probability distribution of \( f(x) \) is markedly different from that of \( x \), particularly when \( f(x) \) is nonlinear. We need a nonlinear transformation of the distribution of \( x \) to get \( f(x) \). We had to wait until 1964 to get a paper on “convex transformations of random variables”, Van Zwet (1964).

### 13.1.3 Bad news

\( F \) is almost always nonlinear, often “S curved”, that is convex-concave (for an increasing function).

### 13.1.4 The central point about what to understand

When \( f(x) \) is convex, say as in trial and error, or with an option, we do not need to understand \( x \) as much as our exposure to \( H \). Simply the statistical properties of \( x \) are swamped by those of \( H \). That is the point of antifragility in which exposure is more important than the naive notion of “knowledge”, that is, understanding \( x \).
13.1.5  Fragility and Antifragility

When $f(x)$ is concave (fragile), errors about $x$ can translate into extreme negative values for $F$. When $f(x)$ is convex, one is immune from negative variations.

The more nonlinear $F$ the less the probabilities of $x$ matter in the probability distribution of the final package $F$.

Most people confuse the probabilities of $x$ with those of $F$. I am serious: the entire literature reposes largely on this mistake.

So, for now ignore discussions of $x$ that do not have $F$. And, for Baal’s sake, focus on $F$, not $x$.

13.2  Transformations of Probability Distributions

Say $x$ follows a distribution $p(x)$ and $z = f(x)$ follows a distribution $g(z)$. Assume $g(z)$ continuous, increasing, and differentiable for now.

The density $p$ at point $r$ is defined by use of the integral

$$D(r) = \int_{-\infty}^{r} p(x) dx$$

hence

$$\int_{-\infty}^{r} p(x) dx = \int_{-\infty}^{f(r)} g(z) dz$$

In differential form

$$g(z) dz = p(x) dx$$

[ASSUMING $f$ is Borel measurable, i.e. has an inverse that is a Borel Set...]

since $x = f^{-1}(z)$, one obtains

$$g(z) dz = p\left(f^{-1}(z)\right) df^{-1}(z)$$

Now, the derivative of an inverse function

$$f^{-1}(z) = \frac{1}{f'(f^{-1}(z))},$$

which provides the useful transformation heuristic:

$$g(z) = \frac{p\left(f^{-1}(z)\right)}{f'(u)|u = f^{-1}(z)|}$$

(13.1)
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\[ g(z) = \frac{p(f^{-1}(z))}{|f'(u)||u = (f^{-1}(z))|} \]

Where \( f \) is convex (and continuous), \( \frac{1}{2}(f(x - \Delta x) + f(x + \Delta x)) \geq f(x) \), concave if \( \frac{1}{2}(f(x - \Delta x) + f(x + \Delta x)) \leq f(x) \). Let us simplify with sole condition, assuming \( f(.) \) twice differentiable, \( \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x^2} \geq 0 \) for all values of \( x \) in the convex case and <0 in the concave one. [WILL DISCUSS OTHER CASES WHERE WE NEED TO SPLIT THE R.V. IN TWO DOMAINS BECAUSE INVERSE NOT UNIQUE]

13.2.1 Some Examples.

**Squaring x:** \( p(x) \) is a Gaussian (with mean 0, standard deviation 1), \( f(x) = x^2 \)

\[ g(x) = \frac{e^{-\frac{x}{2}}}{2\sqrt{2\pi}x}, x \geq 0 \]

which corresponds to the Chi-square distribution with 1 degrees of freedom.

**Exponentiating x:** \( p(x) \) is a Gaussian (with mean \( \mu \), standard deviation \( \sigma \))

\[ g(x) = \frac{e^{-(\log(x) - \mu)^2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}x} \]

which is the lognormal distribution.

13.3 Application 1: Happiness (\( f(x) \)) does not have the same statistical properties as wealth (\( x \))

There is a conflation of fat-tailedness of Wealth and Utility

13.3.1 Case 1: The Kahneman Tversky Prospect theory, which is convex-concave

\[ v(x) = \begin{cases} 
 x^a & x \geq 0 \\
 -\lambda (-x^a) & x < 0 
\end{cases} \]

with \( a \) and \( \lambda \) calibrated \( a = 0.88 \) and \( \lambda = 2.25 \)

For \( x \) (the changes in wealth) following a \( T \) distribution with tail exponent \( \alpha \),

\[ \left( \frac{x}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{\alpha + 1}{2}} \]
13.3. APPLICATION 1: HAPPINESS ($F(X)$) DOES NOT HAVE THE SAME STATISTICAL PROPERTIES AS WEALTH ($X$)

\[
\frac{-20}{-10} \sim \frac{10}{20}
\]

Figure 13.2: Simulation, first. The distribution of the utility of changes of wealth, when the changes in wealth follow a power law with tail exponent $\alpha = 2$ (5 million Monte Carlo simulations).

\[
\frac{-20}{-10} \sim \frac{10}{20}
\]

Figure 13.3: The same result derived analytically, after the Monte Carlo runs.

Where $B$ is the Euler Beta function, $B(a, b) = \Gamma(a) \Gamma(b) / \Gamma(a + b) = \int_0^1 t^{a-1} (1 - t)^{b-1} dt$; we get (skipping the details of $z = v(u)$ and $f(u) \, du = z(x) \, dx$), the distribution $z(x)$ of the utility of happiness $v(x)$

\[
z(x|\alpha, a, \lambda) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{x^{-\alpha} \Gamma(\alpha + 2/\alpha)}{a \sqrt{\alpha} B\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)} & x \geq 0 \\
-\frac{x^{-\alpha} \Gamma(\alpha + 2/\alpha)}{\alpha \lambda \sqrt{\alpha} B\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)} & x < 0
\end{cases}
\]

**Fragility**: as defined in the Taleb-Douady (2012) sense, on which later, i.e. tail sensitivity below $K$, $v(x)$ is less “fragile” than $x$.

$v(x)$ has thinner tails than $x \leftrightarrow$ more robust.

**ASYMPTOTIC TAIL** More technically the asymptotic tail for $V(x)$ becomes $\frac{\alpha}{a}$ (i.e., for $x$ and -$x$ large, the exceedance probability for $V$, $P_{>x} \sim K x^{-\frac{\alpha}{a}}$, with $K$ a constant, or

\[
z(x) \sim K x^{-\frac{\alpha}{a} - 1}
\]

We can see that $v(x)$ can have less fat tails, i.e., when $\alpha < 1$.
Case 2: Compare to the Monotone Concave of Classical Utility

Unlike the convex-concave shape in Kahneman Tversky, classical utility is monotone concave. This leads to plenty of absurdities, but the worst is the effect on the distribution of utility.

Granted one (K-T) deals with changes in wealth, the second is a function of wealth.

Take the standard concave utility function \( g(x) = 1 - e^{-ax} \). With \( a=1 \)

Plot of \( 1- e^{-ax} \)

The distribution of \( v(x) \) will be
With such a distribution of utility it would be absurd to do anything.

13.4 The effect of convexity on the distribution of \( f(x) \)

Note the following property.

Distributions that are skewed have their mean dependent on the variance (when it exists), or on the scale. In other words, more uncertainty raises the expectation.

**Demonstration 1:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Low Uncertainty</th>
<th>High Uncertainty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Example:** the Lognormal Distribution has a term \( \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \) in its mean, linear to variance.

**Example:** the Exponential Distribution \( 1 - e^{-x\lambda} \) \( x \geq 0 \) has the mean a concave function of the variance, that is, \( \frac{1}{\lambda} \), the square root of its variance.

**Example:** the Pareto Distribution \( L^\alpha x^{-1-\alpha} \) \( x \geq L \), \( \alpha > 2 \) has the mean \( \sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 2}} \sqrt[\alpha]{\lambda} \) \times \) Standard Deviation, \( \sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 2}} L \)

13.5 Estimation Methods When the Payoff is Convex

As in the previous chapter, it is necessary to find the best-estimate.
path not taking into account sensitivity to counterfactuals and completeness of sampling. It assumes that what one sees from a time series is the entire story. 1

![Figure 1: The Small Sample Effect and Naive Empiricism](image)

**Figure 1: The Small Sample Effect and Naive Empiricism:** When one looks at historical returns that are skewed to the left, most missing observations are in the left tails, causing an overestimation of the mean. The more skewed the payoff, and the thicker the left tail, the worst the gap between observed and true mean.

Now of concern for us is assessing the stub, or tail bias, that is, the difference between M and M*, or the potential contribution of tail events not seen in the window used for the analysis. When the payoff in the tails is powerful from convex responses, the stub becomes extremely large. So the rest of this note will go beyond the Ilmanen (2012) to explain the convexities of the payoffs in the tails and generalize to classical mistakes of testing strategies with explosive tail exposures on a finite simple historical sample. It will be based on the idea of metaprobability (or metamodel): by looking at effects of errors in models and representations. All one needs is an argument for a *very* small probability of a large payoff in the tail (devastating for the option seller) to reverse long shot arguments and make it uneconomic to sell a tail option. All it takes is a small model error to reverse the argument.

**The Nonlinearities of Option Packages.** There is a compounding effect of rarity of tail events and highly convex payoff when they happen, a convexity that is generally missed in the literature. To illustrate the point, we construct a “return on theta” (or return on time-decay) metric for a delta-neutral package of an option, seen at $t_0$ given an initial asset value $S_0$, with a strike price $K$, a final expiration at time $T$, and priced using an “implied” standard deviation $\sigma_K$.

$$\Pi(N, K) \equiv \frac{1}{\theta_{S_0, t_0, \delta}} \left( O(S_0 e^{N \sigma_K \sqrt{T}}, K, T - t_0, \sigma_K) - O(S_0, K, T - t_0 - \delta, \sigma_K) - \Delta_{S_0, t_0} (1 - S_0) e^{N \sigma_K \sqrt{T}} \right), \tag{13.2}$$

where $O(S_0, K, T - t_0 - \delta, \sigma_K)$ is the European option price valued at time $t_0$ off an initial asset value $S_0$, with a strike price $K$, a final expiration at time $T$, and priced using an “implied” standard deviation $\sigma_K$. The payoff of $\Pi$ is the same whether $O$ is a put or a
13.5. ESTIMATION METHODS WHEN THE PAYOFF IS CONVEX

call, owing to the delta-neutrality by hedging using a hedge ratio $\Delta_{S_0,t_0}$ (thanks to put-call parity, $\Delta_{S_0,t_0}$ is negative if $O$ is a call and positive otherwise). $\theta_{S_0,t_0}$ is the discrete change in value of the option over a time increment $\delta$ (changes of value for an option in the absence of changes in any other variable). With the increment $\delta = 1/252$, this would be a single business day. We assumed interest rate are 0, with no loss of generality (it would be equivalent of expressing the problem under a risk-neutral measure). What 13.2 did is re-express the Fokker-Plank-Kolmogorov differential equation (Black Scholes), in discrete terms, away from the limit of $\delta \to 0$. In the standard Black-Scholes World, the expectation of $\Pi(N,K)$ should be zero, as $N$ follows a Gaussian distribution with mean $-1/00082\sigma^2$. But we are not about the Black Scholes world and we need to examine payoffs to potential distributions. The use of $\sigma_K$ neutralizes the effect of “expensive” for the option as we will be using a multiple of $\sigma_K$ as $N$ standard deviations; if the option is priced at 15.87% volatility, then one standard deviation would correspond to a move of about 1%, $\exp[\sqrt{\frac{1}{252}}\times 1.587]$.

Clearly, for all $K$, $\Pi[0,K]=-1$, $\Pi[\sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}},K]=0$ close to expiration (the break-even of the option without time premium, or when $T-t_0=\delta$, takes place one mean deviation away), and $\Pi[1,K]=0$.

### 13.5.1 Convexity and Explosive Payoffs

Of concern to us is the explosive nonlinearity in the tails. Let us examine the payoff of $\Pi$ across many values of $K = S_0\exp^{\Lambda \sigma_K \sqrt{\delta}}$, in other words how many “sigmas” away from the money the strike is positioned. A package about 20 $\sigma$ out of the money, that is, $\Lambda=20$, the crash of 1987 would have returned 229,000 days of decay, compensating for $> 900$ years of wasting premium waiting for the result. An equivalent reasoning could be made for subprime loans. From this we can assert that we need a minimum of 900 years of data to start pronouncing these options 20 standard deviations out-of-the-money “expensive”, in order to match the frequency that would deliver a payoff, and, more than 2000 years of data to make conservative claims. Clearly as we can see with $\Lambda=0$, the payoff is so linear that there is no hidden tail effect.

![Figure 2: Returns for package $\Pi(N,K=S_0 \exp^{\Lambda \sigma_K \sqrt{\delta}})$ at values of $\Lambda=0,10,20$](image)
Figure 3: The extreme convexity of an extremely out of the money option, with $\Lambda=20$

Visibly the convexity is compounded by the fat-tailedness of the process: intuitively a convex transformation of a fat-tailed process, say a powerlaw, produces a powerlaw of considerably fatter tails. The Variance swap for instance results in $\frac{1}{2}$ the tail exponent of the distribution of the underlying security, so it would have infinite variance with tail $\frac{3}{2}$ off the “cubic” exponent discussed in the literature (Gabaix et al, 2003; Stanley et al, 2000) -and some out-of-the money options are more convex than variance swaps, producing tail equivalent of up to $\frac{1}{5}$ over a broad range of fluctuations.

For specific options there may not be an exact convex transformation. But we can get a Monte Carlo simulation illustrating the shape of the distribution and visually showing how skewed it is.

Fragility Heuristic and Nonlinear Exposure to Implied Volatility. Most of the losses from option portfolios tend to take place from the explosion of implied volatility,

\footnote{This convexity effect can be mitigated by some dynamic hedges, assuming no gaps but, because of “local time” for stochastic processes; in fact, some smaller deviations can carry the cost of larger ones:}
therefore acting as if the market had already experienced a tail event (say in 2008). The same result as Figure 3 can be seen for changes in implied volatility: an explosion of volatility by $5 \times$ results in a $10 \sigma$ option gaining $270 \times$ (the VIx went up $> 10 \times$ during 2008). (In a well publicized debacle, the speculator Niederhoffer went bust because of explosive changes in implied volatility in his option portfolio, not from market movement; further, the options that bankrupted his fund ended up expiring worthless weeks later).

The Taleb and Douady (2012)[63], Taleb Canetti et al (2012)[59] fragility heuristic identifies convexity to significant parameters as a metric to assess fragility to model error or representation: by theorem, model error maps directly to nonlinearity of parameters. The heuristic corresponds to the perturbation of a parameter, say the scale of a probability distribution and looks at the effect of the expected shortfall; the same theorem asserts that the asymmetry between gain and losses (convexity) maps directly to the exposure to model error and to fragility. The exercise allows us to re-express the idea of convexity of payoff by ranking effects.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\times 2 & \times 3 & \times 4 \\
ATM & 2 & 3 & 4 \\
\Lambda = 5 & 5 & 10 & 16 \\
\Lambda = 10 & 27 & 79 & 143 \\
\Lambda = 20 & 7686 & 72741 & 208429 \\
\end{array}
\]

*Table 13.1: The Table presents different results (in terms of multiples of option premia over intrinsic value) by multiplying implied volatility by 2, 3, 4. An option 5 conditional standard deviations out of the money gains 16 times its value when implied volatility is multiplied by 4. Further out of the money options gain exponentially. Note the linearity of at-the-money options*

### 13.5.2 Conclusion: The Asymmetry in Decision Making

To assert overpricing (or refute underpricing) of tail events expressed by convex instruments requires an extraordinary amount of “evidence”, a much longer time series about the process and strong assumptions about temporal homogeneity. Out of the money options are so convex to events that a single crash (say every 50, 100, 200, even 900 years) could be sufficient to justify skepticism about selling *some* of them (or avoiding to sell them) — those whose convexity matches the frequency of the rare event. The further out in the tails, the less claims one can make about their “value”, state of being “expensive”, etc. One can make claims on ”bounded” variables perhaps, not for the tails.


Mapping Fragility and Antifragility (Taleb Douady)

Chapter Summary 14: We provide a mathematical definition of fragility and antifragility as negative or positive sensitivity to a semi-measure of dispersion and volatility (a variant of negative or positive "vega") and examine the link to nonlinear effects. We integrate model error (and biases) into the fragile or antifragile context. Unlike risk, which is linked to psychological notions such as subjective preferences (hence cannot apply to a coffee cup) we offer a measure that is universal and concerns any object that has a probability distribution (whether such distribution is known or, critically, unknown). We propose a detection of fragility, robustness, and antifragility using a single "fast-and-frugal", model-free, probability free heuristic that also picks up exposure to model error. The heuristic lends itself to immediate implementation, and uncovers hidden risks related to company size, forecasting problems, and bank tail exposures (it explains the forecasting biases). While simple to implement, it improves on stress testing and bypasses the common flaws in Value-at-Risk.

14.1 Introduction

The notions of fragility and antifragility were introduced in Taleb (2012). In short, fragility is related to how a system suffers from the variability of its environment beyond...
a certain preset threshold (when threshold is $K$, it is called $K$-fragility), while antifragility refers to when it benefits from this variability—in a similar way to “vega” of an option or a nonlinear payoff, that is, its sensitivity to volatility or some similar measure of scale of a distribution.

Simply, a coffee cup on a table suffers more from large deviations than from the cumulative effect of some shocks—conditional on being unbroken, it has to suffer more from “tail” events than regular ones around the center of the distribution, the “at the money” category. This is the case of elements of nature that have survived: conditional on being in existence, then the class of events around the mean should matter considerably less than tail events, particularly when the probabilities decline faster than the inverse of the harm, which is the case of all used monomodal probability distributions. Further, what has exposure to tail events suffers from uncertainty; typically, when systems—a building, a bridge, a nuclear plant, an airplane, or a bank balance sheet—are made robust to a certain level of variability and stress but may fail or collapse if this level is exceeded, then they are particularly fragile to uncertainty about the distribution of the stressor, hence to model error, as this uncertainty increases the probability of dipping below the robustness level, bringing a higher probability of collapse. In the opposite case, the natural selection of an evolutionary process is particularly antifragile, indeed, a more volatile environment increases the survival rate of robust species and eliminates those whose superiority over other species is highly dependent on environmental parameters.

Figure 14.1 show the “tail vega” sensitivity of an object calculated discretely at two different lower absolute mean deviations. We use for the purpose of fragility and antifragility, in place of measures in $L^2$ such as standard deviations, which restrict the choice of probability distributions, the broader measure of absolute deviation, cut into two parts: lower and upper semi-deviation above the distribution center $\Omega$.

This article aims at providing a proper mathematical definition of fragility, robustness, and antifragility and examining how these apply to different cases where this notion is applicable.

**Intrinsic and Inherited Fragility:** Our definition of fragility is two-fold. First, of concern is the intrinsic fragility, the shape of the probability distribution of a variable and its sensitivity to $s^-$, a parameter controlling the left side of its own distribution. But we do not often directly observe the statistical distribution of objects, and, if we did, it would be difficult to measure their tail-vega sensitivity. Nor do we need to specify such distribution: we can gauge the response of a given object to the volatility of an external stressor that affects it. For instance, an option is usually analyzed with respect to the scale of the distribution of the “underlying” security, not its own; the fragility of a coffee cup is determined as a response to a given source of randomness or stress; that of a house with respect of, among other sources, the distribution of earthquakes. This fragility coming from the effect of the underlying is called inherited fragility. The transfer function, which we present next, allows us to assess the effect, increase or decrease in fragility, coming from changes in the underlying source of stress.

**Transfer Function:** A nonlinear exposure to a certain source of randomness maps into tail-vega sensitivity (hence fragility). We prove that

Inherited Fragility $\Leftrightarrow$ Concavity in exposure on the left side of the distribution
distribution and generate a fragility-detection heuristic covering both physical fragility and model error.

14.1.1 Fragility As Separate Risk From Psychological Preferences

Avoidance of the Psychological: We start from the definition of fragility as tail vega sensitivity, and end up with nonlinearity as a necessary attribute of the source of such fragility in the inherited case—a cause of the disease rather than the disease itself. However, there is a long literature by economists and decision scientists embedding risk into psychological preferences—historically, risk has been described as derived from risk aversion as a result of the structure of choices under uncertainty with a concavity of the muddled concept of “utility” of payoff, see Pratt (1964), Arrow (1965), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971). But this “utility” business never led anywhere except the circularity, expressed by Machina and Rothschild (2008), “risk is what risk-aversors hate.” Indeed limiting risk to aversion to concavity of choices is a quite unhappy result—the utility curve cannot be possibly monotone concave, but rather, like everything in nature necessarily bounded on both sides, the left and the right, convex-concave and, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have debunked, both path dependent and mixed in its nonlinearity.

Beyond Jensen’s Inequality: Furthermore, the economics and decision-theory literature reposes on the effect of Jensen’s inequality, an analysis which requires monotone convex or concave transformations—in fact limited to the expectation operator. The world is unfortunately more complicated in its nonlinearities. Thanks to the transfer function, which focuses on the tails, we can accommodate situations where the source is not merely convex, but convex-concave and any other form of mixed nonlinearities common in exposures, which includes nonlinear dose-response in biology. For instance, the application of the transfer function to the Kahneman-Tversky value function, convex in the negative domain and concave in the positive one, shows that its decreases fragility in the left tail (hence more robustness) and reduces the effect of the right tail as well (also more robustness), which allows to assert that we are psychologically “more robust” to changes in wealth than implied from the distribution of such wealth, which happens to be extremely fat-tailed.

Accordingly, our approach relies on nonlinearity of exposure as detection of the vega-sensitivity, not as a definition of fragility. And nonlinearity in a source of stress is necessarily associated with fragility. Clearly, a coffee cup, a house or a bridge don’t have psychological preferences, subjective utility, etc. Yet they are concave in their reaction to harm: simply, taking $z$ as a stress level and $\Pi(z)$ the harm function, it suffices to see that, with $n > 1$,

$$\Pi(nz) < n \Pi(z) \text{ for all } 0 < nz < Z^*$$

where $Z^*$ is the level (not necessarily specified) at which the item is broken. Such inequality leads to $\Pi(z)$ having a negative second derivative at the initial value $z$.

So if a coffee cup is less harmed by $n$ times a stressor of intensity $Z$ than once a stressor of $nZ$, then harm (as a negative function) needs to be concave to stressors up to the point of breaking; such stricture is imposed by the structure of survival probabilities and the distribution of harmful events, and has nothing to do with subjective utility or some other figments. Just as with dose-response relations, neither the risk to right
the damage of, say, jumping to the ground from thirty feet, then the person would be already dead from cumulative harm. Actually a simple computation shows that he would have expired within hours from touching objects or pacing in his living room, given the multitude of such stressors and their total effect. The fragility that comes from linearity is immediately visible, so we rule it out because the object would be already broken and the person already dead. The relative frequency of ordinary events compared to extreme events is the determinant. In the financial markets, there are at least ten thousand times more events of 0.1% deviations than events of 10%. There are close to 8,000 micro-earthquakes daily on planet earth, that is, those below 2 on the Richter scale—about 3 million a year. These are totally harmless, and, with 3 million per year, you would need them to be so. But shocks of intensity 6 and higher on the scale make the newspapers. Accordingly, we are necessarily immune to the cumulative effect of small deviations, or shocks of very small magnitude, which implies that these affect us disproportionally less (that is, nonlinearly less) than larger ones.

Model error is not necessarily mean preserving. \( s^- \), the lower absolute semi-deviation does not just express changes in overall dispersion in the distribution, such as for instance the “scaling” case, but also changes in the mean, i.e. when the upper semi-deviation from \( \Omega \) to infinity is invariant, or even decline in a compensatory manner to make the overall mean absolute deviation unchanged. This would be the case when we shift the distribution instead of rescaling it. Thus the same vega-sensitivity can also express sensitivity to a stressor (dose increase) in medicine or other fields in its effect on either tail. Thus \( s^-(l) \) will allow us to express the sensitivity to the “disorder cluster” (Taleb, 2012): i) uncertainty, ii) variability, iii) imperfect, incomplete knowledge, iv) chance, v) chaos, vi) volatility, vii) disorder, viii) entropy, ix) time, x) the unknown, xi) randomness, xii) turmoil, xiii) stressor, xiv) error, xv) dispersion of outcomes.

**Detection Heuristic**

Finally, thanks to the transfer function, this paper proposes a risk heuristic that "works" in detecting fragility even if we use the wrong model/pricing method/probability distribution. The main idea is that a wrong ruler will not measure the height of a child; but it can certainly tell us if he is growing. Since risks in the tails map to nonlinearities (concavity of exposure), second order effects reveal fragility, particularly in the tails where they map to large tail exposures, as revealed through perturbation analysis. More generally every nonlinear function will produce some kind of positive or negative exposures to volatility for some parts of the distribution.

### 14.1.2 Fragility and Model Error

As we saw this definition of fragility extends to model error, as some models produce negative sensitivity to uncertainty, in addition to effects and biases under variability. So, beyond physical fragility, the same approach measures model fragility, based on the difference between a point estimate and stochastic value (i.e., full distribution). Increasing the variability (say, variance) of the estimated value (but not the mean), may lead to one-sided effect on the model—just as an increase of volatility causes porcelain cups to break. Hence sensitivity to the volatility of such value, the “vega” of the model with respect to model error is different from the case of the mean. Features such as the
14.1. INTRODUCTION

Figure 14.2: Disproportionate effect of tail events on nonlinear exposures, illustrating the necessary character of the nonlinearity of the harm function and showing how we can extrapolate outside the model to probe unseen fragility.

the standard deviation, no longer used as point estimate, but as a distribution with its own variance. For instance, it can be shown how fat-tailed (e.g. power-law tailed) probability distributions can be expressed by simple nested perturbation and mixing of Gaussian ones. Such a representation pinpoints the fragility of a wrong probability model and its consequences in terms of underestimation of risks, stress tests and similar matters.

14.1.3 Antifragility

It is not quite the mirror image of fragility, as it implies positive vega above some threshold in the positive tail of the distribution and absence of fragility in the left tail, which leads to a distribution that is skewed right.

Fragility and Transfer Theorems

Table 14.1 introduces the Exhaustive Taxonomy of all Possible Payoffs $y=f(x)$

The central Table, Table 1 introduces the exhaustive map of possible outcomes, with 4 mutually exclusive categories of payoffs. Our steps in the rest of the paper are as follows: a. We provide a mathematical definition of fragility, robustness and antifragility. b. We present the problem of measuring tail risks and show the presence of severe biases attending the estimation of small probability and its nonlinearity (convexity) to parametric (and other) perturbations. c. We express the concept of model fragility in terms of left tail exposure, and show correspondence to the concavity of the payoff from a random variable. d. Finally, we present our simple heuristic to detect the possibility of both fragility and model error across a broad range of probabilistic estimations.

Conceptually, fragility resides in the fact that small uncontrolled inputs lead to large changes in the function’s output.
result of a given stress test, or on some measure that depends on the left tail of the distribution, such as an out-of-the-money option. This hypersensitivity of what we like to call an “out of the money put price” to the macro-parameter, which is some measure of the volatility of the distribution of the underlying source of randomness.

Formally, fragility is defined as the sensitivity of the left-tail shortfall (non-conditioned by probability) below a certain threshold $K$ to the overall left semi-deviation of the distribution.

**Examples**

i- A porcelain coffee cup subjected to random daily stressors from use.
ii- Tail distribution in the function of the arrival time of an aircraft.
iii- Hidden risks of famine to a population subjected to monoculture —or, more generally, fragilizing errors in the application of Ricardo’s comparative advantage without taking into account second order effects.
iv- Hidden tail exposures to budget deficits’ nonlinearity to unemployment.
v- Hidden tail exposure from dependence on a source of energy, etc. (“squeezability argument”).

### 14.1.4 Tail Vega Sensitivity

We construct a measure of “vega” in the tails of the distribution that depends on the variations of semi-deviation below certain threshold $W$, chosen in $L_1$ norm in order to ensure its existence under “fat tailed” distributions with finite first semi-moment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Left Tail (Loss Domain)</th>
<th>Right Tail (Gain Domain)</th>
<th>Nonlinear Payoff Function $y = f(x)$ &quot;derivative&quot; where $x$ is a random variable</th>
<th>Derivatives Equivalent (Taleb, 1997)</th>
<th>Effect of fat-tailedness of $f(x)$ compared to primitive $x$.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>Fragile (type 1)</td>
<td>Fat (regular or absorbing barrier)</td>
<td>Fat</td>
<td>Mixed concave left, convex right (fence)</td>
<td>Long up-vega, short down-vega</td>
<td>More fragility if absorbing barrier, neutral otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>Fragile (type 2)</td>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Concave</td>
<td>Short vega</td>
<td>More fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>Robust</td>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Mixed convex left, concave right (digital, sigmoid)</td>
<td>Short up-vega, long down-vega</td>
<td>No effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 4</td>
<td>Antifragile</td>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Fat (thicker than left)</td>
<td>Convex</td>
<td>Long vega</td>
<td>More antifragility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In fact $s$ would exist as a measure even in the case of infinite moments to the right side of $W$.

Let $X$ be a random variable, the distribution of which is one among a one-parameter family of pdf $f_\lambda$, $\lambda \in \mathbb{I} \subset \mathbb{R}$. We consider a fixed reference value $\Omega$ and, from this reference, the left-semi-absolute deviation:

$$s^-(\lambda) = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} (\Omega - x) f_\lambda(x) \, dx$$

We assume that $\lambda \to s^-(\lambda)$ is continuous, strictly increasing and spans the whole range $\mathbb{R}_+ = [0, +\infty)$, so that we may use the left-semi-absolute deviation $s^-$ as a parameter by considering the inverse function $\lambda(s) : \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{I}$, defined by $s^-(\lambda(s)) = s$ for $s \in \mathbb{R}_+$.

This condition is for instance satisfied if, for any given $x < \Omega$, the probability is a continuous and increasing function of $s$. Indeed, denoting $F_\lambda(x) = \mathbb{P}(X < x) = \int_{-\infty}^{x} f_\lambda(t) \, dt$,

an integration by part yields:

$$s^-(\lambda) = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} f_\lambda(x) \, dx$$

This is the case when $\lambda$ is a scaling parameter, i.e., $X \sim \Omega + \lambda(X_1 - \Omega)$ indeed one has in this case

$$F_\lambda(x) = F_1 \left( \Omega + \frac{x - \Omega}{\lambda} \right),$$

$$\frac{\partial F_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(x) = \frac{\Omega-x}{\lambda} f_\lambda(x) \text{ and } s^-(\lambda) = \lambda s^-(1).$$

It is also the case when $\lambda$ is a shifting parameter, i.e. $X \sim X_0 - \lambda$, indeed, in this case $F_\lambda(x) = F_0(x + \lambda)$ and $\frac{\partial s^-}{\partial \lambda}(x) = F_\lambda(\Omega)$.

For $K < \Omega$ and $s \in \mathbb{R}_+$, let:

$$\xi(K, s^-) = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} (\Omega - x) f_{\lambda(s^-)}(x) \, dx$$

In particular, $\xi(\Omega, s^-) = s^-$. We assume, in a first step, that the function $\xi(K, s^-)$ is differentiable on $(-\infty, \Omega] \times \mathbb{R}_+$. The $K$-left-tail-vega sensitivity of $X$ at stress level $K < \Omega$ and deviation level $s^- > 0$ for the pdf $f_\lambda$ is:

$$V(X, f_\lambda, K, s^-) = \frac{\partial \xi}{\partial s^-}(K, s^-) = \left( \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} (\Omega - x) \frac{\partial f_\lambda}{\partial \lambda} \, dx \right) \left( \frac{ds^-}{d\lambda} \right)^{-1} \tag{14.1}$$

As the in many practical instances where threshold effects are involved, it may occur that $\xi$ does not depend smoothly on $s^-$. We therefore also define a finite difference version of the vega-sensitivity as follows:

$$V(X, f_\lambda, K, s^-) = \frac{1}{\Delta s} \left( \xi(K, s^- + \Delta s) - \xi(K, s^- - \Delta s) \right)$$
\[
\int_{-\infty}^{K} (\Omega - x) \frac{f_{\lambda}(s^- + \Delta s)(x) - f_{\lambda}(s^- - \Delta s)(x)}{2\Delta s} \, dx
\]

Hence omitting the input \( \Delta s \) implicitly assumes that \( \Delta s \to 0 \).

Note that \( \xi(K, s^-) = -\mathbb{E}(X|X < K) \mathbb{P}_{f_{\lambda}}(X < K) \). It can be decomposed into two parts:

\[
\xi(K, s^-) = (\Omega - K)F_{\lambda}(K) + P_{\lambda}(K)
\]

\[
P_{\lambda}(K) = \int_{-\infty}^{K} (K - x)f_{\lambda}(x) \, dx
\]

Where the first part \((\Omega - K)F_{\lambda}(K)\) is proportional to the probability of the variable being below the stress level \( K \) and the second part \( P_{\lambda}(K) \) is the expectation of the amount by which \( X \) is below \( K \) (counting 0 when it is not). Making a parallel with financial options, while \( s^- \) is a “put-at-the-money”, \( \xi(K, s^-) \) is the sum of a put struck at \( K \) and a digital put also struck at \( K \) with amount \( \Omega - K \); it can equivalently be seen as a put struck at \( \Omega \) with a down-and-in European barrier at \( K \).

Letting \( \lambda = \lambda(s^-) \) and integrating by part yields

\[
\xi(K, s^-) = (\Omega - K)F_{\lambda}(K) + \int_{-\infty}^{K} F_{\lambda}(x) \, dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} F_{\lambda}^{K}(x) \, dx
\]  

Where \( F_{\lambda}^{K}(x) = F_{\lambda}(\min(x, K)) = \min(F_{\lambda}(x), F_{\lambda}(K)) \), so that

\[
V(X, f_{\lambda}, K, s^-) = \frac{\partial \xi}{\partial s}(K, s^-)
\]

\[
= \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{\lambda}^{K}}{\partial \lambda}(x) \, dx \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{\lambda}}{\partial \lambda}(x) \, dx
\]

For finite differences

\[
V(X, f_{\lambda}, K, s^-, \Delta s) = \frac{1}{2\Delta s} \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \Delta F_{\lambda, \Delta s}^{K}(x) \, dx
\]

Where \( \lambda_{s}^{+} \) and \( \lambda_{s}^{-} \) are such that \( s(\lambda_{s}^{+}) = s^- + \Delta s, s(\lambda_{s}^{-}) = s^- - \Delta s \) and \( \Delta F_{\lambda, \Delta s}^{K}(x) = F_{\lambda, \Delta s}^{K}(x) - F_{\lambda, \Delta s}^{K}(x) \).
Table 14.2: The different curves of $F_\lambda(K)$ and $F'_\lambda(K)$ showing the difference in sensitivity to changes in at different levels of $K$.

14.2 Mathematical Expression of Fragility

In essence, fragility is the sensitivity of a given risk measure to an error in the estimation of the (possibly one-sided) deviation parameter of a distribution, especially due to the fact that the risk measure involves parts of the distribution – tails – that are away from the portion used for estimation. The risk measure then assumes certain extrapolation rules that have first order consequences. These consequences are even more amplified when the risk measure applies to a variable that is derived from that used for estimation, when the relation between the two variables is strongly nonlinear, as is often the case.

14.2.1 Definition of Fragility: The Intrinsic Case

The local fragility of a random variable $X_\lambda$ depending on parameter $\lambda$, at stress level $K$ and semi-deviation level $s^- (\lambda)$ with pdf $f_\lambda$ is its $K$-left-tailed semi-vega sensitivity $V(X, f_\lambda, K, s^-)$.

The finite-difference fragility of $X_\lambda$ at stress level $K$ and semi-deviation level $s^- (\lambda) \pm \Delta s$ with pdf $f_\lambda$ is its $K$-left-tailed finite-difference semi-vega sensitivity $V(X, f_\lambda, K, s^-, \Delta s)$. In this definition, the fragility relies in the unsaid assumptions made when extrapolating the distribution of $X_\lambda$ from areas used to estimate the semi-absolute deviation $s^-(\lambda)$. 
14.2.2 Definition of Fragility: The Inherited Case

Next we consider the particular case where a random variable \( Y = \varphi(X) \) depends on another source of risk \( X \), itself subject to a parameter \( \lambda \). Let us keep the above notations for \( X \), while we denote by \( g_\lambda \) the pdf of \( Y, \Omega_Y = \varphi(\Omega) \) and \( u^-(\lambda) \) the left-semi-deviation of \( Y \). Given a “strike” level \( L = \varphi(K) \), let us define, as in the case of \( X \):

\[
\zeta(L, u^-(\lambda)) = \int_{-\infty}^{K} (\Omega_Y - y) g_\lambda(y) \, dy
\]

The inherited fragility of \( Y \) with respect to \( X \) at stress level \( L = \varphi(K) \) and left-semi-deviation level \( s^-(\lambda) \) of \( X \) is the partial derivative:

\[
V_X(Y, g_\lambda, L, s^-(\lambda)) = \frac{\partial \zeta}{\partial s}(L, u^-(\lambda)) = \\
\left( \int_{-\infty}^{K} (\Omega_Y - Y) \frac{\partial g_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(y) \, dy \right) \left( \frac{ds^-}{d\lambda} \right)^{-1} (14.4)
\]

Note that the stress level and the pdf are defined for the variable \( Y \), but the parameter which is used for differentiation is the left-semi-absolute deviation of \( X \), \( s^-(\lambda) \). Indeed, in this process, one first measures the distribution of \( X \) and its left-semi-absolute deviation, then the function \( \varphi \) is applied, using some mathematical model of \( Y \) with respect to \( X \) and the risk measure \( \zeta \) is estimated. If an error is made when measuring \( s^-(\lambda) \), its impact on the risk measure of \( Y \) is amplified by the ratio given by the “inherited fragility”.

Once again, one may use finite differences and define the finite-difference inherited fragility of \( Y \) with respect to \( X \), by replacing, in the above equation, differentiation by finite differences between values \( \lambda^+ \) and \( \lambda^- \), where \( s^-(\lambda^+) = s^- + \Delta s \) and \( s^-(\lambda^-) = s^- - \Delta s \).

14.3 Implications of a Nonlinear Change of Variable on the Intrinsic Fragility

Let us study the case of a random variable \( Y = \varphi(X) \); the pdf \( g_\lambda \) of which also depends on parameter \( \lambda \), related to a variable \( X \) by the nonlinear function \( \varphi \). We are now interested in comparing their intrinsic fragilities. We shall say, for instance, that \( Y \) is more fragile at the stress level \( L \) and left-semi-deviation level \( u^-(\lambda) \) than the random variable \( X \), at stress level \( K \) and left-semi-deviation level \( s^-(\lambda) \) if the \( L \)-left-tailed semi-vega sensitivity of \( Y_\lambda \) is higher than the \( K \)-left-tailed semi-vega sensitivity of \( X_\lambda \):

\[
V(Y, g_\lambda, L, \mu^-) > V(X, f_\lambda, K, s^-)
\]

One may use finite differences to compare the fragility of two random variables: \( V(Y, g_\lambda, L, \Delta \mu) > V(X, f_\lambda, K, \Delta s) \). In this case, finite variations must be comparable in size, namely \( \Delta u^-/u^- = \Delta s/s^- \).

Let us assume, to start, that \( \varphi \) is differentiable, strictly increasing and scaled so that \( \Omega_Y = \varphi(\Omega) = \Omega \). We also assume that, for any given \( x < \Omega \), \( \frac{\partial F_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(x) > 0 \).
14.3. IMPLICATIONS OF A NONLINEAR CHANGE OF VARIABLE ON THE INTRINSIC FRAGILITY

\[ G_{\lambda} (\phi(x)) = P_{g\lambda} (Y < \phi(y)) = P_{f\lambda} (X < x) = F_{\lambda}(x). \]

Hence, if \( \zeta(L, u^-) \) denotes the equivalent of \( \xi(K, s^-) \) with variable \( (Y, g\lambda) \) instead of \( (X, f\lambda) \), we have:

\[ \zeta (L, u^- (\lambda)) = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} F_{\lambda}^K (x) \frac{d\phi}{dx}(x) dx \]

Because \( \varphi \) is increasing and \( \min(\varphi(x), \varphi(K)) = \varphi(\min(x, K)) \). In particular

\[ \mu^- (\lambda) = \zeta (\Omega, \mu^- (\lambda)) = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} F_{\lambda}^K (x) \frac{d\phi}{dx}(x) dx \]

The \( L \)-left-tail-vega sensitivity of \( Y \) is therefore:

\[ V (Y, g\lambda, L, u^- (\lambda)) = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{\lambda}^K}{\partial \lambda} (x) \frac{d\phi}{dx}(x) dx}{\int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{\lambda}}{\partial \lambda} (x) \frac{d\phi}{dx}(x) dx} \]

For finite variations:

\[ V(Y, g\lambda, L, u^- (\lambda), \Delta u) = \frac{1}{2\Delta u} \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \Delta F_{\lambda, \Delta u}^K (x) \frac{d\phi}{dx}(x) dx \]

Where \( \lambda^+_{u^-} \) and \( \lambda^-_{u^-} \) are such that \( u(\lambda^+_{u^-}) = u^- + \Delta u \), \( u(\lambda^-_{u^-}) = u^- - \Delta u \) and \( F_{\lambda, \Delta u}^K (x) = F_{\lambda^+_{u^-}}^K (x) - F_{\lambda^-_{u^-}}^K (x) \).

Next, Theorem 1 proves how a concave transformation \( \varphi(x) \) of a random variable \( x \) produces fragility.

**Theorem 1 (Fragility Transfer Theorem)**

*Let, with the above notations, \( \varphi : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) be a twice differentiable function such that \( \varphi(\Omega) = \Omega \) and for any \( x < \Omega \), \( \frac{d\varphi}{dx}(x) > 0 \). The random variable \( Y = \varphi(X) \) is more fragile at level \( L = \varphi(K) \) and pdf \( g\lambda \) than \( X \) at level \( K \) and pdf \( f\lambda \) if, and only if, one has:*

\[ \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} H_{\lambda}^K (x) \frac{d^2 \varphi}{dx^2} (x) dx < 0 \]

*Where*

\[ H_{\lambda}^K (x) = \frac{\partial P_{\lambda}^K}{\partial \lambda} (x) \frac{\partial P_{\lambda}^K (\Omega)}{\partial \lambda} - \frac{\partial P_{\lambda} (x)}{\partial \lambda} \frac{\partial P_{\lambda} (\Omega)}{\partial \lambda} \]

*and where*

\[ P_{\lambda} (x) = \int_{-\infty}^{x} F_{\lambda}(t) dt \]

*is the price of the “put option” on \( X\lambda \) with “strike” \( x \) and*
is that of a “put option” with “strike” $x$ and “European down-and-in barrier” at $K$.

$H$ can be seen as a transfer function, expressed as the difference between two ratios. For a given level $x$ of the random variable on the left hand side of $\Omega$, the second one is the ratio of the vega of a put struck at $x$ normalized by that of a put “at the money” (i.e. struck at $\Omega$), while the first one is the same ratio, but where puts struck at $x$ and $\Omega$ are “European down-and-in options” with triggering barrier at the level $K$.

**Proof**

Let $I_{X,\lambda} = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{X,\lambda}}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx$, $I_{X,\lambda}^K = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{X,\lambda}^K}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx$, and $I_{Y,\lambda} = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{Y,\lambda}}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx$. One has $V(X, f_{\lambda}, K, s^-(\lambda)) = \frac{I_{K,\lambda}^Y}{I_{X,\lambda}}$ and $V(Y, g_{\lambda}, L, u^-(\lambda)) = \frac{I_{L,\lambda}^Y}{I_{Y,\lambda}}$ hence:

$$V(Y, g_{\lambda}, L, u^-(\lambda)) - V(X, f_{\lambda}, K, s^-(\lambda)) = \frac{I_{Y,\lambda}^L}{I_{X,\lambda}} - \frac{I_{Y,\lambda}}{I_{X,\lambda}}.$$

On the other hand, we have $I_{X,\lambda} = \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(\Omega)I_{X,\lambda}^K = \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(\Omega)$and

$$I_{Y,\lambda} = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{\lambda}}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx = \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} \left[ \frac{dF_{\lambda}}{dx}(\Omega) - \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx \right].$$

(14.6)

$$I_{Y,\lambda} = \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial F_{\lambda}}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx$$

$$= \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} \left[ \frac{dF_{\lambda}}{dx}(\Omega) - \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx \right].$$

(14.7)

An elementary calculation yields:

$$\frac{I_{Y,\lambda}^L}{I_{X,\lambda}^K} - \frac{I_{Y,\lambda}}{I_{X,\lambda}}$$

$$= - \left( \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(\Omega) \right)^{-1} \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx$$

$$+ \left( \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(\Omega) \right)^{-1} \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx$$

$$= - \int_{-\infty}^{\Omega} H_{\lambda}^K(x)\,dx. (14.8)$$

Let us now examine the properties of the function $H_{\lambda}^K(x)$. For $x < K$, we have $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda}(x) = -
14.3. IMPLICATIONS OF A NONLINEAR CHANGE OF VARIABLE ON THE INTRINSIC FRAGILITY

Figure 14.3: The Transfer function $H$ for different portions of the distribution: its sign flips in the region slightly below $\Omega$

same sign as

$$\frac{\partial P_\lambda(\Omega)}{\partial \lambda} - \frac{\partial P^K_\lambda(\Omega)}{\partial \lambda}.$$

As this is a strict inequality, it extends to an interval on the right hand side of $K$, say $(\infty, K]$ with $K < K < \infty$. But on the other hand:

$$\frac{\partial P_\lambda(\Omega)}{\partial \lambda} - \frac{\partial P^K_\lambda(\Omega)}{\partial \lambda} = \int_K^\Omega \frac{\partial F_\lambda(x)}{\partial \lambda} dx - (\Omega - K) \frac{\partial F_\lambda(K)}{\partial \lambda}.$$

For $K$ negative enough, $\frac{\partial F_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(K)$ is smaller than its average value over the interval $[K, \Omega]$, hence

$$\frac{\partial P_\lambda(\Omega)}{\partial \lambda} - \frac{\partial P^K_\lambda(\Omega)}{\partial \lambda} > 0.$$

We have proven the following theorem.

**Theorem 2 (Fragility Exacerbation Theorem)**

*With the above notations, there exists a threshold $\Theta_\lambda < \Omega$ such that, if $K \leq \Theta_\lambda$ then $H^K_\lambda(x) > 0$ for $x \in (-\infty, \kappa_\lambda]$ with $K < \kappa_\lambda$ and $\partial \lambda < \Omega$. As a consequence, if the change of variable $\varphi$ is concave on $(-\infty, \kappa_\lambda]$ and linear on $[\kappa_\lambda, \Omega]$, then $Y$ is more fragile at $L = \varphi(K)$ than $X$ at $K$.*

One can prove that, for a monomodal distribution, $\Theta_\lambda < \kappa_\lambda < \Omega$ (see discussion below), so whatever the stress level $K$ below the threshold $\Theta_\lambda$, it suffices that the change of variable $\varphi$ be concave on the interval $(-\infty, \Theta_\lambda]$ and linear on $[\Theta_\lambda, \Omega]$ for $Y$ to become more fragile at $L$ than $X$ at $K$. In practice, as long as the change of variable is concave around the stress level $K$ and has limited convexity/concavity away from $K$, the fragility of $Y$ is greater than that of $X$.

Figure 14.3 shows the shape of $H^K_\lambda(x)$ in the case of a Gaussian distribution where $\lambda$ is a simple scaling parameter ($\lambda$ is the standard deviation $\sigma$) and $\Omega = 0$. We represented $K = -2\lambda$ while in this Gaussian case, $\Theta_\lambda = -1.585\lambda$. **Discussion**

**Monomodal case**

We say that the family of distributions $(f_\lambda)$ is *left-monomodal* if there exists $K_\lambda < \Omega$ such that $\frac{\partial f_\lambda}{\partial \lambda} \geq 0$ on $(-\infty, \kappa_\lambda]$ and $\frac{\partial f_\lambda}{\partial \lambda} \leq 0$ on $[\kappa_\lambda, \Omega]$. In this case $\frac{\partial P_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}$ is a convex function on the left half-line $(-\infty, \mu_\lambda]$, then concave after the inflexion point $\mu_\lambda$. For $K \leq \mu_\lambda$, the function $\frac{\partial P^K_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}$ coincides with $\frac{\partial P_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}$ on $(-\infty, K]$, then is a linear extension, following the tangent to the graph of $\frac{\partial P_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}$ in $K$ (see graph below). The value of $\frac{\partial P^K_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(\Omega)$ corresponds to the intersection point of this tangent with the vertical axis $Y$.
\( \Theta \lambda \) corresponds to the unique value of \( K \) such that \( \frac{\partial P^K}{\partial \lambda} (\Omega) = \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} (\Omega) \). When \( K < \Theta \lambda \) then \( G_\lambda(x) = \frac{\partial P^K}{\partial \lambda} (x) / \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} (\Omega) \) and \( G^K_\lambda(x) = \frac{\partial P^K}{\partial \lambda} (x) / \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} (\Omega) \) are functions such that \( G_\lambda(\Omega) = G^K_\lambda(\Omega) = 1 \) and which are proportional for \( x \leq K \), the latter being linear on \([K, \Omega]\). On the other hand, if \( K < \Theta \lambda \) then \( \frac{\partial P^K}{\partial \lambda} (\Omega) < \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda} (\Omega) \) and \( G_\lambda(K) < G^K_\lambda(K) \), which implies that \( G_\lambda(x) < G^K_\lambda(x) \) for \( x \leq K \). An elementary convexity analysis shows that, in this case, the equation \( G_\lambda(x) = G^K_\lambda(x) \) has a unique solution \( \kappa \lambda \) with \( \mu_1 \lambda < \kappa \lambda < \Omega \). The “transfer” function \( H^K_\lambda(x) \) is positive for \( x < \kappa \lambda \), in particular when \( x \leq \mu \lambda \) and negative for \( \kappa \lambda < x < \Omega \).

**Scaling Parameter**

We assume here that \( \lambda \) is a scaling parameter, i.e., \( X_\lambda = \Omega + \lambda (X_1 - \Omega) \). In this case, as we saw above, we have \( f_\lambda(x) = \frac{1}{\lambda} f_1 (\Omega + \frac{x-\Omega}{\lambda}) \), \( F_\lambda(x) = F_1 (\Omega + \frac{x-\Omega}{\lambda}) \), \( P_\lambda(x) = \lambda P_1 (\Omega + \frac{x-\Omega}{\lambda}) \) and \( s(\lambda) = \lambda s^-(1) \). Hence

\[
\xi(K, s^-(\lambda)) = (\Omega - K) F_1 \left( \Omega + \frac{K-\Omega}{\lambda} \right) + \lambda P_1 \left( \Omega + \frac{K-\Omega}{\lambda} \right)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \xi}{\partial s^-}(K, s^-) = \frac{1}{s^-(1)} \frac{\partial \xi}{\partial \lambda}(K, \lambda)
\]
When we apply a nonlinear transformation \( \varphi \), the action of the parameter \( \lambda \) is no longer a scaling: when small negative values of \( X \) are multiplied by a scalar \( \lambda \), so are large negative values of \( X \). The scaling \( \lambda \) applies to small negative values of the transformed variable \( Y \) with a coefficient \( \frac{d\varphi}{dx}(0) \), but large negative values are subject to a different coefficient \( \frac{d\varphi}{dx}(K) \), which can potentially be very different.

### 14.4 Fragility Drift

Fragility is defined as the sensitivity – i.e. the first partial derivative – of the tail estimate \( \xi \) with respect to the left semi-deviation \( s^- \). Let us now define the fragility drift:

\[
V'_K(X,\lambda,K,s^-) = \frac{\partial^2 \xi}{\partial K \partial s^-}(K,s^-)
\]

In practice, fragility always occurs as the result of fragility, indeed, by definition, we know that \( \xi(\Omega, s^-) = s^- \), hence \( V(X,\lambda,\Omega, s^-) = 1 \). The fragility drift measures the speed at which fragility departs from its original value 1 when \( K \) departs from the center \( \Omega \).

**Second-order Fragility**

The second-order fragility is the second order derivative of the tail estimate \( \xi \) with respect to the semi-absolute deviation \( s^- \):

\[
V''_{s^-}(X,\lambda,K,s^-) = \frac{\partial^2 \xi}{(\partial s^-)^2}(K,s^-)
\]

As we shall see later, the second-order fragility drives the bias in the estimation of stress tests when the value of \( s^- \) is subject to uncertainty, through Jensen’s inequality.

### 14.5 Definitions of Robustness and Antifragility

Antifragility is not the simple opposite of fragility, as we saw in Table 1. Measuring antifragility, on the one hand, consists of the flipside of fragility on the right-hand side, but on the other hand requires a control on the robustness of the probability distribution on the left-hand side. From that aspect, unlike fragility, antifragility cannot be summarized in one single figure but necessitates at least two of them.

When a random variable depends on another source of randomness: \( Y\lambda = \varphi(X\lambda) \), we shall study the antifragility of \( Y\lambda \) with respect to that of \( X\lambda \) and to the properties of the function \( \varphi \).

**Definition of Robustness**

Let \( (X) \) be a parametric family of random variables with pdf \( f \). Robustness is...
We say that \( f \lambda \) is \( b \)-robust beyond stress level \( K < \Omega \) if \( V(X\lambda, f\lambda, K', s(\lambda)) \leq b \) for any \( K' \leq K \). In other words, the robustness of \( f\lambda \) on the half-line \((-\infty, K]\) is
\[
R_{(-\infty, K]}(X\lambda, f\lambda, K, s^-(\lambda)) = \max_{K' \leq K} V(X\lambda, f\lambda, K', s^-(\lambda)),
\]
so that \( b \)-robustness simply means
\[
R_{(-\infty, K]}(X\lambda, f\lambda, K, s^-(\lambda)) \leq b.
\]

We also define \( b \)-robustness over a given interval \([K1, K2]\) by the same inequality being valid for any \( K' \in [K1, K2] \). In this case we use
\[
R_{[K1, K2]}(X\lambda, f\lambda, K, s^-(\lambda)) = \max_{K_1 \leq K' \leq K_2} V(X\lambda, f\lambda, K', s^-(\lambda)).
\]

Note that the lower \( R \), the tighter the control and the more robust the distribution \( f\lambda \).

Once again, the definition of \( b \)-robustness can be transposed, using finite differences \( V(X\lambda, f\lambda, K', s^-) \Delta s \).

In practical situations, setting a material upper bound \( b \) to the fragility is particularly important: one need to be able to come with actual estimates of the impact of the error on the estimate of the left-semi-deviation. However, when dealing with certain class of models, such as Gaussian, exponential of stable distributions, we may be lead to consider asymptotic definitions of robustness, related to certain classes.

For instance, for a given decay exponent \( a > 0 \), assuming that \( f\lambda(x) = O(e^{ax}) \) when \( x \to -\infty \), the \( a \)-exponential asymptotic robustness of \( X\lambda \) below the level \( K \) is:
\[
R_{\text{exp}}(X\lambda, f\lambda, K, s^-) = \max_{K' \leq K} \bigg( e^{a(\Omega - K')} V(X\lambda, f\lambda, K', s^-) \bigg)
\]

If one of the two quantities
\[
e^{a(\Omega - K')} f\lambda(K')
\]
or
\[
e^{a(\Omega - K')} V(X\lambda, f\lambda, K', s^-)
\]
is not bounded from above when \( K/[2032?] \to -\infty \), then \( R_{\text{exp}} = +\infty \) and \( X\lambda \) is considered as not \( a \)-exponentially robust.

Similarly, for a given power \( \alpha > 0 \), and assuming that \( f\lambda(x) = O(x^{-\alpha}) \) when \( x \to -\infty \), the \( \alpha \)-power asymptotic robustness of \( X\lambda \) below the level \( K \) is:
\[
R_{\text{pow}}(X\lambda, f\lambda, K, s^-) = \max_{K' \leq K} \bigg( (\Omega - K')^{\alpha - 2} V(X\lambda, f\lambda, K', s^-) \bigg)
\]

If one of the two quantities
\[(\Omega - K')^{\alpha} f\lambda(K')
\]
\[(\Omega - K')^{\alpha - 2} V(X\lambda, f\lambda, K', s^-)
\]
is not bounded from above when \( K/[2032?] \to -\infty \), then \( R_{\text{pow}} = +\infty \) and \( X\lambda \) is considered as not \( \alpha \)-power robust. Note the exponent \( \alpha - 2 \) used with the fragility, for homogeneity reasons, e.g., in the case of stable distributions.
14.5. Definitions of Robustness and Antifragility

**Definition 2a, Left-Robustness (monomodal distribution).** A payoff \( y = \varphi(x) \) is said \((a,b)\)-robust below \( L = \varphi(K) \) for a source of randomness \( X \) with pdf \( f_\lambda \) assumed monomodal if, letting \( g_\lambda \) be the pdf of \( Y = \varphi(X) \), one has, for any \( K' \leq K \) and \( L = \varphi(K) \):

\[
V_X (Y, g_\lambda, L', s^-(\lambda)) \leq aV (X, f_\lambda, K', s^-(\lambda)) + b
\]

The quantity \( b \) is of order deemed of “negligible utility” (subjectively), that is, does not exceed some tolerance level in relation with the context, while \( a \) is a scaling parameter between variables \( X \) and \( Y \).

Note that robustness is in effect impervious to changes of probability distributions. Also note that this measure robustness ignores first order variations since owing to their higher frequency, these are detected (and remedied) very early on.

**Example of Robustness (Barbells):**

a. trial and error with bounded error and open payoff

b. for a "barbell portfolio" with allocation to numeraire securities up to 80% of portfolio, no perturbation below \( K \) set at 0.8 of valuation will represent any difference in result, i.e. \( q = 0 \). The same for an insured house (assuming the risk of the insurance company is not a source of variation), no perturbation for the value below \( K \), equal to minus the insurance deductible, will result in significant changes.

c. a bet of amount \( B \) (limited liability) is robust, as it does not have any sensitivity to perturbations below 0.

### 14.5.1 Definition of Antifragility

The second condition of antifragility regards the right hand side of the distribution. Let us define the right-semi-deviation of \( X \):

\[
s^+(\lambda) = \int_{\Omega}^{+\infty} (x - \Omega)f_\lambda(x)\,dx
\]

And, for \( H > L > \Omega \):

\[
\xi^+(L, H, s^+(\lambda)) = \int_{L}^{H} (x - \Omega)f_\lambda(x)\,dx
\]

\[
W(X, f_\lambda, L, H, s^+) = \frac{\partial \xi^+(L, H, s^+)}{\partial s^+}
\]

\[
= \left( \int_{L}^{H} (x - \Omega)\frac{\partial f_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx \right) \left( \int_{\Omega}^{+\infty} (x - \Omega)\frac{\partial f_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx \right)^{-1}
\]

When \( Y = \varphi(X) \) is a variable depending on a source of noise \( X \), we define:

\[
W_X (Y, g_\lambda, \varphi(L), \varphi(H), s^+) = \left( \int_{\varphi(L)}^{\varphi(H)} (y - \varphi(\Omega))\frac{\partial g_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(y)\,dy \right) \left( \int_{\Omega}^{+\infty} (x - \Omega)\frac{\partial f_\lambda}{\partial \lambda}(x)\,dx \right)^{-1}
\]
1. It is \( b \)-robust below \( \Omega \) for some \( b > 0 \)

2. \( W_X (Y, g, \varphi(L), \varphi(H), s^+(\lambda)) \geq aW (X, f, L, H, s^+(\lambda)) \) where \( a = \frac{u^+(\lambda)}{s^+(\lambda)} \)

The scaling constant \( a \) provides homogeneity in the case where the relation between \( X \) and \( Y \) is linear. In particular, nonlinearity in the relation between \( X \) and \( Y \) impacts robustness.

The second condition can be replaced with finite differences \( \Delta u \) and \( \Delta s \), as long as \( \Delta u/u = \Delta s/s \).

REMARKS

**Fragility is \( K \)-specific.** We are only concerned with adverse events below a certain pre-specified level, the breaking point. Exposures \( A \) can be more fragile than exposure \( B \) for \( K = 0 \), and much less fragile if \( K \) is, say, 4 mean deviations below 0. We may need to use finite \( Ds \) to avoid situations as we will see of vega-neutrality coupled with short left tail.

**Effect of using the wrong distribution \( f \):** Comparing \( V(X, f, K, s^{-}, Ds) \) and the alternative distribution \( V(X, f^*, K, s^*, Ds) \), where \( f^* \) is the “true” distribution, the measure of fragility provides an acceptable indication of the sensitivity of a given outcome – such as a risk measure – to model error, provided no “paradoxical effects” perturb the situation. Such “paradoxical effects” are, for instance, a change in the direction in which certain distribution percentiles react to model parameters, like \( s^{-} \). It is indeed possible that nonlinearity appears between the core part of the distribution and the tails such that when \( s^{-} \) increases, the left tail starts fattening – giving a large measured fragility – then steps back – implying that the real fragility is lower than the measured one. The opposite may also happen, implying a dangerous under-estimate of the fragility. These nonlinear effects can stay under control provided one makes some regularity assumptions on the actual distribution, as well as on the measured one. For instance, paradoxical effects are typically avoided under at least one of the following three hypotheses:

- **a.** The class of distributions in which both \( f \) and \( f^* \) are picked are all monomodal, with monotonous dependence of percentiles with respect to one another.
- **b.** The difference between percentiles of \( f \) and \( f^* \) has constant sign (i.e. \( f^* \) is either always wider or always narrower than \( f \) at any given percentile)
- **c.** For any strike level \( K \) (in the range that matters), the fragility measure \( V \) monotonously depends on \( s^{-} \) on the whole range where the true value \( s^* \) can be expected. This is in particular the case when partial derivatives \( \partial^k V/\partial s^k \) all have the same sign at measured \( s^{-} \) up to some order \( n \), at which the partial derivative has that same constant sign over the whole range on which the true value \( s^* \) can be expected. This condition can be replaced by an assumption on finite differences approximating the higher order partial derivatives, where \( n \) is large enough so that the interval \([s^{-} n\Delta s]\) covers the range of possible values of \( s^* \). Indeed, in this case, \( f \) difference estimate of fragility uses evaluations of \( \xi \) at points spanning this interval.

**Unconditionality of the shortfall measure \( \xi \):** Many, when presenting shortfall, deal with the conditional shortfall \( \int_{-\infty}^{K} x f(x) dx/\int_{-\infty}^{K} f(x) dx \); while such measure might be useful in some circumstances, its sensitivity is not indicative of fragility in the sense used in this discussion. The unconditional tail expectation \( \xi = \int_{-\infty}^{K} x f(x) dx \) is more indicative of exposure to fragility. It is also preferred to the raw probability of falling below \( K \) which is \( f^{K} f(x) dx \), as the latter does not include the consequences.
For instance, two such measures \( \int_{-\infty}^{K} f(x) \, dx \) and \( \int_{-\infty}^{K} g(x) \, dx \) may be equal over broad values of \( K \); but the expectation \( \int_{-\infty}^{K} x \, f(x) \, dx \) can be much more consequential than \( \int_{-\infty}^{K} x \, g(x) \, dx \) as the cost of the break can be more severe and we are interested in its “vega” equivalent.

### 14.6 Applications to Model Error

In the cases where \( Y \) depends on \( X \), among other variables, often \( x \) is treated as non-stochastic, and the underestimation of the volatility of \( x \) maps immediately into the underestimation of the left tail of \( Y \) under two conditions:

1. \( X \) is stochastic and its stochastic character is ignored (as if it had zero variance or mean deviation)
2. \( Y \) is concave with respect to \( X \) in the negative part of the distribution, below \( \Omega \)

"Convexity Bias" or Jensen’s Inequality Effect: Further, missing the stochasticity under the two conditions a) and b), in the event of the concavity applying above \( \Omega \) leads to the negative convexity bias from the lowering effect on the expectation of the dependent variable \( Y \).

#### 14.6.1 Example: Application to Budget Deficits

Example: A government estimates unemployment for the next three years as averaging 9%; it uses its econometric models to issue a forecast balance \( B \) of 200 billion deficit in the local currency. But it misses (like almost everything in economics) that unemployment is a stochastic variable. Employment over 3 years periods has fluctuated by 1% on average.

We can calculate the effect of the error with the following:

- Unemployment at 8% , Balance \( B(8\%) = -75 \) bn (improvement of 125bn) Unemployment at 9%, Balance \( B(9\%) = -200 \) bn Unemployment at 10%, Balance \( B(10\%) = -550 \) bn (worsening of 350bn)

The convexity bias from underestimation of the deficit is by -112.5bn, since

\[
\frac{B(8\%) + B(10\%)}{2} = -312.5
\]

Further look at the probability distribution caused by the missed variable (assuming to simplify deficit is Gaussian with a Mean Deviation of 1%)

Adding Model Error and Metadistributions: Model error should be integrated in the distribution as a stochasticization of parameters. \( f \) and \( g \) should subsume the distribution of all possible factors affecting the final outcome (including the metadistribution).
Figure 14.5: Histogram from simulation of government deficit as a left-tailed random variable as a result of randomizing unemployment of which it is a convex function. The method of point estimate would assume a Dirac stick at -200, thus underestimating both the expected deficit (-312) and the skewness (i.e., fragility) of it.

much as it is a means to verify whether \( f \) and \( g \) capture the full shape of the final probability distribution.

Any situation with a bounded payoff function that organically truncates the left tail at \( K \) will be impervious to all perturbations affecting the probability distribution below \( K \).

For \( K = 0 \), the measure equates to mean negative semi-deviation (more potent than negative semi-variance or negative semi-standard deviation often used in financial analyses).

### 14.6.2 Model Error and Semi-Bias as Nonlinearity from Missed Stochasticity of Variables

Model error often comes from missing the existence of a random variable that is significant in determining the outcome (say option pricing without credit risk). We cannot detect it using the heuristic presented in this paper but as mentioned earlier the error goes in the opposite direction as model tend to be richer, not poorer, from overfitting. But we can detect the model error from missing the stochasticity of a variable or underestimating its stochastic character (say option pricing with non-stochastic interest rates or ignoring that the “volatility” \( s \) can vary).
from missing the variable, insuring that the errors from the model don’t have missing higher order terms that cause severe unexpected (and unseen) biases in one direction because of convexity or concavity, in other words, whether or not the model error causes a change in $z$.

14.7 Model Bias, Second Order Effects, and Fragility

Having the right model (which is a very generous assumption), but being uncertain about the parameters will invariably lead to an increase in model error in the presence of convexity and nonlinearities.

As a generalization of the deficit/employment example used in the previous section, say we are using a simple function:

$$f(x | \alpha)$$

Where $\alpha$ is supposed to be the average expected rate, where we take $\varphi$ as the distribution of $\alpha$ over its domain $\varphi_\alpha$

$$\bar{\alpha} = \int_{\varphi_\alpha} \alpha \varphi(\alpha) d\alpha$$

The mere fact that $\alpha$ is uncertain (since it is estimated) might lead to a bias if we perturb from the outside (of the integral), i.e. stochasticize the parameter deemed fixed. Accordingly, the convexity bias is easily measured as the difference between a) $f$ integrated across values of potential $\alpha$ and b) $f$ estimated for a single value of $\alpha$ deemed to be its average. The convexity bias $\omega_A$ becomes:

$$\omega_A \equiv \int_{\varphi_\alpha} \int_{\varphi_\alpha} f(x | \alpha) \varphi(\alpha) d\alpha dx - \int_{\varphi_\alpha} f(x \mid \left(\int_{\varphi_\alpha} \alpha \varphi(\alpha) d\alpha\right)) dx \quad (14.11)$$

And $\omega_B$ the missed fragility is assessed by comparing the two integrals below $K$, in order to capture the effect on the left tail:

$$\omega_B(K) \equiv \int_{-\infty}^{K} \int_{\varphi_\alpha} f(x | \alpha) \varphi(\alpha) d\alpha dx - \int_{-\infty}^{K} f(x \mid \left(\int_{\varphi_\alpha} \alpha \varphi(\alpha) d\alpha\right)) dx \quad (14.12)$$

Which can be approximated by an interpolated estimate obtained with two values of $\alpha$ separated from a mid point by $\Delta \alpha$ a mean deviation of $\alpha$ and estimating

$$\omega_B(K) \equiv \int_{-\infty}^{K} \frac{1}{2} (f(x | \bar{\alpha} + \Delta \alpha) + f(x | \bar{\alpha} - \Delta \alpha)) dx - \int_{-\infty}^{K} f(x | \bar{\alpha}) dx \quad (14.13)$$
\( \omega'_B(X) = \frac{1}{2} (f(X | \bar{\alpha} + \Delta \alpha) + f(X | \bar{\alpha} - \Delta \alpha)) - f(X | \bar{\alpha}) \) (14.14)

So that

\( \omega_B(K) = \int_{-\infty}^{K} \omega'_B(x) \, dx \) (14.15)

which leads us to the fragility heuristic. In particular, if we assume that \( \omega_B(X)' \) has a constant sign for \( X \leq K \), then \( \omega_B(K) \) has the same sign.

### 14.7.1 The Fragility/Model Error Detection Heuristic (detecting \( \omega_A \) and \( \omega_B \) when cogent)

**Example 1 (Detecting Tail Risk Not Shown By Stress Test, \( \omega_B \)).** The famous firm Dexia went into financial distress a few days after passing a stress test “with flying colors”.

If a bank issues a so-called "stress test" (something that has not proven very satisfactory), off a parameter (say stock market) at -15%. We ask them to recompute at -10% and -20%. Should the exposure show negative asymmetry (worse at -20% than it improves at -10%), we deem that their risk increases in the tails. There are certainly hidden tail exposures and a definite higher probability of blowup in addition to exposure to model error.

Note that it is somewhat more effective to use our measure of shortfall in Definition, but the method here is effective enough to show hidden risks, particularly at wider increases (try 25% and 30% and see if exposure shows increase). Most effective would be to use power-law distributions and perturb the tail exponent to see symmetry.

**Example 2 (Detecting Tail Risk in Overoptimized System, \( \omega_B \)).** Raise airport traffic 10%, lower 10%, take average expected traveling time from each, and check the asymmetry for nonlinearity. If asymmetry is significant, then declare the system as overoptimized. (Both \( \omega_A \) and \( \omega_B \) as thus shown.

The same procedure uncovers both fragility and consequence of model error (potential harm from having wrong probability distribution, a thin-tailed rather than a fat-tailed one). For traders (and see Gigerenzer’s discussions, in Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009), Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996)) simple heuristics tools detecting the magnitude of second order effects can be more effective than more complicated and harder to calibrate methods, particularly under multi-dimensionality. See also the intuition of fast and frugal in Derman and Wilmott (2009), Haug and Taleb (2011).

### 14.7.2 The Fragility Heuristic Applied to Model Error

1. First Step (first order). Take a valuation. Measure the sensitivity to all parameters determining \( V \) over finite ranges \( p \). If materially significant, check if stochasticity
of parameter is taken into account by risk assessment. If not, then stop and declare the risk as grossly mismeasured (no need for further risk assessment). 2-Second Step (second order). For all parameters p compute the ratio of first to second order effects at the initial range $\Delta p = \text{estimated mean deviation}$.

$$H(\Delta p) \equiv \frac{\mu^\prime}{\mu},$$

where

$$\mu^\prime (\Delta p) = \frac{1}{2} \left( f\left(p + \frac{1}{2}\Delta p\right) + f\left(p - \frac{1}{2}\Delta p\right) \right)$$

2-Third Step. Note parameters for which H is significantly > or < 1. 3- Fourth Step: Keep widening $\Delta p$ to verify the stability of the second order effects.

The Heuristic applied to a stress test:
In place of the standard, one-point estimate stress test S1, we issue a "triple", S1, S2, S3, where S2 and S3 are S1 ± $\Delta p$. Acceleration of losses is indicative of fragility.

Remarks. a. Simple heuristics have a robustness (in spite of a possible bias) compared to optimized and calibrated measures. Ironically, it is from the multiplication of convexity biases and the potential errors from missing them that calibrated models that work in-sample underperform heuristics out of sample (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). b. Heuristics allow to detection of the effect of the use of the wrong probability distribution without changing probability distribution (just from the dependence on parameters). c. The heuristic improves and detects flaws in all other commonly used measures of risk, such as CVaR, àÂÍexpected shortfallàÂÍ, stress-testing, and similar methods have been proven to be completely ineffective (Taleb, 2009). d. The heuristic does not require parameterization beyond varying ÎŤp.

14.7.3 Further Applications
In parallel works, applying the "simple heuristic" allows us to detect the following "hidden short options" problems by merely perturbing a certain parameter $p$:

i- Size and pseudo-economies of scale.

ii- Size and squeezability (nonlinearities of squeezes in costs per unit).

iii- Specialization (Ricardo) and variants of globalization.

iv- Missing stochasticity of variables (price of wine).

v- Portfolio optimization (Markowitz).

vi- Debt and tail exposure.

vii- Budget Deficits: convexity effects explain why uncertainty lengthens, doesn’t shorten expected deficits.

viii- Iatrogenics (medical) or how some treatments are concave to benefits, convex to errors.

ix- Disturbing natural systems.\textsuperscript{1}

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Chapter Summary 15: The literature of heavy tails starts with a random walk and finds mechanisms that lead to fat tails under aggregation. We follow the inverse route and show how starting with fat tails we get to thin-tails from the probability distribution of the response to a random variable. We introduce a general dose-response curve showing how the left and right-boundedness of the response in natural things leads to thin-tails, even when the “underlying” variable of the exposure is fat-tailed.

The Origin of Thin Tails.

We have emprisoned the “statistical generator” of things on our planet into the random walk theory: the sum of i.i.d. variables eventually leads to a Gaussian, which is an appealing theory. Or, actually, even worse: at the origin lies a simpler Bernoulli binary generator with variations limited to the set \( \{0,1\} \), normalized and scaled, under summation. Bernoulli, De Moivre, Galton, Bachelier: all used the mechanism, as illustrated by the Quincunx in which the binomial leads to the Gaussian. This has traditionally been the “generator” mechanism behind everything, from martingales to simple convergence theorems. Every standard textbook teaches the “naturalness” of the thus-obtained Gaussian.

In that sense, powerlaws are pathologies. Traditionally, researchers have tried to explain fat tailed distributions using the canonical random walk generator, but twinging it thanks to a series of mechanisms that start with an aggregation of random variables that does not lead to the central limit theorem, owing to lack of independence and the magnification of moves through some mechanism of contagion: preferential attachment, comparative advantage, or, alternatively, rescaling, and similar mechanisms.

But the random walk theory fails to accommodate some obvious phenomena.

First, many things move by jumps and discontinuities that cannot come from the random walk and the conventional Brownian motion, a theory that proved to be sticky (Mandelbrot, 1997).

Second, consider the distribution of the size of animals in nature, considered within-species. The height of humans follows (almost) a Normal Distribution but it is hard to find mechanism of random walk behind it (this is an observation imparted to the author by Yaneer Bar Yam).

Third, uncertainty and opacity lead to more complex statistical mechanisms.
Our approach here is to assume that random variables, under absence of constraints, become power law-distributed. This is the default in the absence of boundedness or compactness. Then, the response, that is, a function of the random variable, considered in turn as an “inherited” random variable, will have different properties. If the response is bounded, then the dampening of the tails of the inherited distribution will lead it to bear the properties of the Gaussian, or the class of distributions possessing finite moments of all orders.

The Dose Response

Let \( S^N(x) : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [k_L, k_R], S^N \in C^\infty \), be a continuous function possessing derivatives \((S^N)^{(n)}(x)\) of all orders, expressed as an \(N\)-summed and scaled standard sigmoid functions:

\[
S^N(x) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{a_k}{1 + \exp(-b_kx + c_k)}
\]

(15.1)

where \(a_k, b_k, c_k\) are scaling constants \(\in \mathbb{R}\), satisfying:

i) \(S^N(-\infty) = k_L\)

ii) \(S^N(\infty) = k_R\)

and (equivalently for the first and last of the following conditions)

iii) \(\frac{\partial^2 S^N}{\partial x^2} \geq 0\) for \(x \in (-\infty, k_1)\), \(\frac{\partial^2 S^N}{\partial x^2} < 0\) for \(x \in (k_2, k_2)\), and \(\frac{\partial^2 S^N}{\partial x^2} \geq 0\) for \(x \in (k_2, \infty)\), with \(k_1 > k_2 \geq k_3 \geq \cdots \geq k_N\).

The shapes at different calibrations are shown in Figure 1, in which we combined different values of \(N=2\) \(S^2\) \((x, a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2, c_1, c_2)\), and the standard sigmoid \(S^1\) \((x, a_1, b_1, c_1)\), with \(a_1=1, b_1=1\) and \(c_1=0\). As we can see, unlike the common sigmoid, the asymptotic response can be lower than the maximum, as our curves are not monotonically increasing. The sigmoid shows benefits increasing rapidly (the convex phase), then increasing at a slower and slower rate until saturation. Our more general case starts by increasing, but the response can be actually negative beyond the saturation phase, though in a convex manner. Harm slows down and becomes “flat” when something is totally broken.

15.1 Properties of the Inherited Probability Distribution

Now let \(x\) be a random variable with distributed according to a general fat tailed distribution, with power laws at large negative and positive values, expressed (for clarity, without loss of generality) as a Student T Distribution with scale \(\sigma\) and exponent \(\alpha\), and support on the real line. Its domain \(\mathcal{D}^f = (\infty, \infty)\), and density \(f_{\sigma,\alpha}(x)\):

\[
\left( \frac{\alpha}{\sigma} \right)^{\frac{\alpha+1}{2}} \frac{\alpha+1}{\sigma^{\alpha+1} \Gamma \left( \frac{\alpha+1}{2} \right)} x^{-\frac{\alpha+1}{2}}
\]
where \( B(a, b) = \frac{(a\Gamma)(b\Gamma)}{\Gamma(a+b)} = \int_0^1 dt t^{a-1}(1 - t)^{b-1} \)
. The simulation effect of the convex-concave transformations of the terminal probability distribution is shown in Figure 2.

And the Kurtosis of the inherited distributions drops at higher \( \sigma \) thanks to the boundedness of the payoff, making the truncation to the left and the right visible. Kurtosis for \( f_{2,3} \) is infinite, but in-sample will be extremely high, but, of course, finite. So we use it as a benchmark to see the drop from the calibration of the response curves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( f_{2,3}(x) )</td>
<td>86.3988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( S^2(1, -2, 1, 2, 1, 15) )</td>
<td>8.77458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( S^2(1, -1/2, 2, 1, 1, 15) )</td>
<td>4.08643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( S^1(1, 1, 0) )</td>
<td>4.20523</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case of the standard sigmoid, i.e., \( N = 1 \).
Figure 15.2: Histograms for the different inherited probability distributions (simulations , $N = 10^6$)
15.1. **PROPERTIES OF THE INHERITED PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION**

(15.3)

\[ g(x) \] is the inherited distribution, which can be shown to have a scaled domain \( D^g = (k_L, k_R) \). It becomes

\[
g(x) = \frac{a_1 \left( \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \left( \log \left( \frac{a_1}{x} \right) + c_1 \right)^2} \right)^{\frac{\alpha + 1}{2}}}{\sqrt{\alpha b_1 \sigma B \left( \frac{a_1 \sigma}{\alpha}, \frac{1}{2} \right) (a_1 - x)}}
\]

(15.4)

![Graph of g(x)](image)

**Table 15.1**: The different inherited probability distributions.

**Table 15.2**: The Kurtosis of the standard drops along with the scale \( \sigma \) of the power law

**Remark 1**: The inherited distribution from \( S(x) \) will have a compact support regardless of the probability distribution of \( x \).
15.2 Conclusion and Remarks

We showed the dose-response as the neglected origin of the thin-tailedness of observed distributions in nature. This approach to the dose-response curve is quite general, and can be used outside biology (say in the Kahneman-Tversky prospect theory, in which their version of the utility concept with respect to changes in wealth is concave on the left, hence bounded, and convex on the right.
Small is Beautiful: Diseconomies of Scale/Concentration

Chapter Summary 16: We extract the effect of size on the degradation of the expectation of a random variable, from nonlinear response. The method is general and allows to show the "small is beautiful" or "decentralized is effective" or "a diverse ecology is safer" effect from a response to a stochastic stressor and prove stochastic diseconomies of scale and concentration (with as example the Irish potato famine and GMOs). We apply the methodology to environmental harm using standard sigmoid dose-response to show the need to split sources of pollution across independent (nonsynergetic) pollutants.

16.1 Introduction: The Tower of Babel

Diseconomies and Harm of scale Where is small beautiful and how can we detect, even extract its effect from nonlinear response? Does getting larger makes an entity more vulnerable to errors? Does polluting or subjecting the environment with a large quantity cause disproportional "unseen" stochastic effects? We will consider different types of dose-response or harm-response under different classes of probability distributions.

The situations covered include:
1. Size of items falling on your head (a large stone vs small pebbles).
2. Losses under strain.
3. Size of animals (The concavity stemming from size can be directly derived from the difference between allomeric and isometric growth, as animals scale in a specific manner as they grow, an idea initially detected by Haldane,[28] (on the "cube law"(TK)).
4. Quantity in a short squeeze
5. The effect of crop diversity
6. Large vs small structures (say the National Health Service vs local entities)
7. Centralized government vs municipalities
8. Large projects such as the concentration of health care in the U.K.
Figure 16.1: The Tower of Babel Effect: Nonlinear response to height, as taller towers are disproportionately more vulnerable to, say, earthquakes, winds, or a collision. This illustrates the case of truncated harm (limited losses). For some structures with unbounded harm the effect is even stronger.
9. Stochastic environmental harm: when, say, polluting with $K$ units is more than twice as harmful than polluting with $K/2$ units.

16.1.1 First Example: The Kerviel Rogue Trader Affair

The problem is summarized in *Antifragile* [67] as follows:

On January 21, 2008, the Parisian bank Société Générale rushed to sell in the market close to seventy billion dollars worth of stocks, a very large amount for any single "fire sale." Markets were not very active (called "thin"), as it was Martin Luther King Day in the United States, and markets worldwide dropped precipitously, close to 10 percent, costing the company close to six billion dollars in losses just from their fire sale. The entire point of the squeeze is that they couldn't wait, and they had no option but to turn a sale into a fire sale. For they had, over the weekend, uncovered a fraud. Jerome Kerviel, a rogue back office employee, was playing with humongous sums in the market and hiding these exposures from the main computer system. They had no choice but to sell, immediately, these stocks they didn’t know they owned. Now, to see the effect of fragility from size (or concentration), consider losses as a function of quantity sold. A fire sale of $70 billion worth of stocks leads to a loss of $6 billion. But a fire sale a tenth of the size, $7 billion would result in no loss at all, as markets would absorb the quantities without panic, maybe without even noticing. So this tells us that if, instead of having one very large bank, with Monsieur Kerviel as a rogue trader, we had ten smaller units, each with a proportional Monsieur Micro-Kerviel, and each conducted his rogue trading independently and at random times, the total losses for the ten banks would be close to nothing.

16.1.2 Second Example: The Irish Potato Famine with a warning on GMOs

The same argument and derivations apply to concentration. Consider the tragedy of the Irish potato famine.

In the 19th Century, Ireland experienced a violent potato famine coming from concentration and lack of diversity. They concentrated their crops with the "lumper" potato variety. "Since potatoes can be propagated vegetatively, all of these lumpers were clones, genetically identical to one another."2

Now the case of genetically modified organism (GMOs) is rich in fragilities (and confusion about the "natural"): the fact that an error can spread beyond local spots bringing fat-tailedness, a direct result of the multiplication of large scale errors. But the mathematical framework here allows us to gauge its effect from loss of local diversity. The greater problem with GMOs is the risk of ecocide, examined in Chapter x.

16.1.3 Only Iatrogenics of Scale and Concentration

Note that, in this discussion, we only consider the harm, not the benefits of concentration under nonlinear (concave) response. Economies of scale (or savings from concentration
and lack of diversity) are similar to short volatility exposures, with seen immediate benefits and unseen deferred losses.

The rest of the discussion is as follows. We will proceed, via convex transformation to show the effect of nonlinearity on the expectation. We start with open-ended harm, a monotone concave response, where regardless of probability distribution (satisfying some criteria), we can extract the harm from the second derivative of the exposure. Then we look at more natural settings represented by the "sigmoid" S-curve (or inverted S-curve) which offers more complex nonlinearities and spans a broader class of phenomena.

**Unimodality as a general assumption.** Let the variable \( x \), representing the stochastic stressor, follow a certain class of continuous probability distributions (unimodal), with the density \( p(x) \) satisfying: \( p(x) \geq p(x + \epsilon) \) for all \( \epsilon > 0 \), and \( x > x^* \) and \( p(x) \geq p(x - \epsilon) \) for all \( x < x^* \) with \( \{ x^* : p(x^*) = \max_x p(x) \} \). The density \( p(x) \) is Lipschitz. This condition will be maintained throughout the entire exercise.

### 16.2 Unbounded Convexity Effects

In this section, we assume an unbounded harm function, where harm is a monotone (but nonlinear) function in \( C^2 \), with negative second derivative for all values of \( x \) in \( \mathbb{R}^+ \); so let \( h(x) \), \( \mathbb{R}^+ \to \mathbb{R}^- \) be the harm function. Let \( B \) be the size of the total unit subjected to stochastic stressor \( x \), with \( \theta(B) = B + h(x) \).

We can prove by the inequalities from concave transformations that, the expectation of the large units is lower or equal to that of the sum of the parts. Because of the monotonocity and concavity of \( h(x) \),

\[
h \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \omega_i x \right) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{N} h(\omega_i x),
\]

for all \( x \) in its domain (\( \mathbb{R}^+ \)), where \( \omega \) are nonnegative normalized weights, that is
And taking expectations on both sides, $\mathbb{E}(\theta(B)) \leq \mathbb{E}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \theta(\omega_i B)\right)$: the mean of a large unit under stochastic stressors degrades compared to a series of small ones.

16.2.1 Application

Let $h(x)$ be the simplified harm function of the form

$$h(x) \equiv -k x^\beta,$$ \hspace{1cm} (16.2)

$k \in (0, \infty), \beta \in [0, \infty)$.

Table 16.1: Applications with unbounded convexity effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Research</th>
<th>$h(x)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liquidation</td>
<td>Toth et al.,[72],Bouchaud et al. [8]</td>
<td>$-k x^{3/2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>Flyvbjerg et al [26]</td>
<td>$-x(\frac{\log(x)+7.1}{10})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example 1: One-Tailed Standard Pareto Distribution. Let the probability distribution of $x$ (the harm) be a simple Pareto (which matters little for the exercise, as any one-tailed distribution does the job). The density:

$$p_{\alpha,L}(x) = \alpha L^\alpha x^{-\alpha-1} \text{ for } x \geq L$$ \hspace{1cm} (16.3)

The distribution of the response to the stressor will have the distribution $g = (p \circ h)(x)$.

Given that $k$ the stressor is strictly positive, $h(x)$ will be in the negative domain. Consider a second change of variable, dividing $x$ in $N$ equal fragments, so that the unit becomes $\xi = x/N$, $N \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 1}$:

$$g_{\alpha,L,N}(\xi) = -\frac{\alpha^\alpha N^{-\alpha} \left(\frac{-\xi}{k}\right)^{-\alpha/\beta}}{\beta \xi},$$ \hspace{1cm} (16.4)
which leads to a simple ratio of the mean of the total losses (or damage) compared to a $\kappa$ number of its $N$ fragments, allowing us to extract the "convexity effect" or the degradation of the mean coming from size (or concentration):

$$\frac{\kappa \, M_\beta(\kappa N)}{M_\beta(N)} = \kappa^{1/3} - 1$$

(16.6)

With $\beta = 1$, the convexity effect =1. With $\beta = 3/2$ (what we observe in orderflow and many other domains related to planning, Bouchaud et al., 2012, Flyvbjerg et al, 2012), the convexity effect is shown in Figure 16.2.

### Table 16.2: The mean harm in total as a result of concentration. Degradation of the mean for $N=1$ compared to a large $N$, with $\beta = 3/2$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected total loss for N units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Unseen Harm. The skewness of $g_{\alpha, L, N}(\xi)$ shows effectively how losses have properties that hide the mean in "small" samples (that is, large but insufficient number of observations), since, owing to skewness, the observed mean loss with tend to be lower than the true value. As with the classical Black Swan exposures, benefits are obvious and harm hidden.

### 16.3 A Richer Model: The Generalized Sigmoid

Now the biological and physical domains (say animals, structures) do not incur unlimited harm, when taken as single units. The losses terminate somewhere: what is broken is broken. From the generalized sigmoid function of [68], where $S^M(x) = \sum_{k=1}^{M} \frac{a_k}{1 + \exp(b_k(c_k - x))}$, a sum of single sigmoids. We assume as a special simplified case $M = 1$ and $a_1 = -1$ so we focus on a single stressor or source of harm $S(x), \mathbb{R}^+ \rightarrow [-1, 0]$ where $x$ is a positive variable simplified, the sawtooth function $S(x)$ = $0 \rightarrow S(x)$ by the following
16.3. A RICHER MODEL: THE GENERALIZED SIGMOID

\[
S(x) = \frac{-1}{1 + e^{b(c-x)}} + \frac{1}{1 + e^{b c}}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (16.7)

The second term is there to insure that \( S(0) = 0 \). Figure 16.3 shows the different calibrations of \( b \) (\( c \) sets a displacement to the right).

**Table 16.3:** Consider the object broken at \(-1\) and in perfect condition at \(0\)

[backgroundcolor=lightgray] The sigmoid, \( S(x) \) in \(C^\infty\) is a class of generalized function (Sobolev, Schwartz [60]); it represents literally any object that has progressive positive or negative saturation; it is smooth and has derivatives of all order: simply anything bounded on the left and on the right has to necessarily have to have the sigmoid convex-concave (or mixed series of convex-concave) shape.

The idea is to measure the effect of the distribution, as in 16.4. Recall that the probability distribution \( p(x) \) is Lipshitz and unimodal.

**Table 16.4:** When variance is high, the distribution of stressors shifts in a way to elevate the mass in the convex zone

The second derivative \( S''(x) = \frac{b^2 e^{b(c+x)}(e^{b x} - e^{b c})}{(e^{b c} + e^{b x})^4} \). Setting the point where \( S''(x) \) becomes 0, at \( x = c \), we get the following: \( S(x) \) is concave in the interval \( x \in [0, c) \) and convex in the interval \( x \in (c, \infty) \).

The classification is obtained by observing the parametrization of the sigmoid.
"convex" parts: $E = E^- + E^+$. Taking $\xi = x/N$, as we did earlier,

$$E^- = N \int_0^c S(\xi) \ p(\xi) \ d\xi,$$

and

$$E^+ = N \int_c^\infty S(\xi) \ p(\xi) \ d\xi.$$

The convexity of $S(.)$ is symmetric around $c$,

$$S''(x)|_{x=-u} = -2b^2 \sinh^4 \left(\frac{bu}{2}\right) \csc h^3(bu)$$

$$S''(x)|_{x=c+u} = 2b^2 \sinh^4 \left(\frac{bu}{2}\right) \csc h^3(bu)$$

We can therefore prove that the effect of the expectation for changes in $N$ depends exactly on whether the mass to the left of $a$ is greater than the mass to the right. Accordingly, if $\int_0^a p(\xi) \ d\xi > \int_a^\infty p(\xi) \ d\xi$, the effect of the concentration ratio will be positive, and negative otherwise.

16.3.1 Application

Example of a simple distribution: Exponential. Using the same notations as 16.2.1, we look for the mean of the total (but without extracting the probability distribution of the transformed variable, as it is harder with a sigmoid). Assume $x$ follows a standard exponential distribution with parameter $\lambda$, $p(x) \equiv \lambda e^{\lambda(-x)}$

$$M_\lambda(N) = \mathbb{E}(S(\xi)) = \int_0^\infty \lambda e^{\lambda(-x)} \left(-\frac{1}{e^{b(-\xi)} + 1} + \frac{1}{e^{bc} + 1}\right) \ dx \quad (16.8)$$

$$M_\lambda(N) = \frac{1}{e^{bc} + 1} - 2F_1 \left(1, \frac{N\lambda}{b}; \frac{N\lambda}{b} + 1; -e^{bc}\right)$$

where the Hypergeometric function $2F_1(a, b; c; z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{a_k b_k z^k}{k! c_k}$.

The ratio $\frac{\kappa M_\lambda(\kappa N)}{M_\lambda(N)}$ doesn’t admit a reversal owing to the shape, as we can see in 16.5, but it shows that high variance can dampen the effects of the
Example of a more complicated distribution: Pareto type IV. Quasiconcave but neither convex nor concave PDF: The second derivative of the PDF for the Exponential doesn’t change sign, \( \frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2}(\lambda \exp(-\lambda x)) = \lambda^3 e^{\lambda(-x)} \), so the distribution retains a convex shape. Further, it is not possible to move its mean beyond the point \( c \) where the sigmoid switches in the sign of the nonlinearity. So we elect a broader one, the Pareto Distribution of Type IV, which is extremely flexible because, unlike the simply convex shape (it has a skewed "bell" shape, mixed convex-concave-convex shape) and accommodates tail exponents, hence has power law properties for large deviations. It is quasiconcave but neither convex nor concave. A probability measure (hence PDF) \( p : \mathfrak{D} \to [0, 1] \) is quasiconcave in domain \( \mathfrak{D} \) if for all \( x, y \in \mathfrak{D} \) and \( \omega \in [0, 1] \) we have:

\[
p(\omega x + (1 - \omega)y) \geq \min(p(x), p(y)).
\]

Where \( x \) is the same harm as in Equation 16.7:

\[
p_{\alpha, \gamma, \mu, k}(x) = \frac{\alpha k^{-1/\gamma}(x - \mu)^{\frac{1}{\gamma} - 1}}{\gamma} \left( \frac{k}{x - \mu} \right)^{-1/\gamma} + 1)^{-\alpha - 1} \quad (16.9)
\]

for \( x \geq \mu \) and 0 elsewhere.
Table 16.6: The different shapes of the Pareto IV distribution with perturbations of $\alpha, \gamma, \mu, \text{ and } k$ allowing to create mass to the right of $c$.

The mean harm function, $M_{\alpha, \gamma, \mu, k}(N)$ becomes:

$$M_{\alpha, \gamma, \mu, k}(N) = \frac{\alpha k^{-1/\gamma}}{\gamma} \int_0^\infty (x - \mu)^{1/\gamma - 1} \left( \frac{1}{e^{bc} + 1} - \frac{1}{e^{b(c - \frac{x}{k}) + 1}} \right) \left( \frac{k}{x - \mu} \right)^{-1/\gamma} + 1 \right)^{-\alpha - 1} dx \quad (16.10)$$

$M(.)$ needs to be evaluated numerically. Our concern is the "pathology" where the mixed convexities of the sigmoid and the probability distributions produce locally opposite results than 16.3.1 on the ratio $\frac{k M_{\alpha, \gamma, \mu, k}(N)}{M_{\alpha, \gamma, \mu, k}(N)}$. We produce perturbations around zones where $\mu$ has maximal effects, as in 16.9. However as shown in Figure 16.7, the total expected harm is quite large under these conditions, and damage will be done regardless of the effect of scale.

Table 16.7: Harm increases as the mean of the probability distribution shifts to the right, to become maximal at $c$, the point where the sigmoid function $S(.)$ switches from concave to convex.
16.3. A RICHER MODEL: THE GENERALIZED SIGMOID

Table 16.8: Different values of $\mu$: we see the pathology where $2M(2)$ is higher than $M(1)$, for a value of $\mu = 4$ to the right of the point $c$.

Table 16.9: The effect of $\mu$ on the loss from scale.

16.3.2 Conclusion

This completes the math showing extracting the "small is beautiful" effect, as well as the effect of dose on harm in natural and biological settings where the Sigmoid is in use. More verbal discussions are in Antifragile.

Acknowledgments

Yaneer Bar-Yam, Jim Gatheral (naming such nonlinear fragility the "Tower of Babel effect"), Igor Bukanov, Edi Pigoni, Charles Tapiero.
How The World Will Progressively Look Weirder to Us

Chapter Summary 17: Information is convex to noise. The paradox is that increase in sample size magnifies the role of noise (or luck); it makes tail values even more extreme. There are some problems associated with big data and the increase of variables available for epidemiological and other "empirical" research.

17.1 How Noise Explodes Faster than Data

To the observer, every day will seem weirder than the previous one. It has always been absolutely silly to be exposed the news. Things are worse today thanks to the web.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>News</strong></td>
<td>Weirder and weirder events reported on the front pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epidemiological Studies, &quot;Big Data&quot;</strong></td>
<td>More spurious &quot;statistical&quot; relationships that eventually fail to replicate, with more accentuated effects and more statistical &quot;significance&quot; (sic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Track Records</strong></td>
<td>Greater performance for (temporary) &quot;star&quot; traders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We are getting more information, but with constant “consciousness”, “desk space”, or “visibility”. Google News, Bloomberg News, etc. have space for, say, <100 items at any point in time. But there are millions of events every day. As the world is more connected, with the global dominating over the local, the number of sources of news is multiplying. But your consciousness remains limited. So we are experiencing a winner-take-all effect in information: like a large movie theatre with a small door.

Likewise we are getting more data. The size of the door is remaining constant, the theater is getting larger.

There is a winner-take-all effect in information: the world becomes a small, but ever-expanding, global village.
CHAPTER 17. HOW THE WORLD WILL PROGRESSIVELY LOOK WEIRDER TO US

Figure 17.1: The picture of a "freak event" spreading on the web of a boa who ate a drunk person in Kerala, India, in November 2013. With 7 billion people on the planet and ease of communication the "tail" of daily freak events is dominated by such news.

Similarity with the Fooled by Randomness Bottleneck

This is similar to the idea that the more spurious returns dominate finance as the number of players get large, and swamp the more solid ones. Start with the idea (see Taleb 2001), that as a population of operators in a profession marked by a high degrees of randomness increases, the number of stellar results, and stellar for completely random reasons, gets larger. The “spurious tail” is therefore the number of persons who rise to the top for no reasons other than mere luck, with subsequent rationalizations, analyses, explanations, and attributions. The performance in the “spurious tail” is only a matter of number of participants, the base population of those who tried. Assuming a symmetric market, if one has for base population 1 million persons with zero skills and ability to predict starting Year 1, there should be 500K spurious winners Year 2, 250K Year 3, 125K Year 4, etc. One can easily see that the size of the winning population in, say, Year 10 depends on the size of the base population Year 1; doubling the initial population would double the straight winners. Injecting skills in the form of better-than-random abilities to predict does not change the story by much. (Note that this idea has been severely plagiarized by someone, about which a bit more soon).

Because of scalability, the top, say 300, managers get the bulk of the allocations, with the lion’s share going to the top 30. So it is obvious that the winner-take-all effect causes distortions: say there are \( m \) initial participants and the “top” \( k \) managers selected, the result will be \( \frac{k}{m} \) managers in play. As the base population gets larger, that is, \( N \) increases linearly, we push into the tail probabilities.

Here read skills for information, noise for spurious performance, and translate the problem into information and news.

**The paradox:** This is quite paradoxical as we are accustomed to the opposite effect, namely that a large increases in sample size reduces the effect of sampling error; here the narrowness of the market puts sampling error on steroids.
17.2 Derivations

Let \( Z \equiv \left( z^j_i \right)_{1 < j < m, 1 < i < n} \) be a \((n \times m)\) sized population of variations, \( m \) population series and \( n \) data points per distribution, with \( i, j \in \mathbb{N} \); assume “noise” or scale of the distribution \( \sigma \in \mathbb{R}^+ \), signal \( \mu \geq 0 \). Clearly \( \sigma \) can accommodate distributions with infinite variance, but we need the expectation to be finite. Assume i.i.d. for a start.

Cross Sectional \((n = 1)\). Special case \( n = 1 \): we are just considering news/data without historical attributes.

Let \( F^{\leftarrow} \) be the generalized inverse distribution, or the quantile,

\[
F^{\leftarrow}(w) = \inf\{ t \in \mathbb{R} : F(t) \geq w \},
\]

for all nondecreasing distribution functions \( F(x) \equiv \mathbb{P}(X < x) \). For distributions without compact support, \( w \in (0,1) \); otherwise \( w \in [0,1] \). In the case of continuous and increasing distributions, we can write \( F^{-1} \) instead.

The signal is in the expectaion, so \( \mathbb{E}(z) \) is the signal, and \( \sigma \) the scale of the distribution determines the noise (which for a Gaussian corresponds to the standard deviation). Assume for now that all noises are drawn from the same distribution.

Assume constant probability the “threshold”, \( \zeta = \frac{k}{m} \), where \( k \) is the size of the window of the arrival. Since we assume that \( k \) is constant, it matters greatly that the quantile covered shrinks with \( m \).

Gaussian Noise

When we set \( \zeta \) as the reachable noise. The quantile becomes:

\[
F^{-1}(w) = \sqrt{2} \sigma \text{erfc}^{-1}(2w) + \mu,
\]

where \( \text{erfc}^{-1} \) is the inverse complementary error function.

Of more concern is the survival function, \( \Phi \equiv F(x) \equiv \mathbb{P}(X > x) \), and its inverse \( \Phi^{-1} \)

\[
\Phi^{-1}_{\sigma,\mu}(\zeta) = -\sqrt{2}\sigma\text{erfc}^{-1}\left(2\frac{k}{m}\right) + \mu
\]

Note that \( \sigma \) (noise) is multiplicative, when \( \mu \) (signal) is additive.

As information increases, the “threshold” gets smaller, \( F^{-1} \) shrinks.
Fat Tailed Noise

Now we take a Student T Distribution as a substitute to the Gaussian.

\[
 f(x) = \alpha^\frac{1}{2} \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + (x-\mu)^2} \sigma B(\frac{\alpha}{2}, \frac{1}{2})
\]  

(17.1)

Where we can get the inverse survival function.

\[
 \gamma^{-1}_{\alpha,\mu}(\zeta) = \mu + \sqrt{\alpha} \sigma \text{ sgn}(1 - 2 \zeta) \sqrt{\frac{1}{I_{(1,\zeta-1)\text{sng}((1-2\zeta)}}} - 1
\]  

(17.2)

where \(I\) is the generalized regularized incomplete Beta function \(I_{(z_0,z_1)}(a,b) = \frac{B_{(z_0,z_1)}(a,b)}{B(a,b)}\), and \(B_z(a,b)\) the incomplete Beta function \(B_z(a,b) = \int_0^z t^{a-1}(1-t)^{b-1}dt\). \(B(a,b)\) is the Euler Beta function \(B(a,b) = \Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)/\Gamma(a+b) = \int_0^1 t^{a-1}(1-t)^{b-1}dt\).

As we can see in Figure 2, the explosion in the tails of noise, and noise only.

Fatter Tails: Alpha Stable Distribution

Part 2 of the discussion to come soon.
17.2. DERIVATIONS

Figure 17.2: Power Law, \( \sigma = \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \)

Figure 17.3: Alpha Stable Distribution
Chapter Summary 18: The one percent of the one percent has tail properties such that the tail wealth (expectation $\int_{K}^{\infty} x p(x) \, dx$) depends far more on inequality than wealth.

18.1 The One Percent of the One Percent are Divorced from the Rest

The one percent of the one percent of the population is vastly more sensitive to inequality than total GDP growth (which explains why the superrich are doing well now, and should do better under globalization, and why it is a segment that doesn’t correlate well with the economy). For the super-rich, one point of GINI causes an increase equivalent to 6-10% increase in total income (say, GDP). More generally, the partial expectation in the tail is vastly more sensitive to changes in scale of the distribution than in its centering. Sellers of luxury goods and products for the superwealthy profit from dispersion more than increase in total wealth or income. I looked at their case as a long optionality, benefit-from-volatility type of industry.

From Antifragile:

Another business that does not care about the average but rather the dispersion around the average is the luxury goods industry——jewelry, watches, art, expensive apartments in fancy locations, expensive collector wines, gourmet farm-raised probiotic dog food, etc. Such businesses only care about the pool of funds available to the very rich. If the population in the Western world had an average income of fifty thousand dollars, with no inequality at all, the luxury goods sellers would not survive. But if the average stays the same, with a high degree of inequality, with some incomes higher than two million dollars, and potentially some incomes higher than ten million, then the business has plenty of customers——even if such high incomes were offset with masses of people with lower incomes. The “tails” of the distribution on the higher end of the income brackets, the extreme, are much more determined by changes in inequality than changes in the average. It gains from dispersion, hence is antifragile.

This explains the bubble in real estate prices in Central London, determined by inequality in Russia and the Arabian Gulf and totally independent of the real estate dynamics in Britain. Some apartments, those for the very rich, sell for twenty times the average per square foot of a building a few blocks away.

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Harvard’s former president Larry Summers got in trouble explaining a version of the point and lost his job in the aftermath of the uproar. He was trying to say that males and females have equal intelligence, but the male population has more variations and dispersion (hence volatility), with more highly unintelligent men, and more highly intelligent ones. For Summers, this explained why men were overrepresented in the scientific and intellectual community (and also why men were overrepresented in jails or failures). The number of successful scientists depends on the “tails,” the extremes, rather than the average. Just as an option does not care about the adverse outcomes, or an author does not care about the haters.

18.1.1 Derivations

Let the r.v. \( x \in [x_{\text{min}}, \infty) \) follow a Pareto distribution (type II), with expected return fixed at \( \mathbb{E}(x) = m \), tail exponent \( \alpha > 1 \), the density function

\[
p(x) = \frac{\alpha ((\alpha - 1)(m - x_{\text{min}}) - x_{\text{min}} + x)^{-\alpha - 1}}{(\alpha - 1)(m - x_{\text{min}})}
\]

We are dealing with a three parameter function, as the fatness of the tails is determined by both \( \alpha \) and \( m - x_{\text{min}} \), with \( m - x_{\text{min}} > 0 \) (since \( \alpha > 1 \)).

Note that with 7 billion humans, the one percent of the one percent represents 700,000 persons.

The same distribution applies to wealth and income (although with a different parametrization, including a lower \( \alpha \) as wealth is more unevenly distributed than income.)

Note that this analysis does not take into account the dynamics (and doesn’t need to): over time a different population will be at the top.

The Lorenz curve. Where \( F(x) \), short for \( P(X < x) \) is the cumulative distribution function and inverse \( F^{-1}(z) : [0,1] \rightarrow [x_{\text{min}}, \infty) \) the Lorenz function for \( z \) \( L(z) : [0,1] \rightarrow [0,1] \) is defined as:

\[
L(z) = \frac{\int_{0}^{z} F^{-1}(y)dy}{\int_{0}^{1} F^{-1}(y)dy}
\]

The distribution function

\[
F(x) = 1 - \left( 1 + \frac{x - x_{\text{min}}}{(\alpha - 1)(m - x_{\text{min}})} \right)^{-\alpha},
\]

so its inverse becomes:
18.1. THE ONE PERCENT OF THE ONE PERCENT ARE DIVORCED FROM THE REST

Hence

\[ L(z, \alpha, m, x_{\min}) = \frac{1}{m}(1-z)^{-1/\alpha} ((z-1)\alpha (m-x_{\min}) + (z-1)^{1/\alpha} (m(z + \alpha - z\alpha) + (z-1)\alpha x_{\min}) \]  

(18.1)

Which gives us different combination of \( \alpha \) and \( m - x_{\min} \), producing different tail shapes: some can have a strong “middle class” (or equivalent) while being top-heavy; others can have more equal inequality throughout.

18.1.2 Gini and Tail Expectation

The GINI Coefficient, \( \in [0,1] \) is the difference between 1) the perfect equality, with a Lorenz \( L(f) = f \) and 2) the observed \( L(z, \alpha, m, x_{\min}) \)

\[ \text{GINI}(\alpha, m, x_{\min}) = \frac{\alpha (m-x_{\min})}{(2\alpha-1) m} \]

Computing the tail mass above a threshold \( K \), that is, the unconditional partial expectation \( E_{>K} = \int_{K}^{\infty} x p(x) \, dx \), which corresponds to the nominal share of the total pie for those with wealth above \( K \),

\[ E_{>K} = (\alpha - 1)^{1-\alpha} (\alpha (K + m - x_{\min} - m) \left( \frac{m-x_{\min}}{K + (\alpha - 1)m - \alpha x_{\min}} \right)^{\alpha} \]

The Probability of exceeding \( K \), \( P_{>K} \) (Short for \( P(X > k) \))

\[ P_{>K} = \left( 1 + \frac{K - x_{\min}}{(\alpha - 1)(m - x_{\min})} \right)^{-\alpha} \]

For the One Percent of the One Percent (or equivalent), we set the probability \( P_{>K} \) and invert to \( K_{P} = (\alpha - 1)(m - x_{\min}) p^{-1/\alpha} - \alpha (1 + m + x_{\min}) \),

\[ E_{>K} = \left( p^{\frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha}} \right) \left( \alpha (m - x_{\min}) + p^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} (m - m\alpha + \alpha x_{\min}) \right) \]
\( E_{>K} \) for a constant \( m \).

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Chapter Summary 19: Explains why the fragile is necessarily in the nonlinear. Examines nonlinearities in medicine /iatrogenics as a risk management problem.

INCOMPLETE CHAPTER as of November 2013

Response

The main framework of broken glass: very nonlinear in response. We replace the Heavy-side with a continuous function in $C^\infty$.

Imagine different classes of coffee cups or fragile items that break as the dose increases, indexed by $\{\beta^i\}$ for their sigmoid of degree 1: the linearity in the left interval $(x_0, x_1]$, where $x$ is the dose and $S(.)$ the response, $S : \mathbb{R}^+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$. (Note that $\alpha = 1$; we keep $a$ (which determines the height) constant so all start at the same point $x_0$ and end at the same one $x_4$. Note that $c$ corresponds to the displacement to the right or the left on the dose-response line.

\[ S_{a,\beta^i,\gamma}(x) \equiv \frac{a}{e^{\beta^i(-(\gamma+x))} + 1} \]

The second derivative:

\[ \frac{\partial^2 S_{a,\beta^i,\gamma}(x)}{\partial x^2} = -2a\beta^2 \sinh^4 \left( \frac{1}{2}\beta(\gamma + x) \right) \cosh^3(\beta(\gamma + x)) \quad (19.1) \]

where $\sinh$ and $\cosh$ are the hyperbolic sine and cosine, respectively.
monomodal distribution with the expectation $\mathbb{E}(z) \in (x_0, x_1]$. We compose $f \circ S$ to get $f(S_{\alpha, \beta^t, \gamma}(x))$. In this case we pick a symmetric power law.

$$f_{\alpha, \sigma}(S_{\alpha, \beta^t, \gamma}(x)),$$

with $\alpha \in (1, \infty)$ and $\sigma \in (0, \infty)$

The objects will produce a probability distribution around $[0, 1]$ since $S_{\alpha, \beta^t, \gamma}(x)$ is bounded at these levels; we can see to the right a Dirac mass concentrating observations at 1. Clearly what has survived is the nonlinear.
19.1 Concavity of Health to Iatrogenics

Table 19.1: Concavity of Gains to Health Spending. Credit Edward Tufte

19.2 Antifragility from Uneven Distribution

Take health effect a function “response” from a single parameter, $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a twice differentiable, the effect from dose $x$.

If response $f$ is twice differentiable up to $x$, then $\frac{\partial^2 f(x)}{\partial x^2}$.
unevenness of distribution: episodic deprivation, intermittent fasting, variable pulmonary ventilation, uneven distribution of proteins (autophagy), vitamins, high intensity training, etc.).

In other words, in place of a dose x, one can give 140% of x, then 60% of x, with a more favorable outcome.

Proof: Jensen’s Inequality.
This is a simplification here since dose response is rarely monotone in its nonlinearity, as we will see further down.

Mixed Nonlinearities in Nature. Nonlinearities are not monotone.

Nonlinearities in Biology - The shape convex-concave necessarily flows from anything increasing (monotone, i.e. never decreasing) and bounded, with a maximum and a minimum values, i.e. never reached infinity from either side. At low levels, the dose response is convex (gradually more and more effective). Additional doses tend to become gradually ineffective or hurt. The same can apply to anything consumed in too much regularity. This type of graph necessarily applies to any situation bounded on both sides, with a known minimum and maximum (saturation), which includes happiness.

For instance, If one considers that there exists a maximum level of happiness and unhappiness then the general shape of this curve with convexity on the left and concavity on the right has to hold for happiness (replace “dose” with wealth and “response” with happiness). Kahneman-Tversky Prospect theory models a similar one for “utility” of changes in wealth, which they discovered empirically.

Iatrogenics. If \( \frac{\partial^2 f(x)}{\partial x^2} \leq 0 \) for all x (to simplify), and x is symmetrically distributed, then the distribution of the “outcome” from administration of f (and only the effect of \( \hat{\theta} \)) will be left skewed, as shown in Figure 1. Further, “known limited upside and unknown downside” to map the effect of the next figure.
19.2. ANTIfragility from Uneven Distribution

**Medical Iatrogenics:** Probability distribution of f. Case of small benefits and large Black Swan-style losses seen in probability space. Iatrogenics occur when we have small identifiable gains (say, avoidance of small discomfort or a minor infection) and exposure to Black Swans with delayed invisible large side effects (say, death). These concave benefits from medicine are just like selling a financial option (plenty of risk) against small tiny immediate gains while claiming “evidence of no harm”.

In short, for a healthy person, there is a small probability of disastrous outcomes (discounted because unseen and not taken into account), and a high probability of mild benefits.

**Proof:** Convex transformation of a random variable, the Fragility Transfer Theorem.

In time series space:

**Mother Nature v/s Medicine. The hypertension example.** On the vertical axis, we have benefits of a treatment, on the horizontal, the severity of the condition. The arrow points at the level where probabilistic gains match probabilistic harm. Iatrogenics disappear nonlinearly as a function of the severity of the condition. This implies that when the patient is very ill, the distribution shifts to antifragile (thicker right tail), with large benefits from the treatment over possible iatrogenics, little to lose.

Note that if you increase the treatment you hit concavity from maximum benefits, a zone not covered in the graph — seen more broadly, it would look like the graph of bounded upside.

From Antifragile:

Second principle of iatrogenics: it is not linear. We should be taking risks with...
Why do we need to focus treatment on more serious cases, not marginal ones? Take this example showing nonlinearity (convexity). When hypertension is mild, say marginally higher than the zone accepted as “normotensive,” the chance of benefiting from a certain drug is close to 5.6 percent (only one person in eighteen benefit from the treatment). But when blood pressure is considered to be in the “high” or “severe” range, the chances of benefiting are now 26 and 72 percent, respectively (that is, one person in four and two persons out of three will benefit from the treatment). So the treatment benefits are convex to condition (the benefits rise disproportionally, in an accelerated manner). But consider that the iatrogenics should be constant for all categories! In the very ill condition, the benefits are large relative to iatrogenics; in the borderline one, they are small. This means that we need to focus on high-symptom conditions and ignore, I mean really ignore, other situations in which the patient is not very ill.

The argument here is based on the structure of conditional survival probabilities, similar to the one that we used to prove that harm needs to be nonlinear for porcelain cups. Consider that Mother Nature had to have tinkered through selection in inverse proportion to the rarity of the condition. Of the hundred and twenty thousand drugs available today, I can hardly find a via positiva one that makes a healthy person unconditionally “better” (and if someone shows me one, I will be skeptical of yet-unseen side effects). Once in a while we come up with drugs that enhance performance, such as, say, steroids, only to discover what people in finance have known for a while: in a “mature” market there is no free lunch anymore, and what appears as a free lunch has a hidden risk. When you think you have found a free lunch, say, steroids or trans fat, something that helps the healthy without visible downside, it is most likely that there is a concealed trap somewhere. Actually, my days in trading, it was called a “sucker’s trade.”

And there is a simple statistical reason that explains why we have not been able to find drugs that make us feel unconditionally better when we are well (or unconditionally stronger, etc.): nature would have been likely to find this magic pill by itself. But consider that illness is rare, and the more ill the person the less likely nature would have found the solution by itself, in an accelerating way. A condition that is, say, three units of deviation away from the norm is more than three hundred times rarer than normal; an illness that is five units of deviation from the norm is more than a million times rarer! The medical community has not modeled such nonlinearity of benefits to iatrogenics, and if they do so in words, I have not seen it formalized in papers, hence into a decision-making methodology that takes probability into account (as we will see in the next section, there is little explicit use of convexity biases). Even risks seem to be linearly extrapolated, causing both underestimation and overestimation, most certainly miscalculation of degrees of harm—for instance, a paper on the effect of radiation states the following: “The standard model currently in use applies a linear scale, extrapolating cancer risk from high doses to low doses of ionizing radiation.” Further, pharmaceutical companies are under financial pressures to find diseases and satisfy the security analysts. They have been scraping the bottom of the barrel, looking for disease among healthier and healthier people, lobbying for reclassifications of conditions, and fine-tuning sales tricks to get doctors to overprescribe. Now, if your blood pressure is in the upper part of the range that used to be called “normal,” you are no longer “normotensive” but “pre-hypertensive,” even if there are no symptoms in view. There is nothing wrong with the classification if it leads to healthier lifestyle and robust via negativa.
medication.
CHAPTER 19. WHY IS THE FRAGILE NONLINEAR?


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